Thyme to touch: Infants possess strategies that protect them from dangers posed by plants

Plants have been central to human life as sources of food and raw materials for artifact construction over evolutionary time. But plants also have chemical and physical defenses (such as harmful toxins and thorns) that provide protection from herbivores. The presence of these defenses has shaped the behavioral strategies of non-human animals. Here we report evidence that human infants possess strategies that would serve to protect them from dangers posed by plants. Across two experiments, infants as young as eight months exhibit greater reluctance to manually explore plants compared to other entities. These results expand the growing literature showing that infants are sensitive to certain ancestrally recurrent dangers, and provide a basis for further exploration.     

The affect heuristic,mortality salience,and risk: Domain‐specific effects of a natural disaster on risk‐benefit perception

We examine how affect and accessible thoughts following a major natural disaster influence everyday risk perception. A survey was conducted in the months following the 2004 south Asian Tsunami in a representative sample of the Swedish population (N = 733). Respondents rated their experienced affect as well as the perceived risk and benefits of various everyday decision domains. Affect influenced risk and benefit perception in a way that could be predicted from both the affect‐congruency and affect heuristic literatures (increased risk perception and stronger risk‐benefit correlations). However, in some decision domains, self‐regulation goals primed by the natural disaster predicted risk and benefit ratings. Together, these results show that affect, accessible thoughts and motivational states influence perceptions of risks and benefits.     

Adult Attachment Dimensions,World View Schemas,and the Psychological Health of Parents of Infants in a Neonatal Intensive Care Unit

This study reports the results of an exploration of the relationship of adult attachment dimensions (closeness, dependence, and anxiety) and world view assumptions (benevolence, meaningfulness, and worthiness) to psychological distress and psychological well-being in 142 parents (71 couples) of newborns recently hospitalized in a neonatal intensive care unit. The results of the Actor-Partner Interdependence Model, hierarchical multiple regression, and mediation analyses showed that parents who were more comfortable with attachment-dependence and parents who held more positive beliefs about benevolence and worthiness had less psychological distress and more well-being. In addition, parents with partners who were more comfortable with attachment-dependence had less psychological distress and more well-being. Attachment-dependence partially mediated the relationships of benevolence and worthiness with psychological distress and the relationship of benevolence with psychological well-being, whereas worthiness had a direct relationship with psychological well-being.     

A sufficiently political orthodox conception of human rights

The traditional conception of human rights, or the orthodox conception (OC), has, over the last few years, been vigorously challenged by the political conception (PC) of human rights. I have two main aims in this paper: the first is to articulate and evaluate the main points of disagreement between the OC and the PC in order to provide a clearer picture of what is at stake in the debate. The second is to argue that the OC has the resources to respond to the PC's most challenging criticism; namely that it is not sufficiently political.     

Why global justice matters

Why does global justice as a philosophical inquiry matter? We know that the world is plainly unjust in many ways and we know that something ought to be done about this without, it seems, the need of a theory of global justice. Accordingly, philosophical inquiry into global justice comes across to some as an intellectual luxury that seems disconnected from the real world. I want to suggest, however, that philosophical inquiry into global justice is necessary if we want to address the problems of humanity. First, in some cases, a theory of global justice is needed for identifying what counts as legitimate problems of justice. Second, even in obvious cases of injustices, such as the fact of preventable extreme poverty to which we know we have an obligation to respond, we cannot know the content and the limits of these obligations and who the primary bearers of these obligations are without some theoretical guidance. However, I acknowledge that philosophical inquiry on global justice risks becoming a philosophical parlor game if it loses sight of the real-world problems that motivate the inquiry in the first place. If global justice is to provide the tools for addressing the problems of humanity, it must remain a problems-driven enterprise.     

On Biotechnology,Theology, and the Human Sciences

There may be very good Christian theological reasons to oppose human biotechnological enhancement. It is, however, difficult to discern what they are. Much of the specifically Christian response to transhumanist biotechnological enhancement has revolved around the metaphysics of human persons; this is hardly surprising, given that similar themes appear in other bioethical themes, such as over in vitro fertilization, abortion, and euthanasia. The main aim of this paper is to clarify the theological requirements for such responses, particularly those that are mistakenly delegated to scientists. In particular, the paper will focus on the need for a Christian theological account of human nature that does not unduly rely on biological accounts of the same.     

Natural Reflection,Phenomenological Reflection and Hyperreflexivity

This paper examines critically the notion of reflection as self-objectification and points out its insufficiency in accounting for the pathological phenomenon of hyperreflexivity. It proposes an understanding of reflection as situated and motivated from within a world and having a normative aspect that concerns the very life of the reflecting person. On this account, the paper argues, on the one hand, that both phenomenological reflection and hyperreflexivity can be viewed as forms of reflection characterized by loss of the world. On the other hand, by construing the phenomenological loss as imaginative vis-à-vis the real loss of hyperreflexivity, the paper emphasizes a difference between the two domains.     

What kind of kind is intelligence?

The model of human intelligence that is most widely adopted derives from psychometrics and behavioral genetics. This standard approach conceives intelligence as a general cognitive ability that is genetically highly heritable and describable using quantitative traits analysis. The paper analyzes intelligence within the debate on natural kinds and contends that the general intelligence conceptualization does not carve psychological nature at its joints. Moreover, I argue that this model assumes an essentialist perspective. As an alternative, I consider an HPC theory of intelligence and evaluate how it deals with essentialism and with intuitions coming from cognitive science. Finally, I highlight some concerns about the HPC model as well, and conclude by suggesting that it is unnecessary to treat intelligence as a kind in any sense.     

ON SOCIAL EVIL AND NATURAL EVIL: IN CONVERSATION WITH CHRISTOPHER SOUTHGATE

In this contribution, the author engages in a conversation with Christopher Southgate on the relationship between social evil and what is called natural “evil.” Theologically, this centers around an understanding of creation and fall. It is argued that Southgate typically treats soteriology and eschatology as themes pertaining to an evolutionary theodicy, whereas an adequate ecotheology would discuss the problem of natural suffering under the rubric of the narrative of God's economy. The question is then how that story is best told.