Using Dual Tasks to Test Immediate Transfer of Training Between Naturalistic Movements: A Proof-of-Principle Study

Theories of motor learning predict that training a movement reduces the amount of attention needed for its performance (i.e., more automatic). If training one movement transfers, then the amount of attention needed for performing a second movement should also be reduced, as measured under dual task conditions. The authors’ purpose was to test whether dual task paradigms are feasible for detecting transfer of training between two naturalistic movements. Immediately following motor training, subjects improved performance of a second untrained movement under single and dual task conditions. Subjects with no training did not. Improved performance in the untrained movement was likely due to transfer, and suggests that dual tasks may be feasible for detecting transfer between naturalistic actions.     

Rich deontic logic: a preliminary study

This paper begins the development of new types of deontic operators, particularly ones whose semantic characterization is based on models with forward-branching time. In such models, supplemented by a choice function to model human agency, and an obligation function to introduce normative features, it is possible to develop a rich language with a variety of obligation operators, differing from one another in how they relate to time, and to the causal conditions, the causal consequences, and the logical consequences of actions. We approach these concepts making extensive use of the notion of a transition, as introduced in [M. Xu, Synthese 112 (1997) 137].     

Religious Naturalism Today

Three questions are addressed. First, concerning the definition of naturalism, I accept the characterization by Rem Edwards (1972) but insist on a materialist or physicalist interpretation of these features. Second, the distinctive characteristic of my religious naturalism is an argument that although a theological position based on a physicalist ontology is constrained by physicalism, the ontology itself does not dictate theological content. Theological content can break free of ontology if this content is valuational rather than ontological. Such a valuational theism becomes possible when Rudolf Bultmann's and Fritz Buri's method of existentialist interpretation is wedded to Henry Nelson Wieman's naturalist conception of God. The knowledge of God in events of grace, therefore, is rooted in moments of creative transformation that are themselves always transformative. This approach makes possible a better approach to the problem of objectivity than Bultmann could achieve. Third, concerning the chief issues facing religious naturalism today, I argue that religious naturalists should more forthrightly confront the issue of ontological materialism and that the most pressing issue concerns thinking out more fully the religious or theological content to be ascribed to such a position after the nature of naturalism is resolved.     

Problems and Possibilities of Theological Models: Responding to David Klemm and William Klink

This essay is a response to the proposals of David Klemm and William Klink concerning the construction and testing of theological models. A number of issues are raised for critical attention. (1) The exclusive attention to Christian theology, with no discussion of other religions, poses some significant problems, not the least of which is that cognitive claims of religious thinking are not universal but rather are defined by the particularities of the religious context in which they are made. (2) Although the authors wish to transcend confessionalism, their focus on Christianity and on the concept of God as a basic assumption can be construed as a kind of confessionalism. (3) The argument that theological and scientific models stand in analogy to each other requires more critical examination, particularly with respect to the issues of explanation, prediction, falsification, nesting, and openness. (4) While the argument is persuasive when referred to certain theologians, such as Paul Tillich, it requires some adjustment if it is to apply to other theological systems, such as Process theology.     

Transzendentalpragmatik und Diskursethik. Elemente und Perspektiven der Apelschen Diskursphilosophie

Transcendental Pragmatics and Discourse Ethics. Elements and Perspectives of Apel's Discourse-Philosophy. The author follows Apel's intellectual biography and shows the conception of a critique of meaning qua ‘reflection upon the discourse within the discourse’ to be the centre of Apel's language-pragmatic ‘Transformation of Philosophy’ (Frankfurt a.M. 1973). Beginning with an explication of the situation of a speaker/thinker, especially of the situation of a philosophising speaker/thinker, Apel reconstructs a two fold apriori of communication: Every thought is situated within the context of a particular, historically evolved, community of language and interaction. At the same time, however, the validity-claims of thoughts transcend the context of their origin towards an unlimited community of argumentation. On the basis of the first apriori Apel criticises the methodical solipsism as well as the objectivism of modern philosophy and theory of science. Drawing upon the second apriori he develops a universalist critique of meaning of relativism and contextualism. In the sixties and seventies Apel worked out a differentiated theory of the – more or less – communicatively cognizing humanities and set it apart from the theory of the causal-explanatory natural sciences, thus challenging the objectivism of a Theory of Unified Science. Building upon this work Transcendental Pragmatics, as developed by Apel and others, sets philosophy primarily two tasks: firstly, a (fallible) internal reconstruction of argumentative discourse as the (logical) situation of speech and thought which seeks to elucidate the conditions of the meaningfulness, i. e. the presuppositions, of discourse. These presuppositions comprise, thus Apel with Habermas, the four validity-claims to intelligibility, sincerety/credibility, truth and normative rightness/legitimacy. Their moral content consists, thus Apel, not only in the recognition of the equality of all beings capable of discursive reasoning but also in their recognition of a co-responsibility for the realizability of discourses and of responsibility. The author argues that the existence of a co-responsibility of this kind is indisputable because the discursive claims to validity are intertwined with a set of ‘primordial promises of dialogue’. Only with the elucidation and explication of these promises can the reconstruction of the internal conditions of discourse be completed.The second task of a pragmatics of argumentation isthe strict resp. actual reflection of the thinker upon the presuppositions of the discourse in which he currently engages. This reflection has a Socratic character and can only be done in the form of discussion and debate (‘Auseinandersetzungen’, Apel, Frankfurt a.M. 1998) with critics of the reconstruction. In this context, the author proposes a method of Socratic reflection upon the presuppositions of dialogue which suspends the usual, theoretically oriented, attitude of the scientist and the philosopher in favour of an actual reflective attitude. Within a dialogue with a sceptic who doubts one of the results of the internal reconstruction of dialogical presuppositions, say X, it is tested whether his doubt as to the unrestricted validity of X can be understood as a sincere contribution to the current dialogue or whether this particular sceptical thesis does not make sense, because it is incompatible with the role of a sincere participant of argumentation which, after all, the sceptic cannot refuse to claim for himself.Finally the author explains Apel's characterization of the tension between “Discourse and Responsibility” (Frankfurt a.M. 1988). In the course of discussions with Max Weber, Lawrence Kohlberg, Hans Jonas et al., Apel formulates and justifies an ethics of responsibility and gives an affirmative answer to the crucial question of whether the fulfilment of the moral obligations connected with the recognition of co-responsibility can be demanded within the non-dialogical circumstances of social reality. Apel's answer employs the idea of counter-strategies which are morally legitimate in virtue of their being worthy of argumentative consensus. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A new vision of a classical question: How to become a mother?

