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51.
Caterina Primi Maria Anna Donati Francesca Chiesi Kinga Morsanyi 《Thinking & reasoning》2018,24(2):258-279
ABSTRACTCognitive reflection is recognized as an important skill, which is necessary for making advantageous decisions. Even though gender differences in the Cognitive Reflection test (CRT) appear to be robust across multiple studies, little research has examined the source of the gender gap in performance. In Study 1, we tested the invariance of the scale across genders. In Study 2, we investigated the role of math anxiety, mathematical reasoning, and gender in CRT performance. The results attested the measurement equivalence of the Cognitive Reflection Test – Long (CRT- L), when administered to male and female students. Additionally, the results of the mediation analysis showed an indirect effect of gender on CRT-L performance through mathematical reasoning and math anxiety. The direct effect of gender was no longer statistically significant after accounting for the other variables. The current findings suggest that cognitive reflection is affected by numerical skills and related feelings. 相似文献
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53.
Autonomic and subjective responsivity to emotional images in people with dissociative seizures 下载免费PDF全文
People with dissociative seizures (DS) report a range of difficulties in emotional functioning and exhibit altered responding to emotional facial expressions in experimental tasks. We extended this research by investigating subjective and autonomic reactivity (ratings of emotional valence, arousal and skin conductance responses [SCRs]) to general emotional images in 39 people with DS relative to 42 healthy control participants, whilst controlling for anxiety, depression, cognitive functioning and, where relevant, medication use. It was predicted that greater subjective negativity and arousal and increased SCRs in response to the affective pictures would be observed in the DS group. The DS group as a whole did not differ from controls in their subjective responses of valence and arousal. However, SCR amplitudes were greater in ‘autonomic responders’ with DS relative to ‘autonomic responders’ in the control group. A positive correlation was also observed between SCRs for highly arousing negative pictures and self‐reported ictal autonomic arousal, in DS ‘autonomic responders’. In the DS subgroup of autonomic ‘non‐responders’, differences in subjective responses were observed for some conditions, compared to control ‘non‐responders’. The findings indicate unaffected subjective responses to emotional images in people with DS overall. However, within the group of people with DS, there may be subgroups characterized by differences in emotional responding. One subgroup (i.e., ‘autonomic responders’) exhibit heightened autonomic responses but intact subjective emotional experience, whilst another subgroup (i.e., ‘autonomic non‐responders’) seem to experience greater subjective negativity and arousal for some emotional stimuli, despite less frequent autonomic reactions. The current results suggest that therapeutic interventions targeting awareness and regulation of physiological arousal and subjective emotional experience could be of value in some people with this disorder. 相似文献
54.
Fundamental failure to think logically about scientific questions: An illustration of tunnel vision with the application of Wason's Card Selection Test to criminal evidence 下载免费PDF全文
Eric Rassin 《Applied cognitive psychology》2018,32(4):506-511
Logic and science are in some respects fundamentally different disciplines, in that for example, application of rules of logic can yield conclusions that are at odds with physical reality. Not surprisingly, people have ample difficulty with logical thinking. Nonetheless, in some instances, logical thinking can fuel empirical decision making. In the current research, it was established that applying rules of logic to a particular area of empirical decision making, that is, criminal fact finding, is indeed quite difficult (Study 1). Furthermore, the ability to think logically was found to be associated with superior evaluation of criminal evidence (Study 2). Implications of these findings are discussed. 相似文献
55.
Salience Versus Proportional Reasoning: Rethinking the Mechanism Behind Graphical Display Effects 下载免费PDF全文
Two experiments examined predictions from two separate explanations for previously observed display effects for communicating low‐probability risks: foreground:background salience and proportional reasoning. According to foreground:background salience, people's risk perceptions are based on the relative salience of the foreground (number of people harmed) versus the background (number of people at risk), such that calling attention to the background makes the risk seem smaller. Conversely, the proportional reasoning explanation states that what matters is whether the respondent attends to the proportion, which conveys how small the risk is. In Experiment 1, we made the background more salient via color and bolding; in contrast to the foreground:background salience prediction, this manipulation did not influence participants' risk aversion. In Experiment 2, we separately manipulated whether the foreground and the background were displayed graphically or numerically. In keeping with the proportional reasoning hypothesis, there was an interaction whereby participants given formats that displayed the foreground and background in the same modality (graphs or numbers, thereby making the proportion easier to form) saw the probability as smaller and were less risk averse than participants given the information in different modalities. There was also a main effect of displaying the background graphically, providing some support for foreground:background salience. In total, this work suggests that the proportional reasoning account provides a good explanation of many display effects related to communicating low‐probability risks, although there is some role for foreground:background salience as well. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
56.
