在线抑制控制训练对失败的限制性饮食者不健康食物选择的改善

失败的限制性饮食者是进食障碍的高危人群,他们面对食物时的抑制控制能力通常很弱,从而更易发展为肥胖,所以改善失败的限制性饮食者对不健康食物的进食选择十分重要。本文采用在线停止信号任务,通过提高失败的限制性饮食者对不健康食物图片的抑制控制能力,从而减少他们在日常生活中对不健康食物的选择。首先对66名失败的限制性饮食者实施前测,然后随机分为对不健康食物图片进行抑制反应的干预组(n=33)和对非食物图片进行抑制反应的控制组(n=31),两组被试接受每天一次(每次10 min左右)共计7次的训练。完成训练后,所有被试均接受后测。结果发现,干预训练后,与控制组相比,干预组被试对不健康食物的选择频率以及对不健康食物自我报告的吸引力和喜爱程度均显著降低。     

4～6岁幼儿经济博弈中的信任行为及其影响因素

本研究通过两个实验考察幼儿是否在博弈任务中表现出对陌生人的信任行为,同时考察可能对幼儿的信任产生影响的因素,包括个体认知因素(观点采择)和环境因素(负性反馈和代际传递)。研究对189名4~6岁幼儿及其家长进行多种任务的测量。实验一通过修订Evans和Krugger(2011)的信任博弈任务,考察幼儿在匿名信任博弈中的信任行为,结果发现与4岁幼儿相比,6岁幼儿对他人的信任更低;实验二考察了幼儿信任的影响因素,结果发现,幼儿在得到负性反馈结果后再次进行信任博弈任务时,他们对他人的信任比前次有所降低,6岁幼儿对他人返还数量的预期比4岁幼儿下降程度更大;6岁幼儿的信任行为(第一次给出意愿)与观点采择能力显著相关;6岁幼儿的信任水平与家长的信任水平显著相关。     

部分线索对记忆提取的影响:认知抑制能力的作用

在回忆时,以刚刚学过的部分项目作为提取线索,被试的回忆成绩反而比没有任何线索时的回忆成绩差,这一现象被称为部分线索效应。该效应通常被认为是抑制执行控制过程对非线索项目记忆表征强度抑制的结果。本研究以Stroop效应量(实验1)和工作记忆容量(实验2)为指标,从个体差异角度考察了认知抑制能力对部分线索效应的影响。结果发现,Stroop效应量与部分线索效应各指标呈显著负相关,Stroop效应量越小,部分线索效应各指标的值越大;工作记忆容量与部分线索效应各指标呈显著正相关,高工作记忆容量个体的部分线索效应各指标的值也更大。结果表明,认知抑制能力越强,部分线索对回忆的破坏作用越大,研究结果支持部分线索效应的提取抑制假说。     

Present Bias and Everyday Self‐Control Failures: A Day Reconstruction Study

Everyday life is full of self‐control problems. The economist's favorite explanation for self‐control problems is present bias. This paper tests whether experimentally elicited present bias predicts self‐control problems in everyday life. We measure present bias by using a standard incentivized delay discounting task and everyday self‐control by using the day reconstruction method (DRM). Because this is the first study to measure everyday self‐control by using the DRM, we also validate the method by showing that its data replicate key results from the seminal Everyday Temptation Study. We find that present bias does not predict everyday self‐control. This points to a distinction between decreasing impatience (as measured in delay discounting tasks) and visceral influences (as occurring in everyday life) as determinants of self‐control problems. We argue that decision making research can benefit from the DRM as a cost‐effective tool that complements lab and field experiments to better understand economic preference measures and their correlates in everyday life decision making. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do we reflect while performing skillful actions? Automaticity,control, and the perils of distraction

From our everyday commuting to the gold medalist’s world-class performance, skillful actions are characterized by fine-grained, online agentive control. What is the proper explanation of such control? There are two traditional candidates: intellectualism explains skillful agentive control by reference to the agent’s propositional mental states; anti-intellectualism holds that propositional mental states or reflective processes are unnecessary since skillful action is fully accounted for by automatic coping processes. I examine the evidence for three psychological phenomena recently held to support anti-intellectualism (choking under pressure, expertise-induced amnesia, and expert confabulation) and argue that it supports neither traditional candidate, but an intermediate attention-control account, according to which the top-down, intention-directed control of attention is a necessary component of skillful action. Only this account recognizes both the role of automatic control in skilled action and the need for higher-order cognition to thread automatic processes together into a unified, skillful performance. This applies to bodily skillful action in general, from the world-class performance of experts to mundane, habitual action. The attention-control account stresses that, for intentions to play their role as top-down modulators of attention, agents must sustain the intention’s activation; hence, the need for reflecting throughout performance.     

