Expertise in soccer teams: A thematic inquiry into the role of Shared Mental Models within team chemistry

AimsThe purpose of the current study was to establish a conceptual framework of team chemistry components in sport with an emphasis on Shared Mental Models (SMM).MethodElite soccer coaches (n = 6) and players (n = 3) were interviewed using a semi-structured interview guide. An inductive thematic analysis was employed to analyze the data.ResultsFour themes related to team chemistry components were identified: (1) members' characteristics (i.e., demographic data, on-field characteristics, and member's ego), (2) coach–players interactions (i.e., professional interaction and emotional intelligence of coaches), (3) interactions among the players (i.e., professional understanding, efficacy beliefs, team cohesion, players' emotional intelligence, team roles, and goals), and (4) interactions with environmental factors (i.e., owners, management, fans, and media).ConclusionsThe cognitive components of the team chemistry model were clustered to establish a conceptual framework of SMM. Furthermore, the cognitive-affective-social-behavioral linkage of team chemistry and athletic performance is examined in light of the emerged model and conceptual framework. Implications and future directions are also discussed.     

Instructor and student knowledge of study strategies

Students' self-reported study skills and beliefs are often inconsistent with empirically supported (ES) study strategies. However, little is known regarding instructors' beliefs about study skills and if such beliefs differ from those of students. In the current study, we surveyed college students' and instructors' knowledge of study strategies and had both groups evaluate the efficacy of learning strategies described in six learning scenarios. Results from the survey indicated that students frequently reported engaging in methods of studying that were not optimal for learning. Instructors' responses to the survey indicated that they endorsed a number of effective study skills but also held several beliefs inconsistent with research in learning and memory (e.g., learning styles). Further, results from the learning scenarios measure indicated that instructors were moderately more likely than students to endorse ES learning strategies. Collectively, these data suggest that instructors exhibited better knowledge of effective study skills than students, although the difference was small. We discuss several notable findings and argue for the improvement of both students' and instructors' study skill knowledge.     

Tool use in left brain damage and Alzheimer's disease: What about function and manipulation knowledge?

Tool use disorders are usually associated with difficulties in retrieving function and manipulation knowledge. Here, we investigate tool use (Real Tool Use, RTU), function (Functional Association, FA) and manipulation knowledge (Gesture Recognition, GR) in 17 left‐brain‐damaged (LBD) patients and 14 AD patients (Alzheimer disease). LBD group exhibited predicted deficit on RTU but not on FA and GR while AD patients showed deficits on GR and FA with preserved tool use skills. These findings question the role played by function and manipulation knowledge in actual tool use.     

The Normativity of Meaning: Guidance and Justification

Abstract

The thesis that meaning is normative has come under much scrutiny of late. However, there are aspects of the view that have received comparatively little critical attention which centre on meaning’s capacity to guide and justify linguistic action. Call such a view ‘justification normativity’ (JN). I outline Zalabardo’s (1997) account of JN and his corresponding argument against reductive-naturalistic meaning-factualism and argue that the argument presents a genuine challenge to account for the guiding role of meaning in linguistic action. I then present a proposal regarding how this challenge may be met. This proposal is then compared to recent work by Ginsborg (2011; 2012), who has outlined an alternative view of the normativity of meaning that explicitly rejects the idea that meanings guide and justify linguistic use. I outline how Ginsborg utilises this notion of normativity in order to provide a positive account of what it is to mean something by an expression which is intended to serve as a response to Kripke’s semantic sceptic. Finally, I argue that Ginsborg’s response to the sceptic is unsatisfactory, and that, insofar as it is able to preserve our intuitive view of meaning’s capacity to guide linguistic action, my proposal is to be preferred.     

Do details bug you? Effects of perceptual richness in learning about biological change

People often have difficulty in understanding processes of biological change, and they typically reject drastic life cycle changes such as metamorphosis, except for animals with which they are familiar. Even after a lesson about metamorphosis, people often do not generalize to animals not seen during the lesson. This might be partially due to the perceptual richness of the diagrams typically used during lessons on metamorphosis, which serves to emphasize the individual animal rather than a class of animals. In two studies, we examined whether the perceptual richness of a diagram influences adults' learning and transfer of knowledge about metamorphosis. One study was conducted in a laboratory setting, and the other was online. In both studies, adults who saw the bland diagram during the lesson accurately transferred more than adults who saw the rich diagram during the lesson.     

A Proposal for the Demarcation of Theory and Knowledge

Research communication in interdisciplinary research projects requires a way of demarcation of theory and knowledge that is easy to communicate, is inconsequential for the framework of concepts, results, and procedures within existing scientific disciplines, and abstains from trying to resolve the dispute between (neo)positivists and constructivists. A simple way of demarcation starts from the notion of language-independent and language-dependent reality. Currently, what passes for knowledge (“news”) and myth (“fake news”) depends, besides on sheer volume and frequency of the messages, increasingly on the internal consistency of (computer) language-dependent reality and decreasingly on language-independent reality. All language is instruction, and knowledge is to know which instructions (that is, theory) are predictive of a result, state, or situation in language-independent reality. Any theory that doesn’t reduce outcome space, or contains one or more empirically/physically impossible instructions, or produces wrong predictions, or falls short of demonstration is not knowledge.     

On the empirical indistinguishability of knowledge structures

In recent years a number of articles have focused on the identifiability of the basic local independence model. The identifiability issue usually concerns two model parameter sets predicting an identical probability distribution on the response patterns. Both parameter sets are applied to the same knowledge structure. However, nothing is known about cases where different knowledge structures predict the same probability distribution. This situation is referred to as ʻempirical indistinguishabilityʼ between two structures and is the main subject of the present paper. Empirical indistinguishability is a stronger form of unidentifiability, which involves not only the parameters, but also the structural and combinatorial properties of the model. In particular, as far as knowledge structures are concerned, a consequence of empirical indistinguishability is that the existence of certain knowledge states cannot be empirically established. Most importantly, it is shown that model identifiability cannot guarantee that a certain knowledge structure is empirically distinguishable from others. The theoretical findings are exemplified in a number of different empirical scenarios.     

On the assessment of procedural knowledge: From problem spaces to knowledge spaces

By generalizing and completing the work initiated by Stefanutti and Albert (2003, Journal of Universal Computer Science, 9, 1455), this article provides the mathematical foundations of a theoretical approach whose primary goal is to construct a bridge between problem solving, as initially conceived by Newell and Simon (1972, Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.), and knowledge assessment (Doignon and Falmagne, 1985, International Journal of Man-Machine Studies, 23, 175; Doignon and Falmagne, 1999, Knowledge spaces. Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag.; Falmagne et al., 2013, Knowledge spaces: Applications in education. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag; Falmagne and Doignon, 2011, Learning spaces: Interdisciplinary applied mathematics. Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag.). It is shown that the collection of all possible knowledge states for a given problem space is a learning space. An algorithm for deriving a learning space from a problem space is illustrated. As an example, the algorithm is used to derive the learning space of a neuropsychological test whose problem space is well known: the Tower of London (TOL; Shallice, 1982, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 298, 199). The derived learning space could then be used for adaptively assessing individual planning skills with the TOL.