Reasoning from Classifications and Definitions

In this paper we analyze the uses and misuses of argumentation schemes from verbal classification, and show how argument from definition supports argumentation based on argument from verbal classification. The inquiry has inevitably included the broader study of the concept of definition. The paper presents the schemes for argument from classification and for argument from definition, and shows how the latter type of argument so typically supports the former. The problem of analyzing arguments based on classification is framed in a structure that reveals the crucial role it plays in the persuasion process. The survey of the literature includes the work of Hastings, Perelman, Kienpointner and Schiappa, but still finds much of value in Aristotle. Lessons drawn from Aristotle’s Topics are shown to be useful for developing new tools for assessing definitions and arguments from definition.

The myth of open concepts: Meehl’s analysis of construct meaning versus black box essentialism

Two views of theoretical concepts in psychology are compared. Meehl’s “open concept” account holds that theoretical concepts are implicitly defined by theories but that empirical criteria can be changed over time (e.g., added or dropped, weightings changed, exchanged for theoretical reductions). This account confuses concepts and theories, does not reflect how diagnostic concepts actually work in medicine and psychology, leads to theory incommensurability, and is unclear about when concepts are the same or different. I propose that an alternative “black box essentialist” account of theoretical concepts, drawn from recent philosophical work on natural kind concepts, better explains how we manage to refer to the same construct even as our theories and criteria change. One implication is that Meehl is incorrect to claim that a reason for psychology’s lack of progress is that its concepts are inherently different from those in the hard sciences.     

Manifest Rationality Reconsidered: Reply to my Fellow Symposiasts

In this paper, I respond to papers on my Manifest Rationality (2000) by Leo Groarke, Hans Hansen, David Hitchcock, and Christopher Tindale presented at the meetings of the Ontario Philosophical Society, October 2000. From the many useful challenges they have directed at my position, I have chosen to focus on two. The dominant issue raised by their papers concerns my definition of argument, and particularly problems with the idea of a dialectical tier. I have selected that as the first strand. Second, several have raised questions that deal with the relationship between logic, rhetoric and dialectic. That is the second strand.     

Analyzing Argumentative Discourse from a Rhetorical Perspective: Defining `Person' and `Human Life' in Constitutional Disputes Over Abortion

In this paper, a case study is presented of constitutional debates about abortion. An analysis is given of arguments from the Roe v. Wade case for definitions concerning the key notions of `person' and `human life'. The paper illustrates how the Court has gradually taken a more pragmatic or rhetorical position on definitional matters crucial to the purpose of regulating abortion.     

Constitutive elements of the concept of human aggression

An analysis of the constitutive elements of the concept of human aggression is made. These constitutive elements are explications of the analytically true implications of the concept of human aggression as they are imbedded into the structure of “normal” language. The analysis results in the following proposal for a definition of the concept of human aggression. Human aggression is characterized—at least from the point of view of the person affected or a neutral judge—as an inconsiderate or malicious violation of a norm which implies current or potential harm by a person actively responsible; characterizing the violation of the norm as “inconsiderate” or “malicious” implies that no arguments for exoneration (e.g., excuses or justifications) will be accepted. These six constitutive elements of the concept of human aggression are discussed; in particular, the structure of possible arguments for incrimination and exoneration is outlined in detail. Finally, some consequences for future research are drawn from this suggestion for the definition of human aggression.     

