3~5岁幼儿权力概念多重隐喻的认知发展

为考察3~5岁幼儿“权力”概念的大小、垂直空间和重量多重隐喻的认知发展进程, 研究采用了将权力人物和无权力人物图片放置大圆形或小圆形、垂直空间的上方框或下方框和不平衡跷跷板重端或轻端的图片迫选任务。通过3个实验及综合分析发现：3岁幼儿尚不具备权力隐喻理解能力; 4岁是幼儿权力隐喻理解能力的重要发展时期, 具备正极权力概念的隐喻理解能力, 建立起有权力为“大、高、重”的多重隐喻联结; 5岁幼儿的权力隐喻理解能力进一步增强, 已具备较完整的多重隐喻理解能力, 建立起有权力为“大、高、重”、无权力为“小、下、轻”的多重隐喻联结。3~5岁幼儿“权力”概念的大小、垂直空间和重量多重隐喻理解能力同步发展, 不受隐喻靶域习得时间早晚的影响。系列研究表明, 学龄前幼儿的权力隐喻理解能力发展趋势符合隐喻一致性理论, 隐喻表征的产生并非“有或无”的模式, 而是“渐进”呈现发展。     

Braine心理逻辑理论述评

该文对Braine提出的在推理心理学研究领域占居重要地位的“心理逻辑理论”做了综合述评。“心理逻辑理论”主要包括三方面内容:构成“心理逻辑理论”基础的一组推理规则图式、将推理规则图式应用于推理过程的推理方案、实际应用意义。Braine认为他和他的同事于1984年设计并实施的以“自然推理系统”所含各推理规则为实验材料的实验结果支持该理论的基本观点。     

Choosing normative properties: a reply to Eklund’s Choosing Normative Concepts

ABSTRACT

The literature surrounding Horgan and Timmons’s Moral Twin Earth scenarios has focused on whether such scenarios present a metasemantic problem for naturalist realists. But in Choosing Normative Concepts, Eklund uses a similar scenario to illuminate a novel, distinctly metaphysical problem for normative realists of both naturalist and non-naturalist stripes. The problem is that it is not clear what (if anything) would suffice for the sort of ardent realist view that normative realists have in mind – the view that reality itself favors certain ways of acting and valuing. Eklund then offers a metasemantic view that he thinks can provide the best solution to this problem. In this reply to Eklund, I argue that Eklund’s treatment of the problem and his solution re-entangle metaphysical and metasemantic issues that ought to be kept separate. I also argue that there is a purely metaphysical solution to the problem at hand, which Eklund’s own solution seems to implicitly rely upon. While these criticisms do not suggest that Eklund’s positive view is false, they do undermine some of the broader lessons that Eklund hopes to draw from the view.     

Not quite neo-sentimentalism

The view that some evaluative concepts are identical to some affective concepts naturally falls out of neo-sentimentalism, but it is unstable. This paper argues for a view of evaluative concepts that is neo-sentimentalist in spirit but which eschews the identity claim. If we adopt a Peacockean view of concepts, then we should think of some evaluative concepts as having possession conditions that are affective in some way. I argue that the best version of this thought claims that possessing those concepts requires being rationally compelled to form evaluative beliefs in response to certain emotions.     

Reconsidering resource rights: the case for a basic right to the benefits of life-sustaining ecosystem services

In the presence of anthropogenic climate change, gross environmental degradation, and mass abject poverty, many political theorists currently debate issues such as people's right to water, the right to food, and the distribution of rights to natural resources more generally. However, thus far many theorists either focus (somewhat arbitrarily) only on one particular resource (e.g. water) or they treat all natural resources alike, meaning that many relevant distinctions within the group of natural resources are overlooked. Hence, the paper will start with an analysis of the various forms which natural resources can take and how this might influence one's conception of resource rights. In so doing, the paper argues that we have to carefully distinguish between the actual physical resources people might control and how we distribute these, and the life-sustaining benefits each and every person draws from sustainable and functioning ecosystems. Based on this distinction, the paper will argue for a right to the benefits of life-sustaining ecosystem services as a universal basic right every person has. Further distributive claims with respect to particular physical resources would thus be limited by the requirements of such a basic right.     

Replies to Bacon,Eklund, and Greenough on Replacing Truth

Andrew Bacon, Matti Eklund, and Patrick Greenough have individually proposed objections to the project in my book, Replacing Truth. Briefly, the book outlines a conceptual engineering project – our defective concept of truth is replaced for certain purposes with a team of concepts that can do some of the jobs we thought truth could do. Here, I respond to their objections and develop the views expressed in Replacing Truth in various ways.     

Why experiments matter*

Experimentation is traditionally considered a privileged means of confirmation. However, why and how experiments form a better confirmatory source relative to other strategies is unclear, and recent discussions have identified experiments with various modeling strategies on the one hand, and with ‘natural’ experiments on the other hand. We argue that experiments aiming to test theories are best understood as controlled investigations of specimens. ‘Control’ involves repeated, fine-grained causal manipulation of focal properties. This capacity generates rich knowledge of the object investigated. ‘Specimenhood’ involves possessing relevant properties given the investigative target and the hypothesis in question. Specimens are thus representative members of a class of systems, to which a hypothesis refers. It is in virtue of both control and specimenhood that experiments provide powerful confirmatory evidence. This explains the distinctive power of experiments: although modelers exert extensive control, they do not exert this control over specimens; although natural experiments utilize specimens, control is diminished.     

The Development of the Conception of Socioeconomic Mobility in Children From Mexico and Spain

The authors studied the developmental stages of children's understanding of upward socioeconomic mobility. They interviewed one hundred 6- to 14-year-old participants from Mexico and Spain and asked them about sources of wealth and factors related to socioeconomic mobility. Categorical analyses of the responses showed few age-related changes but noted some cross-national differences. A different analysis designed to identify levels of understanding showed a significant association between age and type of explanation of socioeconomic mobility. Overall, cross-national comparisons yielded similarities in children's developmental trends, and only slight differences were found with regard to cultural background. The present results contrast with those of studies conducted from the perspective of the social representation theory.     

Unconscious phantasy as an obstacle and as a stimulus to knowledge

This paper underlines and explores the connections between emotional and cognitive development at a very early stage, starting from the psychoanalytic psychotherapy of a 4-year-old boy with autistic features. Development of the personality and development of the mind are shown to proceed together and to be interwoven when the therapist starts to help the child to modulate the terror and the rage related to separation. The development of the idea of a good nipple and the Introjection of it as a mental structure is considered an important step on the way towards separation between mother and baby and towards the formation within the baby self of a space where symbols of the external world can be placed. Autistic features are considered as an extreme form of denial of both internal and external reality.