How Distinctive Is Philosophers’ Intuition Talk?

The word “intuition” is one frequently used in philosophy. It is often assumed that the way in which philosophers use the word, and others like it, is very distinctive. This claim has been subjected to little empirical scrutiny, however. This article presents the first steps in a qualitative analysis of the use of intuition talk in the academy. It presents the findings of two preliminary empirical studies. The first study examines the use of intuition talk in spoken academic English. The second examines the use of intuition talk in written academic English. It considers what these studies tell us about the distinctiveness of philosophical language and methods and considers some implications for evaluative and ameliorative methodology.     

RELIGION,SCIENCE, AND GLOBALIZATION: BEYOND COMPARATIVE APPROACHES

Using case studies from the Indonesian context, this article argues that the current truth regimes we now live by are always and already “hybrid” and that we need new methods for understanding meaning‐making practices in an era of globalization and climate change than comparative approaches allow. Following the works of such thinkers as physicist Karen Barad, political philosopher William Connolly, and eco‐critic Timothy Morton, this article develops the idea that an event‐oriented or object‐oriented approach better captures our hybrid meaning‐making practices. Not only that, but it also provides a lens through which to understand traditions as polydox (rather than orthodox) and the rise of “modern” science as itself a planetary (rather than a Western) phenomenon.     

Past and future of near-infrared spectroscopy in studies of emotion and social neuroscience

Near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) enables the non-invasive measurement of spatiotemporal characteristics of brain function, which has received increasing attention during the last years. This new birth of interest is attributable to unique characteristics of the NIRS technique, which may be summarised in certain technical advantages: its experimental and ecological validity and the extension of application to clinical samples. This paper presents the main applications of the NIRS technique that measures changes in brain activation to study emotions and social neuroscience field. In the first part of this paper, we discuss the basic principles, strengths, and limitations of NIRS for the study of principal emotional functions. In the second part, we focus on the actual applications of NIRS in emotional and social research. In this regard, first, we consider some main topics of emotional contexts, such as visual (facial expression) and auditory cues recognition, and social neuroscience field. Second, we discuss the utility to apply NIRS simultaneously to other techniques (electroencephalography, Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation, and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) to improve the intrinsic power of such measures. Third, we consider the possible applications of NIRS devices to study specific emotion-related functions (such as connectivity and plasticity applications).     

The functional‐cognitive framework as a tool for accelerating progress in cognitive neuroscience: On the benefits of bridging rather than reducing levels of analyses

The subject matter of neuroscience research is complex, and synthesising the wealth of data from this research to better understand mental processes is challenging. A useful strategy, therefore, may be to distinguish explicitly between the causal effects of the environment on behaviour (i.e. functional analyses) and the mental processes that mediate these effects (i.e. cognitive analyses). In this article, we describe how the functional‐cognitive (F‐C) framework can accelerate cognitive neuroscience and also advance a functional treatment of brain activity. We first highlight that cognitive neuroscience can particularly benefit from the F‐C approach by providing an alternative to the problematic practice of reducing cognitive constructs to behavioural and/or neural proxies. Next, we outline how functional (behaviour–environment) relations can serve as a bridge between cognitive and neural processes by restoring mental constructs to their original role as heuristic tools. Finally, we give some examples of how both cognitive neuroscience and traditional functional approaches can mutually benefit from the F‐C framework.     

On the Diversity of the Cognition Disciplines and the Development of A Unifying Philosophy of Information

The cognition and information theoretic sciences have now been in existence for the better part of a century. In that time, their varied disciplines have undergone extensive maturation, honing their methods, constitutions, and evaluation techniques in the pursuit of academic rigor, while not losing sight of the practical influences that have served as their almost universal cornerstone. Meanwhile, this period has also been marked by increasing disparity and gradual distancing of the philosophical underpinnings upon which each field is founded, adding strain to interdisciplinary collaborative efforts. This article presents an overview of select information‐science‐related cognition disciplines, and shows how the nascent Philosophy of Information (PI) can be adopted as a means of unifying these philosophical foundations in an empirically sound manner, without sacrificing general applicability. In addition, it demonstrates how PI is already rooted in the philosophies or epistemological views of several of the cognition disciplines, implicitly or otherwise.     

Abduction by Philosophers: Reorienting Philosophical Methodology

A reorientation is needed in methodological debate about the role of intuitions in philosophy. Methodological debate has lost sight of the reason why it makes sense to focus on questions about intuitions when thinking about the methods or epistemology of philosophy. The problem is an approach to methodology that focuses almost exclusively on questions about some evidential role that intuitions may or may not play in philosophers’ arguments. A new approach is needed. Approaching methodological questions about the role of intuitions in philosophy with an abductive model of philosophical inquiry in mind will help ensure the debate doesn't lose sight of what motivates the debate.     

Qualitative tools and experimental philosophy

Experimental philosophy brings empirical methods to philosophy. These methods are used to probe how people think about philosophically interesting things such as knowledge, morality, and freedom. This paper explores the contribution that qualitative methods have to make in this enterprise. I argue that qualitative methods have the potential to make a much greater contribution than they have so far. Along the way, I acknowledge a few types of resistance that proponents of qualitative methods in experimental philosophy might encounter, and provide reasons to think they are ill-founded.     

Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions

Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have an unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we have, the effect of framing on the strength of those intuitions still needs to be taken into account. I argue that this by itself poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy.     

The Ethical Implications of Considering Neurolaw as a New Power

Caution is one of the orienting principles of neuroscience’s advance in different social spheres. This article shows the importance of maintaining caution in the area of neurolaw because of its risk of becoming a new power that is free from ethical discussion. The article’s objective is to note the principal ethical implications and limitations of neurolaw in light of six cases in which neuroscientific evidence was used in distinct ways. This study seeks to examine the precautions that should be taken in regard to the advance of neurolaw so as not to lose sight of its emancipatory interest.     

Religiousness,religious coping methods,and cognitive test anxiety among African-American college students

This study explored the roles of religiousness and religious coping methods in predicting cognitive test anxiety. A convenience sample of 121 African-American students (97 females and 24 males) ranging in age from 18 to 39 (M_age?=?20.16), attending a historically Black university completed an online questionnaire assessing demographic information, religiousness, religious coping methods, and cognitive test anxiety. Results showed that negative religious coping methods were significant factors in predicting cognitive test anxiety. These relationships may be pertinent for understanding salient factors that influence cognitive test anxiety in African-American college students.