THE SUPERNATURAL AS LANGUAGE GAME

Abstract. For many in the Anglo‐American tradition of language analysis, Ludwig Wittgenstein, the great progenitor of twentieth‐century philosophy of language, showed conclusively that theological terms lack any referent in reality and therefore represent a discourse that can do no more than manifest the existential attitudes that speakers take toward reality as a whole. To think that such terms represent more is to be bewitched by the use of language. Is it possible, however, that theological language references a fundamental human drive? In this article I reexamine the dyad of nature and supernature from the perspective of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Perhaps surprisingly, Wittgenstein's thought on the subject offers much more than his famous, terse aphorism at the conclusion of his first masterwork, the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus ([1921] 1961, 74, §7): “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” Furthermore, the basic Tractarian drive to determine the relationship between language and reality, which is redirected but not extinguished in Wittgenstein's second, divergent, opus, the Philosophical Investigations ([1953] 1967), may be the place for a renewed examination of what the supernatural means in human discourse. Does talk of God give expression to the fundamental transcendence of human knowledge? Is it a language game we can eschew?     

PUTTING PRESUPPOSITIONS ON THE TABLE: WHY THE FOUNDATIONS MATTER

Abstract. Over time scientists have developed an effective investigative process that includes the acceptance of particular basic presuppositions, methods, content, and theories. The deeply held presuppositions are the philosophical foundation of scientific thought and do much to define the field's worldview. These fundamental assumptions can be esoteric for many and can become a source of conflict when they are not commonly shared with other points of view. Such presuppositions affect the observations, the conclusions drawn, and the positions taken. Furthermore, in some cases presuppositions in science have undergone important shifts in meaning, causing an increasing dissonance. We argue that disputes in religion and science often are due to these very basic differences in philosophy that are held by members in the different communities. To better understand the nature of science and its differences with religious views, presuppositions rather than conclusions should be articulated and examined for validity and scope of application.     

Respecting Nature?

This paper considers whether respect is a concept that can be applied fruitfully and cogently to nature and the environment. Through an examination of the idea of nature, respect and an analysis of Paul Taylor’s book Respect for Nature, it argues that, despite the attractiveness of the idea, the concept of respect cannot be coherently and systematically applied to the natural world and that, if a reasoned justification for a non-instrumental view of nature is to be sought, it must be sought elsewhere, perhaps in the notion of care rather than respect per se.     

THE HEFNERIAN LEGACY: RETHINKING THE "NATURE" OF NATURALISM

Philip Hefner calls for religion-and-science to shift attention from pure ideas to embodied ideas. He urges scholars to get back to the Baconian idea that science is intended to enhance life; in Hefner's wording, we must give attention to "science-as-enabler-for-changing/improving-the-world." I believe that this is the realm of overlap between all academic disciplines—what I call the pragmatic overlap. To make his argument Hefner mentions two forms of "conventional wisdom" that need to be rethought. First, he is worried that a "pressure toward naturalism" prevents certain words (such as teleological and transcendence ) from having instructive meaning. Second, with this move toward naturalism Hefner believes we dismiss as archaic all valuable implications of traditional religious myths and symbols. He rightly highlights these exceedingly significant concerns. However, narrowing our focus to the implications of naturalism alone misses the root crisis. That crisis can be articulated as: "conventional wisdom" regarding nature is too unsophisticated to account for the phenomenon it depicts, and furthermore, this understanding of nature controls the methodological, metaphysical, and practical versions of naturalism acquiring societal acceptance. Accordingly, an alternative vision of nature is needed to transform our current "conventional wisdom" such that Hefner's worries are addressed.     

论老子首倡人性善

老子是第一个提出人性善的哲学家。从他的宇宙生成论、人性修养论可以看出老子是主张人性善的。老子认为人性变坏的原因主要是客观事物的影响和世俗教育,"复归于婴儿"是老子人性修养论的总纲,其复归美好天性的主要措施是:反对享乐品的出现,反对世俗的教育。     

《管子》的天地人和合观探析

《管子》的"和合"是一种差等和合,治国理念以天地人和合观为基础,建立了形而上的天地和合道德根据,治国的目标是为了达到社会和合偕习,和合观的使用在方法上运用个人内心和合、国家内外和合达到国家治理,形下之用体现于政治上政通人和以实现天地人和。管子之所以成为我国春秋初期著名的政治家,是因为他的治国理念高远、方法得当、运用适宜,既有道德感化,又有法治辅助,还有礼义调和,实现了社会上下和合、内外和合、形上形下和合。     

Pleasure principle and perfect happiness: morality in Jacques Lacan and Zhuangzi

Jacques Lacan studied Chinese classics and received much inspiration from Zhuangzi. This paper concentrates on the comparative study of morality in those two thinkers from three connecting levels, namely, nature as the source of ethical codes, reason as the means to arrive at the ethical state, and pleasure as the ultimate purpose of morality. The investigation into the topic is enlightening for posthuman morality. Zhuangzi’s idea of the poetics of oneness inspires the Lacanian concept of the Real and ushers us into a new territory to rethink animal rights.