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111.
Paul Giladi 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(5):734-751
AbstractMy aim in this paper is to offer a Hegelian critique of Quine’s predicate nominalism. I argue that at the core of Hegel’s idealism is not a supernaturalist spirit monism, but a realism about universals, and that while this may contrast to the nominalist naturalism of Quine, Hegel’s position can still be defended over that nominalism in naturalistic terms. I focus on the contrast between Hegel’s and Quine’s respective views on universals, which Quine takes to be definitive of philosophical naturalism. I argue that there is no good reason to think Quine is right to make this nominalism definitive of naturalism in this way – where in fact Hegel (along with Peirce) offers a reasonably compelling case that science itself requires some commitment to realism about universals, kinds, etc. Furthermore, even if Hegel is wrong about that, at least his case for realism is still a naturalistic one, as it is based on his views on concrete universality, which is an innovative form of in rebus realism about universals. 相似文献
112.
Patrick Clipsham 《Metaphilosophy》2013,44(4):470-484
Ronald Dworkin famously argued that many putatively nonmoral metaethical theories can only be understood as being internal to the moral domain. If correct, this position, referred to as anti‐archimedeanism, has profound implications for the methodology of metaethics. This is particularly true for skeptical metaethical theories. This article defends a version of anti‐archimedeanism that is true to the spirit rather than the letter of Dworkin's original thesis from several recent objections. First, it addresses Kenneth Ehrenberg's recent attempt to demonstrate how certain metaethical theories can be understood in a morally neutral manner. It then discusses Charles Pigden's claim that Dworkin begs the question against error theorists and nihilists by assuming a conceptual space that error theorists and nihilists would reject. It concludes that the anti‐archimedean methodology originally proposed by Dworkin is defensible, and can be used to support a robust form of moral realism. 相似文献
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114.
In this paper, we argue that time travel is problematic for the endurantist. For it appears to be possible, given time travel, to construct a wall out of a single time travelling brick. This commits the endurantist to one of the following: (a) the wall is composed of the time travelling brick many times over; (b) the wall does not in fact exist at all; (c) the wall is identical to the brick. We argue that each of these options is unsatisfactory. 相似文献
115.
Andreas Losch 《Theology & Science》2013,11(4):393-416
Since Barbour's introduction of the term in 1966, “critical realism” bridges the gulf between science and religion. Yet, like the Golden Gate Bridge, this bridge must be supported by pillars to carry its weight. These pillars are the social and the human sciences, which are still designed too small within critical realism to make a really sustainable construct. Critical realism should be modified to “constructive-critical realism” to allow for more weight of these disciplines in the dialog, which actually should become a trialog. 相似文献
116.
Kevin Reimer 《Theology & Science》2013,11(1):89-107
Nancey Murphy recently offered a proposal for altruistic self-renunciation as the core theory of a Christian research program in psychology. Her argument intersects with recent concerns in moral psychology that theory should be constrained by the lives of ordinary people, an idea known as psychological realism. This article considers limitations for altruistic self-renunciation through research with L’Arche assistants for the developmentally disabled. Incipient, “natural” character is evident through the ambivalence of these everyday altruists, creating a difficult methodological challenge for the psychological realist. Consequently, a novel approach for the mathematical analysis of subject narrative is explored with the use of a powerful computational linguistics program. 相似文献
117.
YUGUO Fei 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2014,9(3):431-440
In contemporary philosophy of science, there are many interesting arguments for and against scientific realism with regard to the meaningfulness and truthfulness of theoretical statements. Some anti-realists hold that since many important concepts in scientific theories have no specific referents, the relevant theoretical statements are therefore either false or meaningless. In this essay, I join the debates concerning the plausibility of scientific realism by focusing on two intertwined issues: first, that of how we can we explicate the meaningfulness of theoretical statements, especially statements pertaining to unobservable objects, and second, that of the meaningfulness of theoretical statements for our acceptance of scientific realism. 相似文献
118.
Alice Pinheiro Walla 《Journal of Global Ethics》2017,13(3):312-325
Did Kant believe we need a world government? It has been a matter of controversy in Kant scholarship whether Kant endorsed the creation of a world state or merely a voluntary federation of states with no coercive power. I argue that Kant's main concern was with a global juridical condition, which he regarded as a rational requirement given the equal freedom and equality of individuals. However, he recognized that implementing this rational ideal requires sensitivity to contingent aspects of world politics. I will argue that Kant offers an ideal theory not disentangled from realist considerations and that he adopts what I will call methodological realism: the attempt to realize the requirements of Right (Recht) in a world governed by its own laws and mechanisms. I will illustrate this interpretation with Kant's discussion of the right of nations (Völkerrecht). The confusion in regard to Kant's actual position on the matter, I will argue, is a direct consequence of Kant's methodological realism. The article concludes by showing how Kant’'s ideas and methods can inspire us to rethink global institutions for our current global challenges. 相似文献
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120.
Gideon Rosen 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2017,47(6):856-876
In Being Realistic About Reasons (Oxford University Press, 2014) T. M. Scanlon argues that particular fact about reasons are explained by contingent non-normative facts together with pure normative principles. A question then arises about the modal status of these pure principles. Scanlon maintains that they are necessary in a sense, and suggests that they are ‘metaphysically’ necessary. I argue that the best view for Scanlon to take, given his other commitments, is that these pure normative principles are metaphysically contingent in some cases and necessary only in a weaker sense. 相似文献