Suits,Autotelicity, Temporal Reallocations,Game Resources and Defining ‘play’

Bernard Suits bequeathed a rich legacy of philosophical insights contributing to our developing a deeper understanding of sport-related issues, and his work has attracted much attention and stimulated valuable controversy over many years. However, the interest it has stimulated appears uneven. In this context and with reference to the former claims above, I focus on a part of his work that has received relatively less commentary, in the hope that it too will yield work of value. Given the imaginative quality of Suits's writing, it is pessimistic to assume that attention to a relatively neglected part of his work will fail to bear fruit, if not as a result of my labours here, then perhaps of someone else's in further discussion. My concern is his account of ‘play’, by which he meant to toy, fiddle or trifle with something or other, written over 30 years ago, and it stems from reflection on one recent effort to examine this part of Suits's work, namely Morgan's discussion of ‘play’. My article attempts an analysis of the definition Suits gave and an evaluation of efforts he made to defend his understanding, alongside brief exploration of Morgan's work. Both of these tasks are undertaken against a background of Suits's broader concerns with the place of games in an ideal life. The conclusions I reach are that Suits's account embodies too many issues to be acceptable; that Morgan's attempt to rescue him from one of them is misdirected; but that even if my criticisms are damaging to the account of ‘play’ I examine, they leave Suits's main work on playing games seriously as sports unscathed.     

医学影像结构与发展中存在的问题与思考

医学影像学在医学领域中是一门重要的学科,已成为医疗工作的重要支柱.现代医学影像已从传统的显示宏观结构发展到反映分子、生化水平的变化;从显示形态改变到反映功能变化;从单纯诊断向治疗方面发展.本文针对医学影像中存在的普遍性问题,分为内部结构性和宏观发展性两个方面,进行了较为系统的揭示和探讨.包括形成原因、表现形式和影响评估.同时指出,只有尊重学科发展规律,通过准入规范、制度建设、继续教育等多种手段,结合发展与辩证的思维,才是解决问题的正确途径.     

Problem definition and information provision by federal bureaucrats

Federal bureaucrats are important sources of information about policy problems. However, federal officials compete for this influence with organized interests plying their own problems and solutions. We attribute the differential agenda influence of the federal bureaucracy to efforts in Congress to construct workable problem definitions in a context of uncertainty about issues. From both behavioral and rational models of congressional decision making, we develop a theory of congressional search for information during problem definition under conditions of uncertainty. The theory presages the prominence of federal bureaucrats in this search, and especially under uncertainty. Using new data sets capturing the appearance of federal bureaucrats at congressional hearings, we find that the mobilization, prominence, and types of federal bureaucrats providing information is explainable in terms of congressional uncertainty about problem definitions.     

供精助孕技术的社会伦理问题

供精助孕技术作为人类辅助生殖技术之一,是实现不育症家庭生育后代的重要手段。通过对人类精子库的发展历程和相关政策的介绍,探讨全球不同社会环境下供精助孕技术所面临的对个人、家庭、社会等方面的伦理问题。讨论供精过程对捐精者的心理社会影响、供精助孕技术后代的知情权及其与供精者的关系界定、供精助孕后代近亲婚配及社会地位和心理状况、实施供精助孕技术对社会学父亲心理社会的影响等问题。如何充分发挥供精助孕技术在辅助生育上的优势并协调社会家庭结构将是未来辅助生殖技术政策调整的方向。

     

THE SUPERNATURAL AS LANGUAGE GAME

Abstract. For many in the Anglo‐American tradition of language analysis, Ludwig Wittgenstein, the great progenitor of twentieth‐century philosophy of language, showed conclusively that theological terms lack any referent in reality and therefore represent a discourse that can do no more than manifest the existential attitudes that speakers take toward reality as a whole. To think that such terms represent more is to be bewitched by the use of language. Is it possible, however, that theological language references a fundamental human drive? In this article I reexamine the dyad of nature and supernature from the perspective of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Perhaps surprisingly, Wittgenstein's thought on the subject offers much more than his famous, terse aphorism at the conclusion of his first masterwork, the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus ([1921] 1961, 74, §7): “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” Furthermore, the basic Tractarian drive to determine the relationship between language and reality, which is redirected but not extinguished in Wittgenstein's second, divergent, opus, the Philosophical Investigations ([1953] 1967), may be the place for a renewed examination of what the supernatural means in human discourse. Does talk of God give expression to the fundamental transcendence of human knowledge? Is it a language game we can eschew?