Précis of <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Virtue Epistemology</Emphasis> (Oxford University Press, 2007)

This is a summary of A Virtue Epistemology, the book that is the subject of this book symposium.     

Replies to commentators on <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Virtue Epistemology</Emphasis> (Oxford University Press, 2007)

Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.

A plea for logical objects

An account of validity that makes what is invalid conditional on how many individuals there are is what I call a conditional account of validity. Here I defend conditional accounts against a criticism derived from Etchemendy’s well-known criticism of the model-theoretic analysis of validity. The criticism is essentially that knowledge of the size of the universe is non-logical and so by making knowledge of the extension of validity depend on knowledge of how many individuals there are, conditional accounts fail to reflect that the former knowledge is basic, i.e., independent of knowledge derived from other sciences. Appealing to Russell’s pre-Principia logic, I defend conditional accounts against this criticism by sketching a rationale for thinking that there are infinitely many logical objects.     

REALISM WITHOUT TRUTH: A REVIEW OF GIERE'S SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVISM

An increasingly popular view among philosophers of science is that of science as action—as the collective activity of scientists working in socially‐coordinated communities. Scientists are seen not as dispassionate pursuers of Truth, but as active participants in a social enterprise, and science is viewed on a continuum with other human activities. When taken to an extreme, the science‐as‐social‐process view can be taken to imply that science is no different from any other human activity, and therefore can make no privileged claims about its knowledge of the world. Such extreme views are normally contrasted with equally extreme views of classical science, as uncovering Universal Truth. In Science Without Laws and Scientific Perspectivism, Giere outlines an approach to understanding science that finds a middle ground between these extremes. He acknowledges that science occurs in a social and historical context, and that scientific models are constructions designed and created to serve human ends. At the same time, however, scientific models correspond to parts of the world in ways that can legitimately be termed objective. Giere's position, perspectival realism, shares important common ground with Skinner's writings on science, some of which are explored in this review. Perhaps most fundamentally, Giere shares with Skinner the view that science itself is amenable to scientific inquiry: scientific principles can and should be brought to bear on the process of science. The two approaches offer different but complementary perspectives on the nature of science, both of which are needed in a comprehensive understanding of science.     

概念转变理论及其发展述评

概念转变是心理与教育领域的热点问题。20多年来,研究者从不同的背景和视角研究概念转变的过程与机制,提出了基于认识论、本体论和朴素理论的多个概念转变理论,成为后续概念转变研究的理论框架。随着研究的深入,这些概念转变理论得以继承和发展,表现为融入了社会、情感等因素并具整合的趋势。本文对当前国际主流的概念转变理论及其发展加以评述,并从问题、方法和视角等方面对未来的概念转变研究加以展望,提出构建更具普适性的概念转变理论框架的设想     

Effect of skill level on recall of visually presented patterns of musical notes

Expertise effects in music were studied in a new task: the construction of mental representations from separate fragments. Groups of expert musicians and non-musicians were asked to recall note patterns presented visually note by note. Skill-level, musical well-formedness of the note patterns and presentation mode were varied. The musicians recalled note patterns better than the non-musicians, even though the presentation was visual and successive. Furthermore, only musicians' performance was affected by musical well-formedness of the note patterns when visual gestalt properties, verbal rehearsability, and familiarity of the stimuli were controlled. Musicians were also able to use letter names referring to notes as efficiently as visual notes, which indicates that the better recall of musicians cannot be explained by perceptual visual chunking. These results and the effect of skill level on the distribution of recall errors indicate that the ability to chunk incoming information into meaningful units does not require that complete familiar patterns are accessible to encoding processes, yet previous knowledge stored in long-term memory affects representation construction in working memory. The present method offers a new reliable tool, and its implications to the research on construction of representations and musical imagery are discussed.     

The Cognitive Relation in a Formal Setting

This paper proposes a formal framework for the cognitive relation understood as an ordered pair with the cognitive subject and object of cognition as its members. The cognitive subject is represented as consisting of a language, conequence relation and a stock of accepted theories, and the object as a model of those theories. This language allows a simple formulation of the realism/anti-realism controversy. In particular, Tarski’s undefinability theorem gives a philosophical argument for realism in epistemology. Special Issue Formal Epistemology II. Edited by Branden Fitelson     

Worries about Pritchard’s safety

I take issue with two claims that Duncan Pritchard makes in his recent book, Epistemic Luck. The first concerns his safety-based response to the lottery problem; the second his account of the relationship between safety and intellectual virtue.     

Two for the show: Anti-luck and virtue epistemologies in consonance

This essay extends my side of a discussion begun earlier with Duncan Pritchard, the recent author of Epistemic Luck.Pritchard’s work contributes significantly to improving the “diagnostic appeal” of a neo-Moorean philosophical response to radical scepticism. While agreeing with Pritchard in many respects, the paper questions the need for his concession to the sceptic that the neo-Moorean is capable at best of recovering “‘brute’ externalist knowledge”. The paper discusses and directly responds to a dilemma that Pritchard poses for virtue epistemologies (VE). It also takes issue with Pritchard’s “merely safety-based” alternative. Ultimately, however, the criticisms made here of Pritchard’s dilemma and its underlying contrast of “anti-luck” and “virtue” epistemologies are intended to help realize his own aspirations for a better diagnosis of radical scepticism to inform a still better neo-Moorean response.