Parallel processing of whole words and morphemes in visual word recognition

Models of morphological processing make different predictions about whether morphologically complex written words are initially decomposed and recognized on the basis of their morphemic subunits or whether they can directly be accessed as whole words and at what point semantics begin to influence morphological processing. In this study, we used unprimed and masked primed lexical decision to compare truly suffixed (darkest) and pseudosuffixed words (glossary) with within-boundary (d ra kest/g ol ssary) to across-boundary (dar ek st/glos as ry) letter transpositions. Significant transposed-letter similarity effects were found independently of the morphological position of the letter transposition, demonstrating that, in English, morphologically complex whole-word representations can be directly accessed at initial word processing stages. In a third masked primed lexical decision experiment, the same materials were used in the context of stem target priming, and it was found that truly suffixed primes facilitate the recognition of their stem-target (darkest–DARK) to the same extent as pseudosuffixed primes (glossary–GLOSS), which is consistent with theories of early morpho-orthographic decomposition. Taken together, our findings provide evidence for both whole-word access and morphological decomposition at initial stages of visual word recognition and are discussed in the context of a hybrid account.     

The bigram trough hypothesis and the syllable number effect in lexical decision

There has been an increasing volume of evidence supporting the role of the syllable in various word processing tasks. It has, however, been suggested that syllable effects may be caused by orthographic redundancy. In particular, it has been proposed that the presence of bigram troughs at syllable boundaries cause what are seen as syllable effects. We investigated the bigram trough hypothesis as an explanation of the number of syllables effect for lexical decision in five-letter words and nonwords from the British Lexicon Project. The number of syllables made a significant contribution to prediction of lexical decision times along with word frequency and orthographic similarity. The presence of a bigram trough did not. For nonwords, the number of syllables made a significant contribution to prediction of lexical decision times only for nonwords with relatively long decision times. The presence of a bigram trough made no contribution. The evidence presented suggests that the bigram trough cannot be an explanation of the syllable number effect in lexical decision. A comparison of the results from words and nonwords is interpreted as providing some support for dual-route models of reading.     

Letter transpositions within morphemes and across morpheme boundaries

Recent evidence has revealed conflicting results regarding the influence of letter transpositions during the recognition of morphologically complex words. While some studies suggest that the disruption of the morpheme boundary through across-boundary transpositions (e.g., darnkess) leads to the absence of masked transposed-letter (TL) priming, other studies have found that TL priming occurs independently of whether or not letters have been transposed across the boundary. We conducted three experiments to test whether the difference between TL- within and TL-across priming is modulated by (a) the transposition of internal versus external letters of the stem (Experiment 1), (b) the overall proportion of affixed trials (Experiment 2), or (c) the relative frequency between prime and target (Experiment 3). The results revealed equal TL-within and TL-across boundary priming across all three experiments, which adds to previous findings suggesting that across-boundary transpositions do not interfere with the recognition of morphologically complex words.     

The Predictive Brain

During the lengthy and complex process of human evolution our ancestors had to adapt to extremely testing situations in which survival depended on making rapid choices that subjected muscles and the body as a whole to extreme tension. In order to seize a prey traveling at speeds that could reach 36 km per hour Homo sapiens had just thousandths of a second in which to anticipate the right moment and position himself before the prey arrived. He also had to prepare the appropriate gesture, tensing his muscles and overcoming the resistance determined by body weight. While we are no longer faced with an environment that is anything so threatening, our brain continues to use these mechanisms day in day out to save time and energy, enabling us to avoid situations of danger, sense in advance the intentions of an interlocutor, and more besides. In this article we set out to show that our brain is not only a reactive mechanism, capable of reacting quickly to the stimuli that arrive from the external environment, but is above all a pro-active mechanism that allows us to make hypotheses, anticipate the consequences of actions, and formulate expectations: in short, to wrong foot an adversary.     

