负性生活事件对初中生自我伤害行为的影响:有调节的中介效应

采用负性生活事件量表、自我批评量表、亲子关系量表和青少年自我伤害行为问卷对333名初中生进行测查,探讨负性生活事件对初中生自我伤害行为的影响及作用机制。结果表明:(1)负性生活事件对初中生的自我批评和自我伤害行为均有显著的正向预测作用;(2)自我批评在负性生活事件与初中生自我伤害行为之间起着部分中介作用;(3)负性生活事件和自我批评的关系(中介效应的前半段路径)受到亲子关系的调节,即负性生活事件对自我批评的正向影响随着父子关系和母子关系的增强而减弱。因此,负性生活事件和初中生自我伤害行为之间存在有调节的中介效应。     

大学生的冲动性特质与自杀意念的关系:一个有调节的中介模型

以应激-易感模型为依据考察冲动性特质与自杀意念的关系,并在此基础上提出一个有调节的中介模型,探讨负性生活事件影响的中介作用以及家庭环境的调节作用。采用巴瑞特冲动性量表、青少年生活事件量表、家庭环境量表、贝克自杀意念量表对902名大学生进行集体施测,旨在考察负性生活事件的影响对大学生冲动性特质与自杀意念的中介作用以及家庭环境的调节作用,结果表明:(1)冲动性特质和负性生活事件的影响能正向预测大学生的自杀意念;(2)负性生活事件的影响在冲动性特质和自杀意念之间起中介作用;(3)负性生活事件影响的中介作用和冲动性特质的直接作用受家庭环境的调节。这些结果对于综合解释环境与个体因素对自杀意念的作用与机制具有重要意义。     

Quine's Naturalism and Behaviorisms

This paper investigates the complicated relations between various versions of naturalism, behaviorism, and mentalism within the framework of W. V. O. Quine's thinking. It begins with Roger Gibson's reconstruction of Quine's behaviorisms and argues that it lacks a crucial ontological element and misconstrues the relation between philosophy and science. After getting clear of Quine's naturalism, the paper distinguishes between evidential, methodological, and ontological behaviorisms. The evidential and methodological versions are often conflated, but they need to be clearly distinguished in order to see whether Quine's argument against mentalism is cogent. The paper argues that Quine's naturalism supports only the weakest version of behaviorism, that is, the evidential one, but this version is compatible with mentalistic semantics. Quine's opposition to mentalism is an overreaction against the behaviorist camp. By contrast, Jerry Fodor's objection to José Luis Bermúdez is an overreaction from the opposite direction.     

Punishment and the potential for negative reinforcement with histamine injection

The present study examined punishment of responding with histamine injection, and its potential to generate avoidance of punishment. Sprague–Dawley rats were trained under concurrent schedules in which responses on one lever (the punishment lever) produced food under a variable‐interval schedule, and under some conditions intermittent injections of histamine, which suppressed behavior. Responses on a second (avoidance) lever prevented histamine injections scheduled on the punishment lever. After stabilization of punished responding, a variable‐interval 15‐s schedule of cancellation of histamine (avoidance) was added for responding on the second/avoidance lever, without subsequent acquisition of responding on that lever. Progressive decreases in the length of the punishment variable‐interval schedule increased suppression on the punishment lever without increases in response rates on the avoidance lever. Exchanging contingencies on the levers ensured that response rates on the avoidance lever were sufficiently high to decrease the histamine injection frequency; nonetheless response rates on the avoidance lever decreased over subsequent sessions. Under no condition was responding maintained on the avoidance lever despite continued punishing effectiveness of histamine throughout. The present results suggest that avoidance conditioning is not a necessary condition for effective punishment, and confirm the importance of empirical rather than presumed categorization of behavioral effects of stimulus events.     

Problem Clarity as a Moderator between Trait Affect and Self‐Perceived Creativity

Empirical studies on the relationship between affect and creativity often produce conflicting results. This inconsistency has led us to believe that the relationship between affect and creativity may be better understood by looking at potential moderators. Our study looked specifically at trait affect and self‐perceived creativity. Using the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) theory with problem clarity as the potential moderator, we hypothesized that when individuals are faced with problems that lack clarity, trait affect has greater sway over their self‐perceived creativity. Our results provided evidence that problem clarity moderated the relationship between positive trait affect and self‐perceived creativity; the positive relationship between positive trait affect and self‐perceived creativity is stronger when problem clarity is low and weaker when problem clarity is high. No moderating effect was found in the relationship between negative trait affect and self‐perceived creativity.     

基于Think/No-think范式的动机性遗忘研究:行为与脑机制

想/不想范式(Think/No-think,TNT)是基于go/no-go范式提出来的用于研究动机性遗忘过程的实验范式,主要过程是指个体对于记忆的提取抑制可以导致随后该记忆的遗忘。近年来TNT范式的大量行为学研究都一致性地发现记忆提取抑制可以产生负性控制效应,验证了在实验室情境下对动机性遗忘进行研究的可行性。其中,负性控制效应指的是压抑条件的项目相对于基线条件的项目的回忆量有显著降低。关于动机性遗忘发生的神经机制的探讨已积累了大量的研究证据,总结脑电(EEG)和功能核磁共振(f MRI)两个模态的研究,我们提出了动机性遗忘发生的多模态功能网络模型。最后,在该模型的基础上,我们展望了TNT范式未来的研究方向,其中特别注意到同步EEG-f MRI技术的应用有望为我们揭示出记忆提取抑制导致的动机性遗忘发生的动态过程。     

负性情绪词语在外显和内隐记忆测验中的定向遗忘效应

以两类具有不同负性情绪强度值的高频汉语双字词为材料,采用项目法定向遗忘范式,探究负性情绪词语在外显和内隐记忆测验中是否存在定向遗忘效应。结果显示,(1)在外显记忆测验中,强、弱负性词均出现了显著的定向遗忘并且弱负性词的定向遗忘效应大于强负性词;(2)在内隐记忆测验中,只有弱负性词出现了显著的定向遗忘,而强负性词则无。可见,内隐记忆测验中的定向遗忘效应对负性信息比外显记忆测验更加敏感。     

“I HEAR MY VOICE,BUT WHO IS TALKING?”: UNDERSTANDING DEPERSONALIZATION

Depersonalization is the frightening experience of being a shut‐inside, ghostlike, “true” self that observes another part of the self interacting in the outside world. The “true” self hides safely within, while the “participating” self holds all affects and impulses. This split in the ego is created via internal projective identification in the face of overwhelming affect, unavailability of adequate identifications, and insufficient support for psychic cohesion. As the transference develops, the powerful entrapping cocoon of depersonalization can be projected onto the now‐entrapping analyst, where it can be addressed. A clinical vignette illustrates these points.     

Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense

Experimental philosophers have challenged friends of the expertise defense to show that (a) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are different from the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, and (b) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are better than the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, in ways that are relevant to the truth or falsity of such judgments. Friends of the expertise defense have responded by arguing that the burden of proof lies with experimental philosophers. This article sketches three arguments which show that both (a) and (b) are probably false. If its arguments are cogent, then shifting the burden of proof is a futile move, since philosophical training makes no difference so far as making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases is concerned.