算法拒绝的三维动机理论

算法拒绝意指尽管算法通常能比人类做出更准确的决策, 但人们依然更偏好人类决策的现象。算法拒绝的三维动机理论归纳了算法主体怀疑、道德地位缺失和人类特性湮没这三个主要原因, 分别对应信任、责任和掌控三种心理动机, 并对应改变算法拒绝的三种可行方案: 提高人类对算法的信任度, 强化算法的主体责任, 探索个性化算法设计以突显人对算法决策的控制力。未来研究可进一步以更社会性的视角探究算法拒绝的发生边界和其他可能动机。     

A Biased Inferential Naivety learning model for a network of agents

We propose a Biased Inferential Naivety social learning model. In this model, a group of agents tries to determine the true state of the world and make the best possible decisions. The agents have limited computational abilities. They receive noisy private signals about the true state and observe the history of their neighbors' decisions. The proposed model is rooted in the Bayesian method but avoids the complexity of fully Bayesian inference. In our model, the role of knowledge obtained from social observations is separated from the knowledge obtained from private observations. Therefore, the Bayesian inferences on social observations are approximated using inferential naivety assumption, while purely Bayesian inferences are made on private observations. The reduction of herd behavior is another innovation of the proposed model. This advantage is achieved by reducing the effect of social observations on agents' beliefs over time. Therefore, all the agents learn the truth, and the correct consensus is achieved effectively. In this model, using two cognitive biases, there is heterogeneity in agents' behaviors. Therefore, the growth of beliefs and the learning speed can be improved in different situations. Several Monte Carlo simulations confirm the features of the proposed model. The conditions under which the proposed model leads to asymptotic learning are proved.     

睾酮对价值加工的影响——基于“累积前景”理论框架的决策行为研究

较多研究支持睾酮和决策中的风险寻求行为呈正相关,但是也有其他的研究未能发现这种关系。基于决策的累计前景理论,本研究使用动态估计参数估计任务(DEEP),结合计算模型的方法,对120名双盲给药、有安慰剂对照的被试进行睾酮对价值加工过程作用的探究。结果显示,睾酮减少了个体的概率扭曲以及增加了损失规避,但是没有引发明显的风险寻求行为,研究结果表明睾酮对个体的价值加工过程产生了影响,使个体对概率的感知更接近于客观值并且增加了对损失的敏感性。     

Attention in risky choice

Previous research on the processes involved in risky decisions has rarely linked process data to choice directly. We used a simple measure based on the relative amount of attentional deployment to different components (gains/losses and their probabilities) of a risky gamble during the choice process, and we related this measure to the actual choice. In an experiment we recorded the decisions, decision times, and eye movements of 80 participants who made decisions on 11 choice problems. We used the number of eye fixations and fixation transitions to trace the deployment of attention during the choice process and obtained the following main results. First, different components of a gamble attracted different amounts of attention depending on participants' actual choice. This was reflected in both the number of fixations and the fixation transitions. Second, the last-fixated gamble but not the last-fixated reason predicted participants' choices. Third, a comparison of data obtained with eye tracking and data obtained with verbal protocols from a previous study showed a large degree of convergence regarding the process of risky choice. Together these findings tend to support dimensional decision strategies such as the priority heuristic.     

Rapid decisions from experience

In many everyday decisions, people quickly integrate noisy samples of information to form a preference among alternatives that offer uncertain rewards. Here, we investigated this decision process using the Flash Gambling Task (FGT), in which participants made a series of choices between a certain payoff and an uncertain alternative that produced a normal distribution of payoffs. For each choice, participants experienced the distribution of payoffs via rapid samples updated every 50 ms. We show that people can make these rapid decisions from experience and that the decision process is consistent with a sequential sampling process. Results also reveal a dissociation between these preferential decisions and equivalent perceptual decisions where participants had to determine which alternatives contained more dots on average. To account for this dissociation, we developed a sequential sampling rank-dependent utility model, which showed that participants in the FGT attended more to larger potential payoffs than participants in the perceptual task despite being given equivalent information. We discuss the implications of these findings in terms of computational models of preferential choice and a more complete understanding of experience-based decision making.     