In this study, Knauff and Johnson‐Laird's (2002) visual impedance hypothesis (i.e., mental representations with irrelevant visual detail can impede reasoning) is applied to the domain of external representations and diagrammatic reasoning. We show that the use of real objects and augmented real (AR) objects can control human interpretation and reasoning about conditionals. As participants made inferences (e.g., an invalid one from "if P then Q" to "P"), they also moved objects corresponding to premises. Participants who moved real objects made more invalid inferences than those who moved AR objects and those who did not manipulate objects (there was no significant difference between the last two groups). Our results showed that real objects impeded conditional reasoning, but AR objects did not. These findings are explained by the fact that real objects may over‐specify a single state that exists, while AR objects suggest multiple possibilities. 相似文献
57.
Mimicry and Investigative Interviewing: Using Deliberate Mimicry to Elicit Information and Cues to Deceit 下载免费PDF全文
Dominic J. Shaw Aldert Vrij Sharon Leal Samantha Mann Jackie Hillman Pär Anders Granhag Ronald P. Fisher 《Journal of Investigative Psychology & Offender Profiling》2015,12(3):217-230
We examined the effect of deliberate mimicry on eliciting (accurate) information and cues to deceit. Mimicry is considered to facilitate cooperation and compliance in truth tellers, whereas liars are constrained to provide detail. We therefore expected truth tellers to be more detailed than liars, particularly after being mimicked. A total of 165 participants told the truth or lied about a meeting they attended. During the interview, an interviewer mimicked half of the participants. Truth tellers were more detailed than liars, but only in the ‘mimicry present’ condition. Truth tellers also gave more accurate units of information than liars, and the difference was most pronounced in the ‘mimicry present’ condition. Mimicry as a tool for eliciting information and cues to deceit fits well with the emerging ‘interviewing to detect deception’ literature, particularly in the ‘encouraging interviewees to say more’ approach. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
58.
Accusations of hypocrisy have flown against both supporters and opponents of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) and Tea Party movements. Integrating the ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM), a newly devised model of political judgment, with political tolerance research, we find that how the political activities of OWS and Tea Party demonstrators are described determines whether or not biases against these groups emerge among people low and high in right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA). Specifically, people low in RWA were more biased against the Tea Party than OWS regardless of whether the groups engaged in normatively threatening or reassuring political behavior, whereas people high in RWA were more biased against OWS than the Tea Party when the groups engaged in normatively threatening (and therefore objectionable), but not normatively reassuring (and therefore acceptable) behavior. These findings further support the IOPM's contention that premise objectionableness, not right‐wing orientation, determines biases in political judgment. 相似文献
59.
The Wished‐For Always Wins Until the Winner Was Inevitable All Along: Motivated Reasoning and Belief Bias Regulate Emotion During Elections 下载免费PDF全文
Paul Thibodeau Matthew M. Peebles Daniel J. Grodner Frank H. Durgin 《Political psychology》2015,36(4):431-448
How do biases affect political information processing? A variant of the Wason selection task, which tests for confirmation bias, was used to characterize how the dynamics of the recent U.S. presidential election affected how people reasoned about political information. Participants were asked to evaluate pundit‐style conditional claims like “The incumbent always wins in a year when unemployment drops” either immediately before or immediately after the 2012 presidential election. A three‐way interaction between ideology, predicted winner (whether the proposition predicted that Obama or Romney would win), and the time of test indicated complex effects of bias on reasoning. Before the election, there was partial evidence of motivated reasoning—liberals performed especially well at looking for falsifying information when the pundit's claim predicted Romney would win. After the election, once the outcome was known, there was evidence of a belief bias—people sought to falsify claims that were inconsistent with the real‐world outcome rather than their ideology. These results suggest that people seek to implicitly regulate emotion when reasoning about political predictions. Before elections, people like to think their preferred candidate will win. After elections, people like to think the winner was inevitable all along. 相似文献
60.
Causal Networks or Causal Islands? The Representation of Mechanisms and the Transitivity of Causal Judgment 下载免费PDF全文
Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be related even when they belong to the same causal chain. To distinguish these possibilities, we tested whether people make transitive judgments about causal chains by inferring, given A causes B and B causes C, that A causes C. Specifically, causal chains schematized as one chunk or mechanism in semantic memory (e.g., exercising, becoming thirsty, drinking water) led to transitive causal judgments. On the other hand, chains schematized as multiple chunks (e.g., having sex, becoming pregnant, becoming nauseous) led to intransitive judgments despite strong intermediate links ((Experiments 1–3). Normative accounts of causal intransitivity could not explain these intransitive judgments (Experiments 4 and 5). 相似文献