Destructiveness, atrocities and healing: epistemological and clinical reflections

In this paper, destructiveness is approached as a multi-dimensional phenomenon where the mental health perspective addresses only one of these dimensions. An attempt is made to locate this phenomenon in the context of epistemological and societal considerations. Critical of mono-dimensional explanations based on causal-reductive epistemology, the paper instead proposes the idea of an 'ecology of destructiveness', according to which mental health professionals cannot possibly continue to assume the role of detached observers. The ordinariness and archetypal fascination of destructiveness are discussed as preventing the psychologizing and pathologizing of it. In addition, it is suggested that 'destructiveness may be a tragic facet of the human condition', without this implying any justification of it. Based on my work with a group of Bosnian ex-camp prisoners, some basic principles of how one can work with survivors of atrocities are derived and discussed. A central feature of this work is the attempt to create an appropriate therapeutic context within which a 'therapeutic presence' and 'therapeutic witnessing' can be developed. Finally, the relevance of Jungian insights to this kind of work is reviewed and the emergence of new types of defences of the self is identified.     

The Brier Rule Is not a Good Measure of Epistemic Utility (and Other Useful Facts about Epistemic Betterness)

Measures of epistemic utility are used by formal epistemologists to make determinations of epistemic betterness among cognitive states. The Brier rule is the most popular choice (by far) among formal epistemologists for such a measure. In this paper, however, we show that the Brier rule is sometimes seriously wrong about whether one cognitive state is epistemically better than another. In particular, there are cases where an agent gets evidence that definitively eliminates a false hypothesis (and the probabilities assigned to the other hypotheses stay in the same ratios), but where the Brier rule says that things have become epistemically worse. Along the way to this ‘elimination experiment’ counter-example to the Brier rule as a measure of epistemic utility, we identify several useful monotonicity principles for epistemic betterness. We also reply to several potential objections to this counter-example.     

J. Wentzel van Huyssteen: Refiguring Rationality in the Postmodern Age

In his three books J. Wentzel van Huyssteen develops a complex and helpful notion of rationality, avoiding the extremes of foundationalism and postmodern relativism and deconstruction. Drawing from several postmodern philosophers of science and evolutionary epistemologists who seek to devise a usable notion of rationality, he weaves together a view that allows for a genuine duet betweenscience and theology. In the process he challenges much contemporary nonfoundationalist theology as well as the philosophical naïveté of some cosmologists and sociobiologists.     

Reviews

Rottschaefer, William A. The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency
Mccutcheon, Russell T. Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia
Drengson, Alan The Practice of Technology: Exploring Technology,Ecophilosophy, and Spiritual Disciplines for Vital Links
Burrell, David B. and Mcginn, Bernard (eds.) God and Creation: An Ecumenical Symposium     

Response: How Do We Know What We Know About the Amish and Other Minorities?

The appraisal by Cory Anderson, Joseph Donnermeyer, Jeffrey Longhofer, and Steven Reschly (hereafter, appraisers) highlights a methodological divide that is important to the study of the Amish and other ethnic or religious minorities. In my reply, I discuss how my work is rooted in a cultural analytic paradigm that differs from the appraisers’ methodological orientation. My reply includes a deconstruction of the appraisal and a discussion of its “shortcomings.” I conclude by showing how the discourse surrounding this appraisal raises important epistemological questions of how we understand human societies.     

Rethinking Epistemic Relativism

“Relativism” is often treated as a dirty word in philosophy, but relativistic theories are not entirely unappealing—they have features that might be tempting if they weren't thought to be outweighed by problematic consequences. The aim of this paper is to rethink both our attitude to epistemic relativism and the basic features of the view itself. The paper discusses four objections and uses them to isolate five constraints on a more plausible epistemic relativism. It then sketches out a view that meets all of these constraints. This stratified epistemic relativism offers a complex, socially informed picture of justification that accounts for the many different kinds of roles that epistemic agents act, and think, in accordance with each day, and can serve as a starting point for constructing a more detailed epistemic relativism, which could secure its appealing benefits without incurring the costs traditionally associated with relativist views.     

