How is Recalcitrant Emotion Possible?

A recalcitrant emotion is an emotion that we experience despite a judgment that seems to conflict with it. Having been bitten by a dog in her childhood, Jane cannot shake her fear of dogs, including Fido, the cute little puppy that she knows to be in no way dangerous. There is something puzzling about recalcitrant emotions, which appear to defy the putatively robust connection between emotions and judgments. If Jane really believes that Fido cannot harm her, what is she afraid of? This article seeks to show how recalcitrant emotion is possible. I argue that reductive theories that identify emotions with judgments, desires, or some combination thereof, cannot explain the possibility of emotional irrationality without contradiction. I then show that the appeal to sui generis attitudes also fails to solve the puzzle of recalcitrant emotions, and diagnose this failure as stemming from a misleading analogy between emotions and perceptions, and in particular, between recalcitrant emotions and perceptual illusions. The solution can be found in a different analogy: between emotions and actions; more specifically, between recalcitrant emotions and weakness of the will, akrasia. Like akratic actions, recalcitrant emotions entail responding to reasons, but to inferior reasons. Irrational but non-contradictory emotions are possible just as weakness of will is possible.     

Clinical Experiences in Using Cognitive-Behavior Therapy to Treat Panic Disorder

Although there is a growing body of research to support the use of psychological treatments for specific disorders, there has been no way for practitioners to provide feedback to researchers on the barriers they encounter in implementing these treatments in their day-to-day clinical work. In order to provide practitioners a means to give researchers information about their clinical experience, the Society of Clinical Psychology and the Division of Psychotherapy of the American Psychological Association collaborated on an initiative to build a two-way bridge between practice and research. A questionnaire was developed on the therapist, patient, and contextual variables that undermine the effective use of CBT in reducing the symptoms of panic disorder, a clinical problem that occurs frequently in clinical practice and has an extensive research base. An Internet-based survey was advertised internationally in listservs and professional newsletters, asking clinicians to indicate all aspects of CBT that they used in treating panic disorder, and to respond to a series of questions with variables that presumably limited successful symptom reduction in clinical work using CBT to treat panic disorder. The final database included responses from 338 participants who varied in experience in applying CBT to the treatment of panic disorders. Participants identified a wide range of patient factors that were barriers to symptom reduction, including symptoms related to panic, motivation, social system, and the psychotherapy relationship, in addition to specific problems with implementing CBT for the treatment of panic disorder.     

Rethinking Neuroethics in the Light of the Extended Mind Thesis

The extended mind thesis is the claim that mental states extend beyond the skulls of the agents whose states they are. This seemingly obscure and bizarre claim has far-reaching implications for neuroethics, I argue. In the first half of this article, I sketch the extended mind thesis and defend it against criticisms. In the second half, I turn to its neuroethical implications. I argue that the extended mind thesis entails the falsity of the claim that interventions into the brain are especially problematic just because they are internal interventions, but that many objections to such interventions rely, at least in part, on this claim. Further, I argue that the thesis alters the focus of neuroethics, away from the question of whether we ought to allow interventions into the mind, and toward the question of which interventions we ought to allow and under what conditions. The extended mind thesis dramatically expands the scope of neuroethics: because interventions into the environment of agents can count as interventions into their minds, decisions concerning such interventions become questions for neuroethics.     

Habitual Virtuous Actions and Automaticity

Dual process theorists in psychology maintain that the mind’s workings can be explained in terms of conscious or controlled processes and automatic processes. Automatic processes are largely nonconscious, that is, triggered by environmental stimuli without the agent’s conscious awareness or deliberation. Automaticity researchers contend that even higher level habitual social behaviors can be nonconsciously primed. This article brings work on automaticity to bear on our understanding of habitual virtuous actions. After examining a recent intuitive account of habitual actions and habitual virtuous actions, the author offers her own explanation in terms of goal-dependent automaticity. This form of automaticity provides an account of habitual virtuous actions that explains the sense in which these actions are rational, that is, done for reasons. Habitual virtuous actions are rational in the sense of being purposive or goal-directed and are essentially linked with the agent’s psychological states. Unlike deliberative virtuous actions, the agent’s reasons for habitual virtuous actions are not present to her conscious awareness at the time of acting.

