What response times tell of children's behavior on the balance scale task

Analysis of accuracy of responses to balance scale problems gives a global idea of the cognitive processes that underlie problem-solving behavior on this task. We show that response times (RTs) provide additional detailed information about the kind and duration of these processes. We derive predictions about the RTs from Siegler's (1981) model for the balance scale task, including the counterintuitive prediction that young adults are slower than children in solving particular balance scale problems. The predictions were tested in a study in which 191 6- to 22-year-old participants were presented with a computerized balance scale task. RTs were analyzed with regression models. In addition to qualitative differences between items, we also modeled quantitative differences between items in the regression models. Analyses supported the predictions and provided additional knowledge on the rules. Rule II was reformulated as a rule that always involves the encoding, but not always the correct application of the distance cue. RTs provided evidence for the use of a buggy-rule and not an addition-rule. Finally, a relation between rule inconsistency and increased RT was found.     

Delusion‐proneness or miscomprehension? A re‐examination of the jumping‐to‐conclusions bias

Previous research has consistently shown that individuals with delusions typically exhibit a jumping‐to‐conclusions (JTC) bias when administrated the probabilistic reasoning ‘beads task’ (i.e., decisions made on limited evidence and/or decisions over‐adjusted in light of disconfirming evidence). However, recent work in this area has indicated that a lack of comprehension of the task may be confounding this finding. The purpose of the present study was to evaluate the influence of task administration, delusion‐proneness, and miscomprehension on the elucidation of the JTC bias. A total of 92 undergraduate university students were divided into one of two task conditions (i.e., non‐computerised and computerised) and were further identified as either delusion‐prone or non‐delusion‐prone and as comprehending or non‐comprehending the task. Overall, 25% of the sample demonstrated a JTC bias, and just over half made illogical responses consistent with a failure to comprehend the task. Qualitative evidence of comprehension revealed that these ‘illogical responses’ were being driven by a misunderstanding of task instructions. The way the task was administrated and levels of delusion‐proneness did not significantly influence JTC. However, miscomprehending participants were significantly more likely to exhibit the bias than those who did comprehend. These results suggest that miscomprehension rather than delusion‐proneness may be driving the JTC bias, and that future research should include measures of miscomprehension.     

Perspective-taking and depth of theory-of-mind reasoning in sequential-move games

Theory-of-mind (ToM) involves modeling an individual's mental states to plan one's action and to anticipate others' actions through recursive reasoning that may be myopic (with limited recursion) or predictive (with full recursion). ToM recursion was examined using a series of two-player, sequential-move matrix games with a maximum of three steps. Participants were assigned the role of Player I, controlling the initial and the last step, or of Player II, controlling the second step. Appropriate for the assigned role, participants either anticipated or planned Player II's strategy at the second step, and then determined Player I's optimal strategy at the first step. Participants more readily used predictive reasoning as Player II (i.e., planning one's own move) than as Player I (i.e., anticipating an opponent's move), although they did not differ when translating reasoning outcome about the second step to optimal action in the first step. Perspective-taking influenced likelihood of predictive reasoning, but it did not affect the rate at which participants acquired it during the experimental block. We conclude that the depth of ToM recursion (related to perspective-taking mechanisms) and rational application of belief-desire to action (instrumental rationality) constitute separate cognitive processes in ToM reasoning.     

The development of causal categorization

Two experiments examined the impact of causal relations between features on categorization in 5- to 6-year-old children and adults. Participants learned artificial categories containing instances with causally related features and noncausal features. They then selected the most likely category member from a series of novel test pairs. Classification patterns and logistic regression were used to diagnose the presence of independent effects of causal coherence, causal status, and relational centrality. Adult classification was driven primarily by coherence when causal links were deterministic (Experiment 1) but showed additional influences of causal status when links were probabilistic (Experiment 2). Children's classification was based primarily on causal coherence in both cases. There was no effect of relational centrality in either age group. These results suggest that the generative model (Rehder, 2003a) provides a good account of causal categorization in children as well as adults.     

Deontic and epistemic reasoning in children

It is widely accepted that adults show an advantage for deontic over epistemic reasoning. Two published studies (Cummins, 1996b; Harris and Núñez, 1996, Experiment 4) found evidence of this “deontic advantage” in preschool-aged children and are frequently cited as evidence that preschoolers show the same deontic advantage as adults. However, neither study has been replicated, and it is not clear from either study that preschoolers were showing the deontic advantage under the same conditions as adults. The current research investigated these issues. Experiment 1 attempted to replicate both Cummins’s and Harris and Núñez’s studies with 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 56), replicating the former with 4-year-olds and the latter with both 3- and 4-year-olds. Experiment 2 modified Cummins’s task to remove the contextual differences between conditions, making it more similar to adult tasks, finding that 4-year-olds (n = 16) show no evidence of the deontic advantage when no authority figure is present in the deontic condition, whereas both 7-year-olds (n = 16) and adults (n = 28) do. Experiment 3 removed the authority figure from the deontic condition in Harris and Núñez’s task, again finding that 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 28) show no evidence of the deontic advantage under these conditions. These results suggest that for preschoolers, the deontic advantage is reliant on particular contextual cues such as the presence of an authority figure, in the deontic condition. By 7 years of age, however, children are reasoning like adults and show evidence of the advantage when no such contextual cues are present.     