Striking coincidences: How realists should reason about them

Many metaethicists assume that our normative judgments are both by and large true, and the product of causal forces. In other words, many metaethicists assume that the set of normative judgments that causal forces have led us to make largely coincides with the set of true normative judgments. How should we explain this coincidence? This is what Sharon Street (2006) calls the practical/theoretical puzzle. Some metaethicists can easily solve this puzzle, but not all of them can, Street argues; she takes the puzzle to constitute a specific challenge for normative realism. In this article I elucidate Street’s puzzle and outline possible solutions to it, framed in terms of a general strategy for reasoning about coincidences. I argue that the success of Street’s challenge crucially depends on how we set the ‘reference class’ of normative judgments that we could have endorsed, assuming realism. I conclude that while the practical/theoretical puzzle falls short of posing a general challenge for normative realism, it can be successful as a selective challenge for specific realist views.     

Decoding emotions in expressive music performances: A multi-lab replication and extension study

With over 560 citations reported on Google Scholar by April 2018, a publication by Juslin and Gabrielsson (1996) presented evidence supporting performers’ abilities to communicate, with high accuracy, their intended emotional expressions in music to listeners. Though there have been related studies published on this topic, there has yet to be a direct replication of this paper. A replication is warranted given the paper’s influence in the field and the implications of its results. The present experiment joins the recent replication effort by producing a five-lab replication using the original methodology. Expressive performances of seven emotions (e.g. happy, sad, angry, etc.) by professional musicians were recorded using the same three melodies from the original study. Participants (N?=?319) were presented with recordings and rated how well each emotion matched the emotional quality using a 0–10 scale. The same instruments from the original study (i.e. violin, voice, and flute) were used, with the addition of piano. In an effort to increase the accessibility of the experiment and allow for a more ecologically-valid environment, the recordings were presented using an internet-based survey platform. As an extension to the original study, this experiment investigated how musicality, emotional intelligence, and emotional contagion might explain individual differences in the decoding process. Results found overall high decoding accuracy (57%) when using emotion ratings aggregated for the sample of participants, similar to the method of analysis from the original study. However, when decoding accuracy was scored for each participant individually the average accuracy was much lower (31%). Unlike in the original study, the voice was found to be the most expressive instrument. Generalised Linear Mixed Effects Regression modelling revealed that musical training and emotional engagement with music positively influences emotion decoding accuracy.     

Dialoguing Height Psychology into a life of interconnectedness: Response to commentaries by Hwang,Bhawuk, King & Hodgetts,Kashima, and Xie,Su, & Zhong

Liu (Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 000, 000) attempts to articulate an epistemology for the aspirational practice of Height Psychology as a human science informed by Kantian epistemology in dialogue with other philosophies, especially Confucianism and Taoism. Height Psychology is a framework or metatheory for the practice of teaching, research, and service rooted in Kantian epistemology, in dialogue with other philosophies. It provides a holistic philosophy for social scientists responding to wicked problems unfolding over long periods of time. In responding to commentaries, I suggest a corollary to Shweder's (Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 3, p. 207) ‘One mind, many mentalities’: ‘Many indigenous psychologies, interconnected by one epistemology’. Height Psychology is about holding to an invisible moral centre. The practical postulates are foundational to the moral and ethical practices of human societies: they are for doing, their value is ontological. Human agency, proscribed by natural science epistemologies takes centre stage in Height Psychology by facilitating social scientists to act reflexively from multiple positions (from basic to action research) to benefit society. Height Psychology is dedicated to articulating and actioning the moral and ethical basis of a human science that can assist present and future generations of social scientists to meet the grave situational futures facing us in different parts of the world.     

Humility,Virtue Epistemology,and the New Atheism

Most criticisms of the New Atheism are attempts at traditional apologetics. However, Christians who wish to defend the faith against the onslaughts of these critics might appeal to virtue epistemology by showing that the New Atheists do not possess the necessary habits of thought that a person would need to make a careful and thoughtful consideration of the evidence. In fact, the New Atheists fail to practice intellectual humility and this prevents them from genuine engagement with the strengths religion offers.