Resisting ruthless reductionism: A comment on Bickle

Philosophy and Neuroscienceis an unabashed apologetic for reductionism in the philosophy of mind. Although we have learnt much from Bickle's work, we find his central claims unconvincing. Our comments have two central foci:Bickle's account of mental causation, and his single-cell account of consciousness. We argue that Bickle's attempt to solve the problem of mental causation is marred by his refusal to take multiple realizability seriously, and we suggest that his faith in single cell accounts of consciousness is misplaced. We remain unconvinced that the solutions to the problems of mental causation and consciousness are to be found in neuroscience.     

Practical Reasons and the Redundancy of Motives

Jonathan Dancy, in his 1994 Aristotelian Society Presidential Address, set out to show 'why there is really no such thing as the theory of motivation'. In this paper I want to agree that there is no such thing, and to offer reasons of a different kind for that conclusion. I shall suggest that the so-called theory of motivation misconstrues the question which it purports to answer, and that when we properly analyse the question and distinguish it clearly from other questions with which it should not be confused, we do not need a theory of motivation at all.     

Mapping Moral Motivation

In this paper we defend a version of moral internalism and a cognitivist account of motivation against recent criticisms. The internalist thesis we espouse claims that, if an agent believes she has reason to A, then she is motivated to A. Discussion of counter-examples has been clouded by the absence of a clear account of the nature of motivation. While we can only begin to provide such an account in this paper, we do enough to show that our version of internalism can be defended against putative counter-examples. All theories of motivation which take what motivates to be a psychological state run foul of the following plausible constraint: the reason why you ought to do an action and the reason why you do it can be the same. In our view, however, while what motivates is a reason (which is a fact) the state of being motivated is a cognitive stage, viz. the belief that one has reason to act. In cases where the agent's relevant beliefs are false, then she has no reason to act, but nontheless her action can be explained in other ways.     

Epistemic justification and premise acceptability

In this paper, we want to explore the connection between premises' being acceptable and their being in some sense justified. The equivalence of premise acceptability and justification seems intuitively correct. But to argue for such a connection, we need to analyze the concepts of acceptability and justification. Such an analysis also seems necessary if this equivalence is to advance our understanding of premise acceptability. Following L. J. Cohen, we may say S believes that p when S is disposed to feel it true that p, while S accepts that p when S takes that p as a premise for further deliberation or action. Reasons for belief are reasons for acceptance, and epistemological (as opposed to pragmatic) reasons for acceptance are reason for belief. Following William P. Alston, we may explicate being a justifying reason for belief through the notion of an adequate ground on which the belief is based. In turn, adequacy of ground means that the mechanism grounding the belief is reliable. Given these notions, we may define a concept of justification in terms of presumptive adequacy.     

Gender and projective imagination of threat in achievement and affiliation situations

In a study by Pollak and Gilligan (1982) where fantasies of violence were seen as indicative of perception of danger, women responded with more violent imagery to situations of achievement, whereas men responded with more violent imagery to affiliation situations. This indicates gender differences in motivational needs, which corresponds to modern gender development theories (e.g., Chodorow, 1978). In the present studies, the hypotheses that women fear achievement situations whereas men fear situations of affiliation were tested on Swedish samples totaling 44 men and 47 women. In Study 1, the hypothesis that violent imagery correlates with affiliation themes in the stories written by men was partly supported, whereas the hypothesis that violent imagery would be highly correlated with achievement themes in the stories written by women was not confirmed. In Study 2, no support was obtained for the hypotheses. In sum, contrary to previous studies, no substantial support was obtained for the hypothesis that women connect violent imagery with achievement situations, whereas some evidence was found for the hypothesis that men construe danger as arising from affiliation situations. The greater incidence of violence in men’s fantasy reported in previous studies was not supported in either of the two studies. The results are discussed in the context of cross-cultural differences.     

A study of misbehavior: token reinforcement in the rat

The purpose of this research was to investigate the phenomenon of misbehavior described by Breland and Breland (1961). Rats were trained to obtain ball-bearings and drop them in a hole for food or water reinforcers. In confirmation of the Brelands' observation, many subjects were slow to deliver the balls, and frequently attempted to chew them before they were dropped. A series of four experiments, in which the same rats were used throughout, showed that delivery times tended to be longer with food than with water, and that these times increased when nylon balls were substituted. The effect of motivational level was investigated by varying both deprivation and amount of prefeeding; no effect on delivery time was detected, although other measures of performance were affected by motivational factors. Similar results were obtained in a final experiment that employed a new set of naive subjects. The studies demonstrated that misbehavior can be studied in an experimental situation, and the results supported an analysis in terms of competition between stimulus-reinforcer and response-reinforcer contingencies. The question of why such effects have not been reported in previous token reinforcer studies was unanswered.