空间推理的脑机制：一项ERP研究

记录14名正常成人完成四种空间推理及一种基线任务（记忆任务）时的事件相关电位,对空间推理的脑电活动情况进行考察。研究结果表明,在200ms-900ms窗口,推理任务比基线任务诱发更大的正成分。对不同推理任务的比较表明,具体与抽象材料的单模型推理诱发相似的波形;单模型与有效的双模型任务诱发的ERP成分明显不同,在300ms-600ms窗口,后者比前者诱发更大的正波;在200-600ms时间窗口,存在有效结论与无有效结论的双模型问题也诱发明显不同的ERP波形。研究的结果表明,推理与记忆涉及不同的加工要求,推理需要整合前提的信息,而记忆只需要储存前提信息。在解决双模型推理问题时,从200ms开始,被试就对刺激材料进行初步的加工与判断,随后对双模型问题采用有注解的单模型加工策略。另外,不同材料的空间推理任务之间的波形较为一致,表明视觉表象并未明显影响空间推理过程。     

Majority merging by adaptive counting

The present paper introduces a belief merging procedure by majority using the standard format of Adaptive Logics. The core structure of the logic ADM ^c (Adaptive Doxastic Merging by Counting) consists in the formulation of the conflicts arising from the belief bases of the agents involved in the procedure. A strategy is then defined both semantically and proof-theoretically which selects the consistent contents answering to a majority principle. The results obtained are proven to be equivalent to a standard majority operator for bases with partial support.     

条件推理的条件概率模型述评

该文从理论模型和实验范式两个方面对Oaksford等人提出的条件推理概率模型作了综合评述,并充分肯定该模型将演绎推理与归纳推理结合起来进行研究对推理心理学的发展所作出的重要贡献。     

条件推理中的二元效应初探

通过预备实验选取前件(或后件)是二元(或多元)的5种条件命题的4种推理形式作为实验材料,以大学本科生为被试,考察了五种不同条件命题类型对4种推理结果的影响.结果表明命题类型、推理规则以及两者的交互作用都非常显著.这个结果进一步验证了条件推理的集合映射模型.     

Can an agent's false belief be corrected by an appropriate communication? Psychological reasoning in 18-month-old infants

Do 18-month-olds understand that an agent's false belief can be corrected by an appropriate, though not an inappropriate, communication? In Experiment 1, infants watched a series of events involving two agents, a ball, and two containers: a box and a cup. To start, agent1 played with the ball and then hid it in the box, while agent2 looked on. Next, in agent1's absence, agent2 moved the ball from the box to the cup. When agent1 returned, agent2 told her "The ball is in the cup!" (informative-intervention condition) or "I like the cup!" (uninformative-intervention condition). During test, agent1 reached for either the box (box event) or the cup (cup event). In the informative-intervention condition, infants who saw the box event looked reliably longer than those who saw the cup event; in the uninformative-intervention condition, the reverse pattern was found. These results suggest that infants expected agent1's false belief about the ball's location to be corrected when she was told "The ball is in the cup!", but not "I like the cup!". In Experiment 2, agent2 simply pointed to the ball's new location, and infants again expected agent1's false belief to be corrected. These and control results provide additional evidence that infants in the second year of life can attribute false beliefs to agents. In addition, the results suggest that by 18 months of age infants expect agents' false beliefs to be corrected by relevant communications involving words or gestures.     

The psychology of meta-ethics: exploring objectivism

How do lay individuals think about the objectivity of their ethical beliefs? Do they regard them as factual and objective, or as more subjective and opinion-based, and what might predict such differences? In three experiments, we set out a methodology for assessing the perceived objectivity of ethical beliefs, and use it to document several novel findings. Experiment 1 showed that individuals tend to regard ethical statements as clearly more objective than social conventions and tastes, and almost as objective as scientific facts. Yet, there was considerable variation in objectivism, both across different ethical statements, and across individuals. The extent to which individuals treat ethical beliefs as objective was predicted by the way they grounded their ethical systems. Groundings which emphasize the religious, pragmatic, and self-identity underpinnings of ethical belief each independently predicted greater ethical objectivity. Experiment 2 replicated and extended these findings with a refined measure of ethical objectivism. Experiment 3 demonstrated the robustness of the religious grounding of ethics, and differentiates it from mere religious belief and from political orientation. The results shed light on the nature of ethical belief, and have implications for the resolution of ethical disputes.     

Sample diversity and premise typicality in inductive reasoning: evidence for developmental change

Evaluating whether a limited sample of evidence provides a good basis for induction is a critical cognitive task. We hypothesized that whereas adults evaluate the inductive strength of samples containing multiple pieces of evidence by attending to the relations among the exemplars (e.g., sample diversity), six-year-olds would attend to the degree to which each individual exemplar in a sample independently appears informative (e.g., premise typicality). To test these hypotheses, participants were asked to select between diverse and non-diverse samples to help them learn about basic-level animal categories. Across various between-subject conditions (N=133), we varied the typicality present in the diverse and non-diverse samples. We found that adults reliably selected to examine diverse over non-diverse samples, regardless of exemplar typicality, six-year-olds preferred to examine samples containing typical exemplars, regardless of sample diversity, and nine-year-olds were somewhat in the midst of this developmental transition.     

Optimal Predictions in Everyday Cognition: The Wisdom of Individuals or Crowds?

Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2006) asked individuals to make predictions about the duration or extent of everyday events (e.g., cake baking times), and reported that predictions were optimal, employing Bayesian inference based on veridical prior distributions. Although the predictions conformed strikingly to statistics of the world, they reflect averages over many individuals. On the conjecture that the accuracy of the group response is chiefly a consequence of aggregating across individuals, we constructed simple, heuristic approximations to the Bayesian model premised on the hypothesis that individuals have access merely to a sample of k instances drawn from the relevant distribution. The accuracy of the group response reported by Griffiths and Tenenbaum could be accounted for by supposing that individuals each utilize only two instances. Moreover, the variability of the group data is more consistent with this small-sample hypothesis than with the hypothesis that people utilize veridical or nearly veridical representations of the underlying prior distributions. Our analyses lead to a qualitatively different view of how individuals reason from past experience than the view espoused by Griffiths and Tenenbaum.     

Reward Systems,Moral Reasoning,and Internal Auditors’ Reporting Wrongdoing

This study investigates the issue of whistle-blowing behavior that results from internal auditors discovering company wrongdoing in the process of preparing financial information. An experiment was conducted to examine whether reward systems such as cash incentives or employment contracts have an impact on auditors’ disclosing wrongdoing behavior. The results indicate that internal auditors are more likely to report wrongdoing to higher authorities when incentives are provided, suggesting reward systems have a positive effect on disclosing company’s wrongdoing or even fraud. In addition, the result reveals that internal auditors with lower levels of moral reasoning are more sensitive to cash incentives.     

The public's probabilistic numeracy: How tasks,education and exposure to games of chance shape it

As we navigate a world full of uncertainties and risks, dominated by statistics, we need to be able to think statistically. Very few studies investigating people's ability to understand simple concepts and rules from probability theory have drawn representative samples from the public. For this reason we investigated a representative sample of 1000 Swiss citizens, using six probabilistic problems. Most reasoned appropriately in problems representing pure applications of probability theory, but failed to do so in approximations of real‐world scenarios – a disparity we replicated in a sample of first‐year psychology students. Additionally, education is associated with probabilistic numeracy in the former but not the latter type of problems. We discuss possible reasons for these task disparities and suggest that gaining a comprehensive picture of citizens' probabilistic competence and its determinants requires using both types of tasks. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.