Emotional Intelligence and Career Decision‐Making Self‐Efficacy: National and Gender Differences

This study examined the effect of emotional intelligence (EI) on career decision‐making self‐efficacy (CDMSE) in an East Asian context, as well as the moderating roles of gender and country. Data were collected from undergraduate students from China (N = 149) and South Korea (N = 218). The results showed that all 4 factors of EI were positively related to CDMSE. Moreover, while the effects of 3 EI factors on CDMSE were found to be greater among the Chinese students than the South Korean students, no gender differences were detected. By introducing cultural influences, the findings provide important implications for career counseling.     

Justice Orientation as a Moderator of the Framing Effect on Procedural Justice Perception

Justice orientation is a justice-relevant personality trait, which is referred to as the tendency to attend to fairness issues and to internalize justice as a moral virtue. This study examined the moderating role of justice orientation in the relationship between justice perception and response to a decision problem. The authors manipulated procedural justice and the outcome valence of the decision frame within a vignette, and measured justice orientation of 174 Japanese participants. As hypothesized, the results indicated an interaction between procedural justice and framing manipulation, which was moderated by individual differences in justice orientation. In negative framing, justice effects were larger for individuals with high rather than low justice orientation. The results are explained from a social justice perspective, and the contributions and limitations of this study are also discussed with respect to our sample and framing manipulation.     

Judges' views of child sexual abuse: Evaluating beliefs against research findings in a Finnish sample

Beliefs impact our decision‐making and different professionals have been shown to have beliefs about child sexual abuse (CSA) that do not coincide with scientific findings. In the present study, judges' beliefs regarding CSA were explored. Finnish judges (N = 104) answered a questionnaire about CSA related issues as well as questions regarding their professional experience of CSA cases. The judges held both correct and incorrect beliefs; while their CSA prevalence estimates were rather well in line with research findings, half of the participants estimated that no professionals use suggestive methods when interviewing children and more than 40% thought suggestive methods can be useful when trying to get a child to tell about real events. Judges correctly assumed symptoms cannot be used to assess a CSA case, however, the majority thought play observations were appropriate means for evaluating such suspicions. Experience seemed to lead to more confidence in their own expertise but not in an actual increase in knowledge, namely, judges thought themselves more expert when more experienced although their expertise as measured by the questionnaire did not improve. Overall, the judges had both correct and erroneous beliefs but while experience did not improve the situation, gaining information about CSA did. More research about the beliefs of judges and how such beliefs impact legal decision‐making is needed.     

Misreporting signs of child abuse: The role of decision‐making and outcome information

Two studies provided evidence that a decision to report an ambiguous case of child abuse affected subsequent memory of the case information, such that participants falsely recognized details that were not presented in the original information, but that are schematically associated with child abuse. Moreover, post‐decision information that the child had later died from abuse influenced the memory reports of participants who had chosen not to report the case, increasing their reports of false schema‐consistent details. This suggests that false decision‐consistent memories are primarily due to sense‐making, schematic processing rather than the motivation to justify the decision. The present findings points to an important mechanism by which decision information can become distorted in retrospect, and emphasize the difficulties of improving future decision‐making by contemplating past decisions. The results also indicate that decisions may generate false memories in the apparent absence of external suggestion or misleading information. Implications for decision‐making theory, and applied practices are discussed.     

Handedness differences in information framing

Previous research has shown that strength of handedness predicts differences in sensory illusions, Stroop interference, episodic memory, and beliefs about body image. Recent evidence also suggests handedness differences in the susceptibility to common decision biases such as anchoring and sunk cost. The present paper extends this line of work to attribute framing effects. Sixty-three undergraduates were asked to advise a friend concerning the use of a safe allergy medication during pregnancy. A third of the participants received negatively-framed information concerning the fetal risk of the drug (1–3% chance of having a malformed child); another third received positively-framed information (97–99% chance of having a normal child); and the final third received no counseling information and served as the control. Results indicated that, as predicted, inconsistent (mixed)-handers were more responsive than consistent (strong)-handers to information changes and readily update their beliefs. Although not significant, the data also suggested that only inconsistent handers were affected by information framing. Theoretical implications as well as ongoing work in holistic versus analytic processing, contextual sensitivity, and brain asymmetry will be discussed.