Internalism and the Origin of Rational Motivation

What makes a subject's motivationrational is its originating in her practicalreasoning. I explain the appeal of this thesisabout rational motivation, and explore itsrelation to recent discussions of internalismabout reasons for action. I do so in theservice of clarifying an important meta-ethicaldebate between Humean motivational skeptics andtheir Kantian opponents. This debate is oneover whether, as this skeptic contends andKantians deny, considerations about ourmotivational capacities, together withinternalism, restrict genuine reasons foraction to merely instrumental ones. I arguethat properly adjudicating this debate requiresidentifying one particular way in which thethesis about rational motivation has beendeveloped – namely, as a part of what I term``the traditional conception' of themotivational efficacy of practical reason. Onthis conception, rational motivation consistsin choosing some course of conduct out of one'scognitive appreciation of the way its relationto one's practicable good gives one reason todo so. And I side with Kantians against theHumean motivational skeptic in part on groundsthat Kant himself – though not all Kantians –would find congenial: namely, that we shouldaccept the traditional conception.     

Serendipity in the Theater: Maude Adams as James M. Barrie's American Muse

A special niche in theatre history is addressed to begin to fill a void in the contemporary creativity literature. The present essay focuses on Maude Adams and James M. Barrie in an attempt to demonstrate that, serendipitously, Adams initially impacted Barrie's creative process, and thereafter became his platonic source of inspiration for the plays he created for her, meriting the belated title of muse. Set change theory is underscored as a plausible cognitive explanation for Barrie's illumination. The psychoanalytic theory of transference is proposed as an underlying mechanism for facilitating the change of mental set during the incubation stage. A brief discussion on a selective theoretical integration from the fields of cognitive psychology, psychoanalysis, and neuroscience is followed by conclusions.     

Light Affine Set Theory: A Naive Set Theory of Polynomial Time

In [7], a naive set theory is introduced based on a polynomial time logical system, Light Linear Logic (LLL). Although it is reasonably claimed that the set theory inherits the intrinsically polytime character from the underlying logic LLL, the discussion there is largely informal, and a formal justification of the claim is not provided sufficiently. Moreover, the syntax is quite complicated in that it is based on a non-traditional hybrid sequent calculus which is required for formulating LLL.In this paper, we consider a naive set theory based on Intuitionistic Light Affine Logic (ILAL), a simplification of LLL introduced by [1], and call it Light Affine Set Theory (LAST). The simplicity of LAST allows us to rigorously verify its polytime character. In particular, we prove that a function over {0, 1}* is computable in polynomial time if and only if it is provably total in LAST.     

内隐的可接近信息对FOK判断等级和准确性的影响

该研究使用RJR研究范式,探讨内隐的可接近信息对FOK判断等级和判断准确性的影响。结果发现：FOK判断等级受内隐的可接近信息量的影响,二者呈非单调递增、递减的关系;FOK判断等级随内隐的可接近信息强度的增强而增高;FOK判断准确性随内隐的可接近信息量的增多而降低,并随内隐的可接近信息强度的增强而增高。     

注意捕获的另一扇窗户——无意视盲

观察者集中注意于某个物体或事件的时候,他们经常不能觉察到显著的、与众不同的物体,这种现象被称为“无意视盲”（Inattentional Blindness）。在无意视盲研究中,存在两类实验范式——静态无意视盲和动态无意视盲研究范式。首先,从刺激的感觉显著性、认知显著性、心理工作负荷、定势和期望以及加工能力等方面分析了影响无意视盲的因素;其次,对无意视盲和无意遗忘的争议以及无意视盲是“全或无”还是连续谱的争议也进行了总结;最后,从无意视盲角度出发探讨了内隐注意捕获和外显注意捕获之间的关系     

超越效价和唤醒—— 情绪的动机维度模型述评

情绪的动机维度模型认为, 高动机强度的情绪窄化(narrow)认知加工而低动机强度的情绪扩展(broaden)认知加工。该理论超越了先前对效价和唤醒两大情绪维度的二分法, 证明了情绪的动机维度对注意、记忆等认知加工产生扩展和窄化效应, 深化了积极情绪的扩展-建设理论, 有助于深入理解情绪与认知的交互作用。未来研究应建立动机维度的操作性定义, 并进一步发展出诱发不同动机维度情绪的标准化刺激材料或任务。     

Leave No Poor Behind:

Globalization is being celebrated in many circles as a distinctive achievement of our age, drawing peoples and societies more closely together and creating far greater wealth than any previous generations ever knew. While the first of these assertions is correct in the sense that societies and cultures are colliding, hitherto relatively closed horizons are opening up, and spaces and time are compressing, the second deserves critical interrogations. Using Africa's experience with globalization as a case study, this article argues that globalization be understood as an emerging preference for certain institutional and policy practices that are creating and coercively imposing pervasive but avoidable conditions of material deprivations on many societies. The article defends a motivational rationale anchored in the normative vision of socio‐economic and development rights as a way to mitigate the deleterious effects of unguarded globalization.     

Disbelief,lies, and manipulations in a transactional discourse model

Disbelief, lies, and manipulations have been objects of scholarly consideration from widely different perspectives: historical, sociological, philosophical, ethical, logical, and pragmatic. In this paper, these notions are re-examined in the framework of a Transactional Discourse Model which operates in terms of the location and relocation of various knowledge items within two sets of knowledge, A and B, representing two interlocators A and B, and two of their subsets C_a and C_b, which constitute the sets of the matters of A's and B's current concern. This approach reveals certain formal features shared by lies, disbelief, and manipulations that indicate that these three types of discourse behavior constitute a deviation from successful interpersonal communication as defined in the proposed model. The model, moreover, enables us to explicitly capture both the similarities and the differences of lies and manipulations with other pragmatic phenomena, such as jokes, impersonating, role-acting, memory failure, politeness expressions, and tact; the comparison suggests that certain modifications of Gricean conversational maxims may be in order.     

Constructing Cantorian counterexamples

Cantors diagonal argument provides an indirect proof that there is no one-one function from the power set of a set A into A. This paper provides a somewhat more constructive proof of Cantors theorem, showing how, given a function f from the power set of A into A, one can explicitly define a counterexample to the thesis that f is one-one.