Exploring Decision Making Around Therapist Self‐Disclosure in Cognitive Behavioural Therapy

Background

Therapist self‐disclosure (TSD) usage varies greatly among different psychotherapy orientations. Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that there are reasons for its judicious use, and a small number of researchers have proposed guidelines for how TSD should be used to help therapists across psychotherapy models make decisions around disclosure. However, there is almost no literature specifically exploring how cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) practitioners make decisions around employing TSD within the CBT framework.

Objective

This study aimed to explore how experienced CBT practitioners make decisions around TSD.

Method

In‐depth qualitative interviews were conducted with six clinical psychologists who were trained and experienced in CBT, and the interviews were analysed thematically.

Results

There were two overarching themes in terms of how they made decisions to self‐disclose: (A) the rules for TSD use, which included sub‐themes (a) it must have a clear purpose, (b) it must fit, (c) the therapist must maintain boundaries, and (d) the therapist must always reflect on his/her use of TSD; and (B) how they use TSD, which included subthemes of (a) using it as a tool for change and (b) using it to manage the therapeutic relationship.

Conclusion

Participants’ decisions on whether or not to self‐disclose were strongly influenced by the CBT model, and this process went beyond what is suggested in the transtheoretical literature. Understanding this process may lead to the development of CBT‐specific guidelines for making TSD‐related decisions.     

Two Envelopes and Binding

This paper describes a way of defending a modification of Eckhardt's [2013] solution to the Two Envelopes Paradox. The defence is based on ideas from Arntzenius, Elga, and Hawthorne [2004].     

Be aware of the rifle but do not forget the stench: differential effects of fear and disgust on lexical processing and memory

The aim of this study was to investigate the role of discrete emotions in lexical processing and memory, focusing on disgust and fear. We compared neutral words to disgust-related words and fear-related words in three experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants performed a lexical decision task (LDT), and in Experiment 3 an affective categorisation task. These tasks were followed by an unexpected memory task. The results of the LDT experiments showed slower reaction times for both types of negative words with respect to neutral words, plus a higher percentage of errors, this being more consistent for fear-related words (Experiments 1 and 2) than for disgust-related words (Experiment 2). Furthermore, only disgusting words exhibited a higher recall accuracy than neutral words in the memory task. Moreover, the advantage in memory for disgusting words disappeared when participants carried out an affective categorisation task during encoding (Experiment 3), suggesting that the superiority in memory for disgusting words observed in Experiments 1 and 2 could be due to greater elaborative processing. Taken together, these findings point to the relevance of discrete emotions in explaining the effects of the emotional content on lexical processing and memory.     

A qualitative analysis of strategies for managing suicide-related events during deployment from the perspective of Army behavioral health providers,chaplains, and leaders

The purpose of this qualitative study was to investigate the use of strategies for managing suicide-related events (SREs; i.e., suicide deaths, suicide attempts, and suicidal ideation with a plan and intent to die) during deployment from the perspective of Army decision makers: behavioral health providers (BHPs), chaplains, and leaders. A total of 76 Army personnel participated in individual interviews or focus groups. Participants identified unit watch, weapon removal, medical evacuations, and debriefings as common strategies used to manage SREs in deployed settings. Many of these strategies were highlighted as short-term solutions only. Participants also underscored the importance of unit cohesion and communication among leaders, BHPs, and chaplains to effectively manage SREs. The need for structured guidelines for successfully managing SREs in deployed settings is discussed.     

