偶然情绪对决策的影响

情绪在决策领域中的引入曾历经过一个从刻意回避到日益重视的过程, 大量研究表明, 即使与决策本身无关的偶然情绪也会对人类的决策行为具有重要作用。本文通过梳理本领域的最新研究提出未来应注重考察：偶然情绪的影响条件、具体情绪的作用以及偶然情绪与可选项的情感属性对决策的交互影响。最后, 本文在情绪激发方法、情绪的操纵检测和决策任务实测等方面进行了总结并提出一点研究建议。     

Toward a Gongfu Reconstruction of Confucianism —Responses to Comments by Huang Yong,Fan Ruiping,and Wang Qingjie

Responding to comments of my recent book, Understanding the Analects of Confucius, by Huang Yong, Fan Ruiping, and Wang Qingjie, this paper looks to highlight one of its major features—that it is a contemporary continuation of the Chinese tradition of doing commentary both as a way of allowing classic texts to unfold their rich meanings in the context of different times, and as a way for the commentator to express his or her own views. It strives to explain how a gongfu reconstruction of Confucianism can explain the apparent inconsistency between advocating rule-like instructions next to its encouragement of the art of flexibility, and to reveal what is more fundamental about Confucianism—rather than a system of rigid moral rules, it is an art of life. This gongfu interpretation would lead to the view that Confucianism does not depend on metaphysical truths as its justification, although it does need to hold metaphysical views as a way of affirming its values, which are justified through the excellence of life to which they lead. While the gongfu approach more accurately reflects Confucius’ own philosophical orientation, and it is therefore used to determine technical details such as what interpretations to put into translation of a text and what interpretations to list in the annotations as alternatives, it is, in the author’s humble view, also a unique contribution that the Chinese tradition can offer to world philosophy.     

From Humanized Nature to Naturalized Humans―Li Zehou’s Transformation of the Classical Chinese “Tianren Heyi ” Paradigm Through the Lens of Kant and Early Marx

Li Zehou belongs among the ranks of the most important Chinese philosophers of the 20th and 21st centuries. In his complex theoretical system, he aimed to reconcile the Chinese cultural heritage with the demands of the contemporary world. Besides elaborating on traditional Chinese philosophy, Li launched many innovative views based on his understanding of specific developments in pre-modern and modern Western philosophy. His philosophy could be described as the search for a synthesis between Western and traditional Chinese thought and a specifically Chinese modernization. In order to provide a basic insight into Li’s specific methods of combining Kant, early Marx and classical Chinese philosophy, the present article investigates his elaboration of the traditional Chinese paradigm of “the unity of nature and man” (tianren heyi天人合一) through the lens of ideas about humanized nature (renhua de ziran人化的自然) and naturalized humans (ziranhua de ren自然化的人).     

Xiong Shili on the Nature,the Mind and the Origin of Badness as Evidenced in Ming Xin Pian 明心篇 (Explaining the Mind )

The question of the origin of badness is a core problematic in New Confucian philosopher Xiong Shili’s 熊十力 (1885–1968) Ming Xin Pian明心篇 (Explaining the Mind; 1959), a work representative of his thought towards the end of his life. In this essay, I examine how Xiong uses the concepts of the nature (xing 性) and the mind (xin 心) to explain the origin of moral badness. Xiong asserts that the Buddhists never concerned themselves with the problem of the origin of ignorance and delusion, afflictions that in turn lead to suffering and wrongdoing. Xiong sets out to redress what he claims the Buddhists had failed to do. I argue that the conceptual structure of both Xiong Shili’s and Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (1130–1200) theoretical approaches to this problem are isomorphic. The isomorphism is significant because it suggests that Xiong consciously drew on Zhu Xi and/or the Buddhist models that Zhu in turn drew on. I provide evidence to show that even as late as 1959, and despite his increasingly entrenched criticisms of Buddhism, Xiong continued to draw on key concepts and models drawn from Buddhist philosophy of mind.     

