Integrating Human and Natural Systems in Community Psychology: An Ecological Model of Stewardship Behavior

Community psychology (CP) research on the natural environment lacks a theoretical framework for analyzing the complex relationship between human systems and the natural world. We introduce other academic fields concerned with the interactions between humans and the natural environment, including environmental sociology and coupled human and natural systems. To demonstrate how the natural environment can be included within CP’s ecological framework, we propose an ecological model of urban forest stewardship action. Although ecological models of behavior in CP have previously modeled health behaviors, we argue that these frameworks are also applicable to actions that positively influence the natural environment. We chose the environmental action of urban forest stewardship because cities across the United States are planting millions of trees and increased citizen participation in urban tree planting and stewardship will be needed to sustain the benefits provided by urban trees. We used the framework of an ecological model of behavior to illustrate multiple levels of factors that may promote or hinder involvement in urban forest stewardship actions. The implications of our model for the development of multi-level ecological interventions to foster stewardship actions are discussed, as well as directions for future research to further test and refine the model.     

Using Generalizability Theory to Disattenuate Correlation Coefficients for Multiple Sources of Measurement Error

Over the years, research in the social sciences has been dominated by reporting of reliability coefficients that fail to account for key sources of measurement error. Use of these coefficients, in turn, to correct for measurement error can hinder scientific progress by misrepresenting true relationships among the underlying constructs being investigated. In the research reported here, we addressed these issues using generalizability theory (G-theory) in both traditional and new ways to account for the three key sources of measurement error (random-response, specific-factor, and transient) that affect scores from objectively scored measures. Results from 20 widely used measures of personality, self-concept, and socially desirable responding showed that conventional indices consistently misrepresented reliability and relationships among psychological constructs by failing to account for key sources of measurement error and correlated transient errors within occasions. The results further revealed that G-theory served as an effective framework for remedying these problems. We discuss possible extensions in future research and provide code from the computer package R in an online supplement to enable readers to apply the procedures we demonstrate to their own research.     

Models for the Detection of Deviations from the Expected Processing Strategy in Completing the Items of Cognitive Measures

This paper presents confirmatory factor models with fixed factor loadings that enable the identification of deviations from the expected processing strategy. The instructions usually define the expected processing strategy to a considerable degree. Simplification is a deviation from instructions that is likely to occur in complex cognitive measures. Since simplification impairs the validity of the measure, its identification is important. Models representing simplicity and instruction-based processing strategies were considered in investigating the data of 345 participants obtained by a working memory measure in order to find out whether and how the use of these strategies influences model-data fit. As expected, the consideration of simplicity strategies improved the model-data fit achieved for the instruction-based strategy.     

Choosing the Appropriate Design and Analysis of a Research Project

It is extremely important that the proper mental planning of a research project is considered before the data collection ever begins. Otherwise, problems may be encountered after the data have been collected and it may then be too late to correct them. This paper will explain some of the important considerations necessary in choosing an adequate design and analysis for a research project.     

What is the nature of the mind's pattern-recognition process?

If we look at the human mind as a pattern-recognition device, what is the nature of its pattern-recognizing? And how does it differ from the majority of pattern-recognition methods we have collectively devised over the decades? These broad philosophical questions emerge from the studies of chess thought, and we propose that a major task of the mind is to engage in “experience recognition” (Linhares & Freitas, 2010). One of the basic tenets of that proposal is that pattern recognition, in cognitive science and related disciplines, does not accurately reflect human psychology. As an example, the well-known article by Chase and Simon, “perception in chess”, and the benchmark cognitive computational models of chess, by Gobet et al. were criticized. Lane and Gobet (2011) provide serious skepticism concerning some of those arguments, and here we take the opportunity to respond and expand the theoretical constructs of “experience recognition”. We postulate that the mind's pattern-recognizing process holds the following properties: it is a highly path-dependent process; it prioritizes internal encodings; it is a self-organizing process in constant change; and it constructs its future information-processing pathways by continuously recognizing the possibilities that lie within the adjacent possible.     