Defining agency after implicit bias

Recent findings in empirical psychology show that implicit biases can affect behavior in ways that are difficult to control deliberatively. Doris argues that findings like these constitute a threat to agency, if agency is defined as the ability to reflectively, deliberatively direct one’s actions. I argue, however, that implicit biases pose no fundamental threat to agency since they can be brought under indirect deliberative control, whereby deliberative, reflective actions put in place automatic processes that automatically inhibit unwanted biases. Since automatic processes can be thus used to achieve deliberatively, reflectively endorsed goals, agency should be defined as the ability to act in line with reflectively endorsed goals, whether by deliberative or automatic processes.     

Divided attention enhances explicit but not implicit conceptual memory: an item-specific account of the attentional boost effect

The Attentional Boost Effect (ABE) refers to the counterintuitive finding that words encoded with to-be-responded targets in a divided-attention condition are remembered better than words encoded with distractors. Previous studies suggested that the ABE-related enhancement of verbal memory depends upon the activation of abstract lexical representations. In the present study, we extend this hypothesis by embedding it in the context of a broader perspective, which proposes that divided attention in the ABE paradigm affects item-specific, but not relational, processing. To this purpose, we examined the ABE in the matched tasks of category-cued recall (CCRT: explicit memory) and category exemplar generation (CEGT: implicit memory). In addition, study time was varied (500, 1500 or 4000?ms), to further determine whether the attentional boost manipulation could influence late-phase elaborative processing. In agreement with the predictions of the item-specific account, the results showed that exemplars encoded with targets were recalled better than exemplars encoded with distractors in the CCRT, but not in the CEGT. Moreover, performance in the CCRT increased with study time, whereas the size of the ABE-related enhancement tended to decrease, further confirming that this effect hinges upon early phase encoding processes.     

Conditionals,Context, and the Suppression Effect

Modus ponens is the argument from premises of the form If A, then B and A to the conclusion B (e.g., from If it rained, Alicia got wet and It rained to Alicia got wet). Nearly all participants agree that the modus ponens conclusion logically follows when the argument appears in this Basic form. However, adding a further premise (e.g., If she forgot her umbrella, Alicia got wet) can lower participants’ rate of agreement—an effect called suppression. We propose a theory of suppression that draws on contemporary ideas about conditional sentences in linguistics and philosophy. Semantically, the theory assumes that people interpret an indicative conditional as a context‐sensitive strict conditional: true if and only if its consequent is true in each of a contextually determined set of situations in which its antecedent is true. Pragmatically, the theory claims that context changes in response to new assertions, including new conditional premises. Thus, the conclusion of a modus ponens argument may no longer be accepted in the changed context. Psychologically, the theory describes people as capable of reasoning about broad classes of possible situations, ordered by typicality, without having to reason about individual possible worlds. The theory accounts for the main suppression phenomena, and it generates some novel predictions that new experiments confirm.     

Successfully controlling intrusive memories is harder when control must be sustained

After unpleasant events, people often experience intrusive memories that undermine their peace of mind. In response, they often suppress these unwanted memories from awareness. Such efforts may fail, however, when inhibitory control demands are high due to the need to sustain control, or when fatigue compromises inhibitory capacity. Here we examined how sustained inhibitory demand affected intrusive memories in the Think/No-Think paradigm. To isolate intrusions, participants reported, trial-by-trial, whether their preceding attempt to suppress retrieval had triggered retrieval of the memory they intended to suppress. Such counter-intentional retrievals provide a laboratory model of the sort of involuntary retrieval that may underlie intrusive memories. Using this method, we found that longer duration trials increased the probability of an intrusion. Moreover, on later No-Think trials, control over intrusions suddenly declined, with longer trial durations triggering more relapses of items that had been previously been purged. Thus, the challenges of controlling retrieval appear to cause a decline in control over time, due to a change in state, such as fatigue. These findings raise the possibility that characteristics often true of people with psychiatric disorders – such as compromised sleep, and increased demand on control – may contribute to difficulties in suppressing intrusive memories.