Exploring memory in infancy: deferred imitation and the development of declarative memory

Imitation is an important means by which infants learn new behaviours. When infants do not have the opportunity to immediately reproduce observed actions, they may form a memory representation of the event which can guide their behaviour when a similar situation is encountered again. Imitation procedures can, therefore, provide insight into infant memory. The deferred imitation paradigm requires a modelled action to be reproduced following a delay, without prior motor practice. As such, deferred imitation procedures have been proposed to tap declarative memory abilities in non‐verbal populations such as infants. Contrary to the popular belief that infants form sparse or ill‐defined memories, deferred imitation research reveals that infants store and retrieve highly detailed memory representations. The specificity of detail encoded into the representation can, however, cause memory retrieval to fail at young ages. Developing the ability to identify event components which are central (the target stimulus) versus details which are peripheral (the exact context in which learning occurred) is therefore an important aspect of memory development. Using deferred imitation procedures to study the transition from constrained to flexible memory representations can thus facilitate our understanding of the development of declarative memory during the infancy period. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

从认知发展看思维和逻辑的基本类型

人类和个人对事物的认知发展过程可分为感性认知和理性认知两大阶段。思维即理性认知。思维按其意识和复杂性程度可分为直觉思维、形象思维、抽象思维和辩证思维四种基本类型。逻辑学是描述思维的产物即思想的形式结构与其规律的科学,也是为思维提供思维形式与其变形规则的模规范性科学。当代逻辑学按其产生和适用的主要思维领域不同,可分为准逻辑、形象逻辑、形式逻辑和辩证逻辑四种基本类型。     

Freedom as Non‐Domination and Widespread Prejudice

This paper offers an answer to an objection to Phillip Pettit’s neo‐republican account of freedom as non‐domination raised by Sharon Krause. The objection is that widespread prejudice, such as systemic racism or sexism, generates significant obstacles to individuals’ free agency but that neo‐republicanism fails to explain why these obstacles reduce freedom. This is because neo‐republicanism defines domination in terms of the capacity for arbitrary interference, but many prejudiced actions do not involve physical coercion, threats, or any other behavior typically described as types of interference. The paper discusses three strategies to account for the impact of widespread prejudice on the domination of groups. It argues that the most plausible strategy redefines domination in terms of behavior that is prima facie wrong and lacks appropriate checks. Such behavior includes interference but also includes prejudiced actions, such as failing to select the most qualified candidate for a job.     

Do You Know What I Feel? Partners' Predictions and Judgments of Each Other's Emotional Reactions to Emotion-Eliciting Situations

The goal of the present study was to investigate empathic accuracy in couples, specifically the partners' ability to predict each other's emotional reactions to social situations. For this, 36 French Canadian couples aged from 18 to 34 years predicted their own reactions as well as their partner's reactions to a series of emotional situations. They then role-played these emotional situations while being videotaped. At a later time, the taped role-play segments were rated by the role-play actors themselves, by their partners, and by 5 individuals who did not know the actors. Results revealed high levels of empathic accuracy when we compared the partners' predictions of each other's reactions. However, when these predictions were compared with the participants' self-evaluations of their role-plays or with evaluations by individuals who did not know the actors, partners showed a positive bias in that they predicted more appropriate and fewer inappropriate reactions to the social situations for their partners than were self-rated by the partners themselves or rated by individuals who did not know the actors. Finally, the existence of couple-specific private meaning systems could not be confirmed in the present context as the evaluations of emotional expressions by unknown others, the actors' partners, and the actors themselves were largely congruent.     

道德教育：在日常生活与非日常生活之间

道德教育应当回归生活世界,已成为解决当前道德教育弊病的一种共识。但是如何回归,这是一个有待深入探讨的问题。从道德教育与生活世界共在同构的基础上,我们可把生活世界划分为日常生活世界与非日常生活世界,因此,针对当今道德教育的弊端,我们认为道德教育应当在日常生活与非日常生活之间的张力结构中博弈式存在。     

大学生元认知特点与非智力因素关系的研究

研究考察大学生元认知各成份特点与学生学习动机、坚持性、学习方法等非智力因素之间的相互关系。研究表明学生元认知各成份之间的发展并不均衡,元认知的监控能力较薄弱。在元认知整体水平上存在性别差异。元认知的发展水平与非智力因素之间存在着正相关。     

RELIGION AND EMPIRICISM IN THE WORKS OF PETER BERGER

Abstract. Peter Berger established himself in the sociological profession in large part through his functional interpretations of religion and its ostensible demise in relation to the empirical bent of modern intellectual thought. Yet, in his ef–fort to expand the scope of empiricism such that it might address nontrivial concerns, Berger found himself attempting to understand the "substance" of religiori—that is, the conviction that there exists an "other" which confronts us unconditionally and consequently forms the basis of all issues concerning value and meaning. Berger's writings deserve critical attention in that they disclose both the problems and the promises of utilizing empirical methods for the task of rehabilitating, rather than debunking, humanity's religious propensities.     

What happens before and after acute enactments? An exercise in clinical validation and the broadening of hypotheses

This paper seeks to validate clinical facts and theoretical hypotheses that have been discussed before and that address configurations involving chronic and acute enactments. Its validation process compares clinical material from psychoanalytic work in different psychoanalytic cultures - work from South America-Uruguay (Yardino), Europe-Spain (Sapisochin), South Africa (Ivey), Europe-UK (Bateman). It documents clinical facts described in four articles and confirms that during chronic enactments the analytic dyad gets caught up in a dual relationship that veils and congeals the triangular situation because acknowledging it would be traumatic. The lack of triangular space impedes the formation of symbols as well as dreaming and creates non-dreams-for-two. During chronic enactments analysts use their implicit alpha-function to assemble traumatic areas. These areas emerge as a mix of discharges and non-dreams that are dreamed through acute enactments. Acute enactments occur when chronic enactments dissolve and patients experience an abrupt contact with reality. The attenuated trauma is then dreamed alive. The linking of new symbols develops a network of symbolic thought and creates dreams-for-two and broadens the patient's mental universe. The validation process has deepened our vision concerning clinical facts, especially in relation to: (1) the wavering between acute and chronic enactments, (2) analysts' inhibitions and feelings of guilt, and (3) the influence of analysts' personalities on the configurations they describe. These theoretical hypotheses have been confirmed and broadened not only in relation to the vicissitudes of dream work in traumatic areas, but also in relation to defenses such as thin or thick skin, and in relation to listening in countertransferential detours.     

Platonic Knowledge and the Standard Analysis

Abstract

In this paper I explore Plato’s reasons for his rejection of the so‐called standard analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. I argue that Plato held that knowledge is an infallible mental state in which (a) the knowable is present in the knower and (b) the knower is aware of this presence. Accordingly, knowledge (epistēmē) is non‐propositional. Since there are no infallible belief states, the standard analysis, which assumes that knowledge is a type of belief, cannot be correct. In addition, I argue that Plato held that belief (doxa) is only possible for the sort of being capable of knowledge. This is because self‐reflexivity is necessary for infallible knowledge and self‐reflexivity is only possible if the intellect is immaterial. This capacity for self‐reflexivity is also essential for belief, since beliefs are, paradigmatically, not dispositions but self‐reflexive mental states.