What People Want From Their Professionals: Attitudes Toward Decision‐making Strategies

Attitudes toward four types of decision‐making strategies—clinical/fully rational, clinical/heuristic, actuarial/fully rational, and actuarial/heuristic—were examined across three studies. In Study 1, undergraduate students were split randomly between legal and medical decision‐making scenarios and asked to rate each strategy in terms of the following: (i) preference; (ii) accuracy; (iii) fairness; (iv) ethicalness; and (v) its perceived similarity to the strategies used by actual legal and medical professionals to make decisions. Studies 2 and 3 extended Study 1 by using a more relevant scenario and a community sample, respectively. Across the three studies, the clinical/fully rational strategy tended to be rated the highest across all attitudinal judgments, whereas the actuarial/heuristic strategy tended to receive the lowest ratings. Considering the two strategy‐differentiating factors separately, clinically based strategies tended to be rated higher than actuarially based strategies, and fully rational strategies were always rated higher than heuristic‐based strategies. The potential implications of the results for professionals' and those affected by their decisions are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Four empirical tests of Unconscious Thought Theory

According to Unconscious Thought Theory, people make better decisions after unconscious than after conscious thought (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006a). Unconscious Thought Theory yields four specific predictions. First, an exact replication of Dijksterhuis et al. (2006a) study should indicate that unconscious decisions are superior to conscious decisions. Second, decisions should improve with duration of conscious thought. Third, unconscious decisions should be superior to conscious decisions, even if unconscious decisions are deliberated while having access to information. Fourth, unconscious decisions should be based on a weighting strategy. We report results of four studies, featuring 480 participants, that yield no evidence in favor of these predictions. Therefore our findings cast doubt on Unconscious Thought Theory and its advice to base decisions on unconscious thought. The results of our studies suggest that it is better to base decisions on conscious thought while having access to information.     

Consumer decisions in relationships

Most research on consumer choice assumes that decisions are usually made by individuals, and that these decisions are based on an individual's personal attitudes, beliefs, and preferences. Yet, much consumer behavior—from joint decisions to individual choices—is directly or indirectly shaped by people with whom we have some relationship. In this target article, we examine how each member in a relationship can affect how consumer decisions are made. After reviewing foundational work in the area, we introduce a powerful and statistically sophisticated methodology to study decisions within relationships—a dyadic framework of decision-making. We then discuss how the study of consumer decisions in relationships can be informed by different theories in the relationships field, including attachment, interdependence, social power, communal/exchange orientations, relationship norms, and evolutionary principles. By building on the seminal foundations of prior joint-decision making research with theories and methods from contemporary relationship science, we hope to facilitate the integration of the consumer and relationships literature to better understand and generate novel hypotheses about consumer decisions in relationships.     

Bridging the gap between joint and individual decisions: Deconstructing preferences in relationships

Most choice research has studied how people make decisions within a narrowly defined choice context and has not paid sufficient attention to the role of social context. We commend Simpson, Griskevicius, and Rothman for directing the attention of choice researchers to the study of joint decision making and current theories on relationships. Building on SGR, we propose that a relationship partner's influence varies with the type of decision at hand and with situational factors. We propose four possible types of decision episodes, defined by whether the decision stage and the consumption stage each occur singly or jointly, and explore how the decision type impacts the extent to which a decision maker will take a partner's preferences into account. We further discuss how situational factors, such as the environment in which the decision is made, as well as the mindset and cognitive resources of the decision maker, are likely to influence decision outcomes.     

But I can’t pass that far! The influence of motor skill on decision making

Objectives

The influence of motor skill on perceptual-cognitive and perceptual-motor decision making has been theorised but not verified empirically.

Method

Expert (n = 19), developmental (n = 20), and lesser-skilled netballers (n = 19) completed tests designed to evaluate three different components of domain-specific expertise: (i) motor skill-execution; (ii) perceptual-cognitive decision making; and (iii) perceptual-motor decision making.

Results

Each of the three measures was found to improve commensurate with domain-specific skill. Decisions requiring movements (perceptual-motor) elicited more accurate decision making than simple verbal responses (perceptual-cognitive), irrespective of participant skill. Although motor skill was found to be related to the successful execution of a most appropriate movement in a game situation, it was not found to limit the nature of the decision made by participants. No evidence was found to support the supposition that lesser-skilled participants bias their perceptual-cognitive decisions towards ones supported by their motor ability.

Conclusions

Results fail to comprehensively support the contemporary models for the development of perceptual-cognitive and perceptual-motor skill in sport.