Post-traumatic stress symptoms in mothers of children with leukaemia undergoing the first 12 months of therapy: Predictive models

The aim of this study consists in the measurement of psychological health and adaptation in mothers of children during the first 12 months of treatment for leukaemia and in the identification of possible early predictors. Ninety-four mothers were followed longitudinally at one week (T1), one month (T2), six months (T3) and 12 months (T4) post-diagnosis. The instruments used were: PTSD symptom checklist, BSI-18, Problem Scale, Ladder of life and an in-depth interview (EFI-C). Couple connectedness, family routine reorganisation, parental communication around the child's illness and trust in the medical care significantly increased from T1 to T4. Two models are proposed concerning possible predictors of mothers’ PTSS at T2 and at T3. Clinical suggestions are proposed on the basis of our empirical findings in order to plan informative, clinical and practical interventions for mothers of children under treatment for leukaemia.     

Science,Scientism and Imaginaries of Publics in the UK: Passive Objects,Incipient Threats

Two-way public engagement with science is an important modern democratic practice that paradoxically coincides with the intensifications of state surveillance and policing of publics and social movements engaging with issues involving science. This raises important questions about the contemporary anatomies of publics, and what count as legitimate expressions of public concern over scientific stakes within the knowledge economy. Implicit in the tension between inclusion and surveillance are concerns over the social meaning and authority of science amongst both scientific practitioners and publics. Bringing science and technology studies (STS) and social movement studies (SMS) into dialogue offers a means to explore the neglected ontological stakes in the framing of scientific imaginaries of publics, and public imaginaries of science. Post-WWII UK science–publics relations have emerged in three significant modalities, with publics imagined: as passive non-entities, circa 1950–1990 (continuing); as incipient threats due to presumed deficits in their grasp of science 1990–2000 (continuing); and, since circa 2000, as politicised threats requiring state control. Each modality is shaped by elite denial of the normative commitments embedded within science as surrogate politics—scientism. In each mode, scientistic elite emphasis on epistemic issues forecloses engagement with broader public meanings expressing legitimate normative and ontological differences. Fusing the more epistemic focus of STS with SMS's emphasis on meaning and democratic process offers a route to deeper democratic forms of public engagement with what is called science, which would also precipitate more accountability in elite discourses around science and technology.     

On the Shoulders of Idiots: Re-thinking Science Communication as ‘Event’

Characterised by a shift from a diffusion to a deliberation model of science communication, the past decades have witnessed a proliferation of science communication formats. In order to better understand the complexity and novelty of these formats, we propose a ‘model of emergence’ that conceptualises science communication as an event in which the event itself, as well as the various actors that contribute to it, are emergent. To operationalise this model of emergence, we use Isabelle Stengers' figure of the idiot as an analytical tool which lets us interrogate our own implicit assumptions about science communication and the way they shape interactions in specific communication events. This makes it possible to be more sensitive to the ways in which we enable the emergence of particular identities and audience reactions, but also how we understand the role of science communicators themselves. A recent experiment with a science communication installation, ‘The Landscape of Expectations’, is used as an example that lets us trace how the ‘idiotic behaviours’ of visitors, which on one level make no sense, enable us to query presuppositions about the repertoire of behaviours available to the public and the assumed relations of power between experts and laypeople.     

Modelling the History of Ideas

We propose a new method for the history of ideas that has none of the shortcomings so often ascribed to this approach. We call this method the model approach to the history of ideas. We argue that any adequately developed and implementable method to trace (dis)continuities in the history of human thought, or concept drift, will require that historians use explicit interpretive conceptual frameworks. We call these frameworks models. We argue that models enhance the comprehensibility of historical texts, and provide historians of ideas with a method that, unlike existing approaches, is susceptible neither to common holistic criticisms nor to Skinner's objections that the history of ideas yields arbitrary and biased reconstructions. To illustrate our proposal, we discuss the so-called Classical Model of Science and draw upon work in computer science and cognitive psychology.