Abstract

This article offers a reflection on conception, pregnancy, and the first mother–infant relationships of mothers with motoric and sensory disabilities. Based on more than 13 years of experience with women with motoric and sensory disabilities who had a desire for a child, the author analyzes this unusual situation from three different points of view: the medical help to procreate, meeting a partner for the mother, and the link with the initial maternal family, i.e. the mother’s mother. The last part concerns the possibility of the development of a mother–infant relationship when bodily function is lacking.     

Thurstonian-Based Analyses: Past, Present, and Future Utilities

Current psychometric models of choice behavior are strongly influenced by Thurstone’s (1927, 1931) experimental and statistical work on measuring and scaling preferences. Aided by advances in computational techniques, choice models can now accommodate a wide range of different data types and sources of preference variability among respondents induced by such diverse factors as person-specific choice sets or different functional forms for the underlying utility representations. At the same time, these models are increasingly challenged by behavioral work demonstrating the prevalence of choice behavior that is not consistent with the underlying assumptions of these models. I discuss new modeling avenues that can account for such seemingly inconsistent choice behavior and conclude by emphasizing the interdisciplinary frontiers in the study of choice behavior and the resulting challenges for psychometricians. The author would like to thank R. Darrell Bock whose work inspired many of the ideas presented here. The paper benefitted from helpful comments by Albert Maydeu-Olivares and Rung-Ching Tsai. The reported research was supported in parts by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.     

High Aspirations: Differences in Employee Satisfaction Between University Faculty and Staff

Employee satisfaction surveys were examined for five universities in the US, UK and Canada, selected because they presented results for faculty and other staff separately. Faculty consistently score more negatively on employee satisfaction across a wide range of areas. The most negative responses are for areas such as personal/worklife balance, work demands/workload, university direction, and whether the employee would choose to work at the same institution again/would recommend it for employment. The results are consistent with previous studies which have shown that education level is negatively associated with job satisfaction. The results suggest that university faculty have high aspirations, since in a number of indicators faculty working conditions appear superior to those of staff (tenure; average income; sabbatical leaves; work control; involvement and consultation in university decision-making), although junior faculty prior to tenure may experience more stress than staff. Employers undertaking employee satisfaction surveys need to take into account systematic differences in aspirations among their employees, when interpreting survey results.     

Reliability and generalizability of an acted-out false belief task in 3-year-olds

The current study tested the reliability and generalizability of a narrative act-out false belief task held to reveal Theory of Mind (ToM) competence at 3 years of age, before children pass verbal standard false belief tasks (the “Duplo task”; Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2013, Psychological Science). We conducted the task across two labs with methodologically improved matched control conditions. Further, we administered an analogue intensionality version to assess the scope of ToM competence in the Duplo task. 72 3-year-olds participated in a Duplo change-of-location task, a Duplo intensionality task, and half of them in a matched verbal standard change-of-location task, receiving either false belief or matched true belief scenarios. Children performed at chance in the false belief Duplo location change and intensionality tasks as well as in the standard false belief task. There were no differences to the standard task, and performance correlated across all three false belief tasks, revealing a rather unified competence and no task advantage. In the true belief conditions of both Duplo tasks, children performed at ceiling and significantly different from the false belief conditions, while they were at chance in the true belief condition of the standard task. The latter indicates that a pragmatic advantage of the Duplo task compared to the standard task holds only for the true belief scenarios. Our study shows that the Duplo task measures the same ToM competence as the standard task and rejects a notion of earlier false belief understanding on the group level in 3-year-old children.     

Scientific Naturalism, the Mind-Body Relation, and Religious Experience

Although attempts to explain religious experience in terms of brain processes usually presuppose the identification of scientific naturalism with the s ensationist, a theistic, m aterialist version of naturalism (naturalism_sam), this version is inadequate for science, and human experience more generally, for numerous reasons. An alternative version, based on p anexperientialism, p anentheism, and a p rehensive doctrine of perception (naturalism_ppp), not only avoids those problems but also allows for religious experience understood as the soul's direct experience of a Holy Reality.