Problems and solutions for a hybrid approach to grounding practical normativity

Source Hybridism about practical reasons is the position that facts that constitute reasons sometimes derive their normative force from external metaphysical grounds, and sometimes from internal. Although historically less popular than either Source Internalism or Source Externalism, hybridism has lately begun to garner more attention. Here, I further the hybridist's cause by defending Source Hybridism from three objections. I argue that we are not warranted in rejecting hybridism for any of the following reasons: that hybridists cannot provide an account of normative weight, that hybridists are committed to implausible results concerning practical deliberation, or that Source Hybridism is objectionably unparsimonious.     

Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies

Moral error theories are often rejected by appeal to ‘companions in guilt’ arguments. The most popular form of companions in guilt argument takes epistemic reasons for belief as a ‘companion’ and proceeds by analogy. I show that this strategy fails. I claim that the companions in guilt theorist must understand epistemic reasons as evidential support relations if her argument is to be dialectically effective. I then present a dilemma. Either epistemic reasons are evidential support relations or they are not. If they are not, then the companions in guilt argument fails. If they are, then a reduction of epistemic reasons to evidential support relations becomes available and, consequently, epistemic reasons cease to be a viable ‘companion’ for moral reasons. I recommend this structure of argument over existing strategies within the literature and defend my claims against recent objections from companions in guilt theorists.     

Contrived motivating operations alter delay‐discounting values of disordered gamblers

The present study required 9 disordered gamblers to make hypothetical selections between smaller and larger amounts of money at varying delays. Participants were also required to respond to the task given the contrived hypothetical conditions of earning twice or half as much as they did at their current jobs. The results demonstrated how participants’ delay discounting was altered via contrived motivating operations, strengthening the argument that discounting may be a state variable.     

False-positive tangible outcomes of functional analyses

Functional analysis (FA) methodology is the most precise method for identifying variables that maintain problem behavior. Occasionally, however, results of an FA may be influenced by idiosyncratic sensitivity to aspects of the assessment conditions. For example, data from several studies suggest that inclusion of a tangible condition during an FA may be prone to a false-positive outcome, although the extent to which tangible reinforcement routinely produces such outcomes is unknown. We examined susceptibility to tangible reinforcement by determining whether a new response was acquired more readily when exposed to a tangible contingency relative to others commonly used in an FA (Study 1), and whether problem behavior known not to have a social function nevertheless emerged when exposed to tangible reinforcement (Study 2). Results indicated that inclusion of items in the tangible condition should be done with care and that selection should be based on those items typically found in the individual's environment.     

Objective and epistemic gradability: Is the new angle on the Knobe effect empirically grounded?

According to the New Angle, any explanation of the Knobe effect must be gradable and asymmetric. It has been argued that only Hindriks’ approach meets both criteria. First, we argue that Holton’s hypothesis also meets the criteria. Second, we show that the authors are not justified in taking the criteria to be empirically justified. We have failed to replicate the asymmetry result in two experiments. Moreover, gradability can be objective or epistemic. We show that the New Angle presupposes objective gradability. In our experiments, the patterns of responses to questions about epistemic and objective gradability are the same, irrespective of whether the feature is objectively gradable (e.g., blameworthiness) or not (e.g., intentionality). Our results thus question the extent to which the New Angle is empirically grounded. Moreover, they raise doubt whether the answers to questions about epistemic and objective gradability can be taken at face value at all.

Abbreviations: NRH - normative reasons hypothesis; NVH - norm violation hypothesis; DQ - degree question; DAQ - degree of agreement question     

How permissive consent works

Consent that is voluntary, informed and given by a competent person sometimes transforms a wrong into a right act. How does consent that meets these requirements change the moral property of an act, namely that of being a wronging of a person? This is the question this paper will deal with. Some authors argue that valid consent changes the moral property of an act by changing the reasons which speak against the act. This account of the normative force of consent will be critically examined and rejected. An alternative model will then be put forward and defended according to which consent changes the moral property of an act if and only if the wrong-making property of the act is that it is not consented to. The upshot will be that consent does not eliminate the wrong-making property if the unconsented act is wrong for other reasons than not being consented to.     

Remarks on the psycho-logic of action

The present paper is a discussion of Jan Smedslund's main action axiom (4.3.1) in Psycho-logic. I have interpreted the axiom in two different ways: a) as a presupposition about the determinants of action, and b) as a definition of highest expected utility. My conclusion is that taken as a supposition about the determinants of action, 4.3.1 is basically right, though not in the form it has in Psychologic. 4.3.1 taken as a definition, on the other hand, is basically wrong.     

Eudaimonism and the Ground of Normative Reasons

This essay develops an argument against eudaimonism in support of John Hare's earlier critique of eudaimonism. In contrast to Hare, who mounts a Kantian-Scotist objection to what he calls a single-source view of motivation in eudaimonism, my critique of eudaimonism focuses on the ground of normative reasons in eudaimonism while also taking a page from Scotus's ethics. I argue that the main issue with eudaimonism is with the ultimate end and manner of our willing, which fails to correspond to the right ordering of love based on the nature of goodness in the object.     

What use has approved

The meaning of a word is given by a customary rule for its use. I defend that claim and explain its implications by a comparison with customary rules in law. I address two problems about customary rules: first, how can the mere facts of social practice yield a norm? Secondly, how can we explain disagreement about the requirements of a custom, if those requirements are determined by the shared practice of the participants in a community? These problems can be resolved in a way that illuminates customary rules, and helps to explain the relation between the meaning of a word and the customary rule for its use. The meaning of a word is the usefulness that it has because of the customary rule for its use.