A group construal account of drop-in-the-bucket thinking in policy preference and moral judgment

Decisions, both moral and mundane, about saving individuals or resources at risk are often influenced not only by numbers saved and lost, but also by proportions of groups saved and lost. Consider choosing between a program that saves 60 of 240 lives at risk and one that saves 50 of 100. The first option maximizes absolute number saved; the second, proportion saved. In two studies, we show that the influence of proportions on such decisions depends on how items at risk are mentally represented. In particular, we show that proportions have greater influence on people's decisions to the extent that the items at risk are construed as forming groups, as opposed to distinct individuals. Construal was manipulated by means of animated displays in which resources at risk moved either independently (promoting individual construal) or jointly (promoting group construal). Results support the hypothesis that (a) decision makers form mental representations which vary in the degree to which resources at risk are construed as groups versus individuals and (b) construal of resources as groups promotes the influence of proportions on decisions and moral judgments.     

Fundamental Beliefs,Origin Explanations and Perceived Effectiveness of Protection Measures: Exploring Laypersons' Chains of Reasoning About Influenza

Laypersons' chains of reasoning in explaining recent influenza outbreaks are investigated. Drawing on social representations theory, fundamental worldviews, that is, the belief in a dangerous world (BDW), are postulated to anchor explanations of disease origins, which in turn affect perceived effectiveness of protection measures. Our study, based on a longitudinal survey among the general public in Switzerland, showed that the lower people's BDW scores, the more they appeal to natural origins to explain outbreaks and the more they perceive official protection measures as effective. The higher people's BDW scores, the more they explain outbreaks via hygienic origins, which are linked with out‐group discrimination measures, and conspiracy origins, which are linked with lower perceived effectiveness of aid intervention measures. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of self–other decision-making on time-based intertemporal choice

The effects of self–other decision-making on intertemporal choice have been revealed in many studies using a monetary outcome. However, the outcome of intertemporal choice is not restricted to money; time is also a scarce and nonrenewable resource outcome. Thus, we conducted a series of experiments to address the effects of self–other decision-making on time-based intertemporal choice, a type of intertemporal choice that uses time as an outcome. Over the course of three experiments, differences in self–other decision-making were evidenced. Participants who made decisions for others were more likely to prefer the smaller but sooner (SS) option over the larger but later (LL) option and considered the gain of the SS option to be significantly greater than that of the LL option. Participants who made decisions for themselves were likely to prefer the LL option over the SS option. However, they considered the gains of the LL and the SS option to be indifferent. Changing the role of decision-making could affect the ability of individuals to consider the future consequences of their decisions. The effects of self–other decision-making on time-based intertemporal choice could be explained by the accounts of economic reasoning and construal level theory. The findings indicated that the effects of self–other decision-making on time-based intertemporal choice, which could be generated simply by rewording questions, can help individuals make optimal long-term choices without the need for increased control.     

Singular Clues to Causality and Their Use in Human Causal Judgment

It is argued that causal understanding originates in experiences of acting on objects. Such experiences have consistent features that can be used as clues to causal identification and judgment. These are singular clues, meaning that they can be detected in single instances. A catalog of 14 singular clues is proposed. The clues function as heuristics for generating causal judgments under uncertainty and are a pervasive source of bias in causal judgment. More sophisticated clues such as mechanism clues and repeated interventions are derived from the 14. Research on the use of empirical information and conditional probabilities to identify causes has used scenarios in which several of the clues are present, and the use of empirical association information for causal judgment depends on the presence of singular clues. It is the singular clues and their origin that are basic to causal understanding, not multiple instance clues such as empirical association, contingency, and conditional probabilities.     

A neural cognitive model of argumentation with application to legal inference and decision making

Formal models of argumentation have been investigated in several areas, from multi-agent systems and artificial intelligence (AI) to decision making, philosophy and law. In artificial intelligence, logic-based models have been the standard for the representation of argumentative reasoning. More recently, the standard logic-based models have been shown equivalent to standard connectionist models. This has created a new line of research where (i) neural networks can be used as a parallel computational model for argumentation and (ii) neural networks can be used to combine argumentation, quantitative reasoning and statistical learning. At the same time, non-standard logic models of argumentation started to emerge. In this paper, we propose a connectionist cognitive model of argumentation that accounts for both standard and non-standard forms of argumentation. The model is shown to be an adequate framework for dealing with standard and non-standard argumentation, including joint-attacks, argument support, ordered attacks, disjunctive attacks, meta-level attacks, self-defeating attacks, argument accrual and uncertainty. We show that the neural cognitive approach offers an adequate way of modelling all of these different aspects of argumentation. We have applied the framework to the modelling of a public prosecution charging decision as part of a real legal decision making case study containing many of the above aspects of argumentation. The results show that the model can be a useful tool in the analysis of legal decision making, including the analysis of what-if questions and the analysis of alternative conclusions. The approach opens up two new perspectives in the short-term: the use of neural networks for computing prevailing arguments efficiently through the propagation in parallel of neuronal activations, and the use of the same networks to evolve the structure of the argumentation network through learning (e.g. to learn the strength of arguments from data).