Coping,Reasons for Living,and Suicide in Black College Students

The authors examined the roles of reasons for living and coping in protecting against suicidal behaviors among 361 Black college students. Results of a path analysis revealed that reasons for living mediated against suicidal ideation through an inverse effect on depression. Results also indicated that greater use of emotion‐oriented coping may lead to suicidal ideation through increased depression and decreased reasons for living, whereas avoidance‐oriented coping protected against suicide. Implications for these results are further discussed.     

Motivating Operations Affect Stimulus Control: A Largely Overlooked Phenomenon in Discrimination Learning

Several recent studies have explored what Michael (e.g., 1982) termed the value-altering effect and the behavior-altering effect of motivating operations. One aspect of the behavior-altering effect that has garnered no recent attention involves changes in stimulus control produced by motivating operations. To call attention to this aspect of the behavior-altering effect, we herein review 11 studies that are concerned with the influence of varying levels of food or water deprivation on stimulus generalization. These studies suggest that motivating operations influence stimulus control (a) by changing the evocative strength of not just an established discriminative stimulus, but also of stimuli that are physically similar to it; (b) by changing the range of stimuli that evoke the operant in question; and (c) by exerting these effects in a graded fashion. These findings are potentially of conceptual and applied significance, and it appears that further research examining how motivating operations alter stimulus control, including some studies suggested herein, is warranted.     

Con-reasons and the causal theory of action

A con-reason is a reason which plays a role in motivating and explaining an agent's behaviour, but which the agent takes to count against the course of action taken. Most accounts of motivating reasons in the philosophy of action do not allow such things to exist. In this essay, I pursue two aims. First, I argue that, whatever metaphysical story we tell about the relation between motivating reasons and action, con-reasons need to be acknowledged, as they play an explanatory role not played by pro-reasons (the reason the agent takes to count in favour of the action taken). Second, I respond to an argument recently developed by David-Hillel Ruben to the effect that a causal theory of action – still known as ‘the standard story’ – cannot account for con-reasons. His argument attempts to show that a fundamental principle of the causal theory cannot be reconciled with the role con-reasons play in a certain kind of imagined case. I first argue that a causal theorist is not, in fact, committed to the problematic principle; this argument has an added benefit, since the principle has been taken by many to show that the causal theory generates a puzzle about the possibility of weak-willed action. I then argue that a causal theorist has good reason to reject the possibility of Ruben's imagined cases. If successful, my arguments make clearer the commitments of the causal theory and show that it can accommodate con-reasons in the way I think they ought to be accommodated.     

Authority in Relationships

Abstract

Authority consists in having standing to make a claim on another person’s actions. Authority comes in degrees: persons have the authority to make moral demands on each other, but if they participate in close relationships, such as friendships or love relationships, their authority over each other is greater, compared to the authority of strangers to make demands, as participants in personal relationships can demand more from each other than can strangers. This paper discusses the phenomenon of a relationship-dependent greater authority on a conceptual level. It thereby fills a gap in the literature on the proper theory of authority: while being a common part of our moral practice, relationship-dependent authority has mostly been neglected in this context. It is even doubtful whether the most influential contemporary accounts of authority can accommodate it. As will be argued, neither Joseph Raz’s service conception nor Stephen Darwall’s second-personal conception of authority are able to. The triggering-reasons account of authority, as recently developed by David Enoch, is better suited in this regard: according to this conception, relationship-dependent authority stems from special conditional reasons that are implied by relationships and that can be triggered by the authoritative demands of their participants.     

A Very Good Reason to Reject the Buck-Passing Account

This paper presents a new objection to the buck-passing account of value. I distinguish the buck-passing account of predicative value from the buck-passing account of attributive value. According to the latter, facts about attributive value reduce to facts about reasons and their weights. But since facts about reasons’ weights are themselves facts about attributive value, this account presupposes what it is supposed to explain. As part of this argument, I also argue against Mark Schroeder's recent account of the weights of reasons, which purports to explain the weights of reasons in terms of further reasons without circularity. I then argue that if we abandon the buck-passing account of attributive value, it would be ad hoc and unjustifiable to continue to endorse the buck-passing account of predicative value. In short, there seems to be little hope for the buck-passing account in either form. The paper ends by sketching a novel alternative theory according to which reasons are analysed in terms of the attributive value of motives. I suggest that a normative reason to ? is something that would be a good motive for ?-ing. At least at first glance, this view has numerous merits and few problems.     

Charting the Attributes of God: The Common Ground of Three Religions according to Ramon Llull (1232–1316)

The Open Letter written by 138 major representatives of Islam to the leaders of the Christian churches, on 13 October 2007, came as something of a surprise. Perhaps more surprisingly, in 1283, the Catalan theologian, Ramon Llull, wrote imaginatively of exactly such a letter in one of his novels, thus demonstrating that the interfaith question is not just a problem of our modern times, which became acute only on September 11. On the contrary, the churches have always been conscious of this interfaith context. Yet methods of tackling the problem have differed widely down the centuries and among Christian traditions. The solution proposed by Ramon Llull and analysed in this article starts from the common acceptance of the attributes of God in all three monotheistic religions. It deserves our attention not only as an interesting historical example but also as a way of avoiding some of our current problems and impasses.     

When Should we Regret?

In this paper, I develop and defend the ‘Justified Decision Perspective’ (JDP) in answer to the question of when we should regret the things we have done. I claim that one should not regret a past decision one has made so long as it was justified in relation to the kind of person one was at the time of acting. On this time-indexing account, judging a decision to be justified – at least for the purposes of assessing one’s regrets – is a matter of identifying the practical reasons that were epistemically available to the agent when she was deliberating about what to do. Accordingly, when responding to her regrets, an agent should not invoke (a) reasons that existed but were epistemically unavailable to her when she was deliberating; or (b) reasons that only came into existence after she acted. The JDP has important implications for prospective regret. In particular, it implies we should worry less about experiencing regret in the future than many of us do. Thus, my overall aim is to show that we often have reason to reject our regrets, which means that regret should play a less prominent and painful role in our lives than it does currently.     

The verdictive organization of desire

Deliberation often begins with the question ‘What do I want to do?’ rather than a question about what one ought to do. This paper takes that question at face value, as a question about which of one’s desires is strongest, which sometimes guides action. The paper aims to explain which properties of a desire make that desire strong, in the sense of ‘strength’ relevant to this deliberative question. The paper argues that one’s judgment about one wants most will sometimes play a verdictive role, partially determining what the agent most wants, and so making itself true.     

时间压力的双刃效应及其作用机制

时间压力是现代社会中人们经常面对的重要问题。以往研究认为时间压力只会产生消极影响, 然而现有研究发现时间压力也会产生积极影响。总结以往研究, 介绍了时间压力的概念和测量方式, 分别阐述了时间压力的损耗作用和促进作用, 并用注意焦点理论、激活理论、维生素模型和挑战?阻碍模型等理论解释时间压力的双刃效应。未来研究应该进一步关注：(1)基于时间心理账户开展时间压力的分类研究; (2)时间压力促进作用的动机和情绪双路径机制; (3)探寻有效缓解时间压力损耗作用的机制。