Causal uncertainty and metacognitive inferences about goal attainment

These four studies investigated G. Weary and J. A. Edwards’ (1996) hypothesis that causal uncertainty feelings serve as input to perceivers regarding the adequacy of their causal knowledge and thus determine the amount of processing accorded a given task. Participants worked on a task until they had satisfied an assigned stop rule. In three experiments, high causally uncertain people processed more information under a sufficiency of information rule and less under an enjoyment rule, whereas low causally uncertain people generally did not differentiate between the rules. In the last experiment, low causally uncertain people exhibited a similar pattern to the chronic causally uncertain individuals in the first experiments, but only after their causal uncertainty beliefs and feelings had been primed.     

Early adolescents show sustained susceptibility to cognitive interference by emotional distractors

A child's ability to continuously pay attention to a cognitive task is often challenged by distracting events. Distraction is especially detrimental in a learning or classroom environment in which attended information is typically associated with establishing skills and knowledge. Here we report a study examining the effect of emotional distractors on performance in a subsequent visual lexical decision task in 11- to 13-year-old students (n=30). Lexical decisions about neutral verbs and verb-like pseudowords (i.e., targets) were analysed as a function of the preceding distractor type (pleasant, neutral, or unpleasant photos) and the picture–target stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA; 200 or 600 ms). Across distractor categories, emotionally arousing pictures prolonged decisions about word targets when compared to neutral pictures, irrespective of the SOA. The present results demonstrate that similar to adults, early adolescent students exhibit sustained susceptibility to cognitive interference by irrelevant emotional events.     

Emotion and culture: A meta-analysis

A meta-analysis of 190 cross-cultural emotion studies, published between 1967 and 2000, was performed to examine (1) to what extent reported cross-cultural differences in emotion variables could be regarded as valid (substantive factors) or as method-related (statistical artefacts, cultural bias), and (2) which country characteristics could explain valid cross-cultural differences in emotion. The relative contribution of substantive and method-related factors at sample, study, and country level was investigated and country-level explanations for differences in emotions were tested. Results indicate that a correction for statistical artefacts and method-related factors reduced the observed cross-cultural effect sizes considerably. After controlling for valence (positive vs. negative emotions) and kind of study (self-report vs. recognition studies), the remaining cross-cultural variance was associated with subsistence mode, political system, values, and religiosity. Values explained more variance than did ecological or sociopolitical variables. It was concluded that both method-related factors (13.8% of variance explained) and culture-level factors (27.9% of variance explained) underlie observed cross-cultural differences.     

Cognitive sources of evidence for neuroticism's link to punishment-reactivity processes

Theories of neuroticism emphasise its close potential link to punishment-reactivity processes, yet cognitive sources of evidence for this proposed processing basis are surprisingly scarce. The present two studies (N = 123) sought to rectify this important gap in the literature in terms of reactivity to error feedback. Study 1 found that individuals high in neuroticism were faster to switch behavioural responses following errors, whereas an opposite pattern was found among individuals low in neuroticism. Study 2 extended this error-reactivity perspective to the realm of behavioural decision making. Individuals high in neuroticism switched their behavioural predictions following error feedback, whereas this tendency was non-significant among individuals low in neuroticism. Together, the studies present novel, but theory-informed, cognitive paradigms for assessing punishment-reactivity processes, confirm neuroticism's link to such processes, and do so in the realms of both reaction time (Study 1) and behavioural predictions (Study 2). The discussion focuses on the utility of modelling punishment-reactivity processes in cognitive terms and highlights relevant directions for future research.     

Reappraisal and expected value modulate risk taking

Decision making is informed by appraisals of appetitive cues and their associated opportunities for rewards. Such appraisals can be modulated by cognitive regulation strategies in order to promote goal-directed choices. Little is known about how cognitive regulation strategies, especially reappraisal, alter risk taking during decision making. To characterise the effect of reappraisal on risk taking, we systematically varied both the goal of regulation and the value of the decision options. Participants engaged in two reappraisal strategies with opposite goals, to increase (“emphasise”) or decrease (“de-emphasise”) the importance of an upcoming decision, during the presentation of cues signalling monetary decisions. The expected value of taking a risk was systematically varied across decisions such that a risky choice could be beneficial or disadvantageous. Reappraisal strategies increased or decreased risk taking in accordance both with regulation goals and expected value information. These results suggest that reappraisal can be used to flexibly alter behaviour associated with appetitive cues while maintaining value information.