Beyond Therapy and Enhancement: The Alteration of Human Nature

With the rapid progress and considerable promise of nanobiotechnology/neurosciences there is the potential of transforming the very nature of human beings and of how humans can conceive of themselves as rational animals through technological innovations. The interface between humans and machines (neuro-digital interface), can potentially alter what it means to be human, i.e., the very idea of human nature and of normal functioning will be changed. In this paper, I argue that we are potentially on the verge of a paradigm shift in terms of the ends and goals of techno-science and its applications in the biomedical sciences. In particular, the development of brain-computer interfaces could reconceptualize the very notion of what it means to be human. Hence, we should not limit our reflections of applications in terms of therapy and enhancement but also include an examination of applications aiming at the alteration of human nature. To this end I will first delineate the potential paradigm shift and then map out four distinct clusters of concerns in relation to the brain-computer interface. Finally, I argue that our moral and philosophical reflections should follow a procedural model based on managed consensus due to our pluralistic context.

Nanotechnology, Enhancement, and Human Nature

Is nanotechnology-based human enhancement morally permissible? One reason to question such enhancement stems from a concern for preserving our species. It is harder than one might think, however, to explain what could be wrong with altering our own species. One possibility is to turn to the environmental ethics literature. Perhaps some of the arguments for preserving other species can be applied against nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter human nature. This paper critically examines the case for using two of the strongest arguments in the environmental ethics literature to show that nanotechnology-based human enhancements are impermissible: 1) Our species, like many other naturally occurring species, has aesthetic value. So, nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter our species should be prohibited. 2) Our species plays valuable ecological roles. Nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter our species are likely to interfere with our species playing our ecologically valuable roles. So, such enhancements should be prohibited. Neither argument, ultimately, proves conclusive. The paper concludes, however, that considerations underlying both arguments may show us that some nanotechnology-based human enhancements are impermissible.     

University psychology clinics in Australia: Their place in professional training

Abstract: There is universal recognition of the need for developmentally appropriate supervised clinical experience in professional psychology training. University clinics were established to provide a bridging function for postgraduate clinical psychology students, assisting the integration of psychological theory and research into real‐world clinical applications and professional identity development. The aim of training in university clinics is to provide opportunities for clinical practice and high‐quality supervision to monitor and shape clinical skills. The experiences gained in external practicum settings complement this initial training but cannot replace it. The recent introduction of Medicare rebates for psychology services has threatened the survival of university clinics because low‐cost psychological treatment is now available from experienced practitioners. This paper provides data on Australian university clinics collected before the introduction of Medicare. Concerted efforts are needed to protect university clinics in order to maintain standards required for accreditation of clinical psychology training programs. The potential impact of the loss of university training clinics is discussed and strategies to ensure their survival are suggested.     

QUESTIONING SCIENTIFIC FAITH IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The late nineteenth century was not only a time in which religious faith was questioned in light of increasing claims of natural science. It is more accurate to see the familiar Victorian crisis of faith as but one aspect of a larger historical phenomenon, one in which the methods of both religion and science came under scrutiny. Among several examinations of the status of scientific knowledge in the waning decades of the century, the treatment of the subject by the German theologian Wilhelm Herrmann and philosopher Hans Vaihinger rejected its objective nature and denied that either scientists or theologians had access to the truth of nature. Although this stance regarding the nature of science, religion, and their relationship was limited to intellectuals in German society at the time, it foreshadowed developments in our own day in which the traditional search for truth has been problematized.     

DIVINING “DIVINE ACTION” IN THEOLOGY‐AND‐SCIENCE: A REVIEW ESSAY

The topic of divine action has been central to the theology‐and‐science discussion over the last twenty years. Some tentative conclusions are currently being drawn in light of research initiatives that have been engaged on this topic. I review three recent books that have responded in some way to the ongoing discussion. These responses show that, notwithstanding the advances made in the conversation, much work remains to be done before a plausible theory of divine action emerges at the interface of theology and science.     

试论孟子与士人精神

作为中国“轴心时代”的重要思想家,孟子希望以道德化政治,实现天下有道。他提出士人修养的“浩然之气”,在士人与君主的关系上主张“道高于君”,而对于广大普通民众则倡导“使先知觉后知,使先觉觉后觉”。在此基础上,孟子推出了四种士人典范。而在孟子这些思想中,一以贯之的乃是对德性的张扬,在“尊德性”与“道问学”之间,他明显偏重于前者,这是孟子关于士人精神的特色所在。在孟子的精神世界里,我们可以看到的更多的是一种道德信仰和勇气。正是从这个意义上讲,孟子是一位信仰道德的“宗教家”,而不是一位代表智性的“学问家”。