WHY I BELIEVE IN AN EXTERNAL WORLD

Abstract: I claim in this article that if my experience is such that it seems to me that there is an external object before me, then I have reason to believe that there is an external object before me. The sceptic argues that since my having the experience is compatible both with there being and with there not being an external object before me, I have no reason to believe that the former possibility obtains and not the latter. I respond that the sceptic has ignored a relevant difference between the two possibilities: I can make sense of the former possibility but not of the latter. I examine two broad categories of sceptical possibilities (dreams and hallucinations), explain why I cannot make sense of them, and explain why my inability to make sense of them gives me reason to believe they do not obtain.     

从“胡为民现象”看我国医疗领域的社会失范

随着我国经济体制的转型,由于市场机制的引进和发展不规范,医药卫生体制改革不成熟,在医疗领域出现了很多失范的现象。透过“胡为民现象”,分析了我国医疗领域社会失范的特点和原因,并针对原因提出了防治医疗领域社会失范的意见和措施     

Morality,Inescapable Rational Authority,and a God's Wishes

It is a supposed conceptual truth about moral norms that we have reason to comply with them even if we desire not to. This combination of rational authority and inescapability is thought to be incompatible with instrumentalism about practical reason. This essay argues that there are ways in which norms with inescapable rational authority can exist alongside instrumentalism about practical reason. One way involves positing an afterlife and a powerful supernatural agency—so, a kind of god—who has total control over our welfare in that afterlife. I go on to argue that the attitudes of this god would also provide something answering to our impressions of moral desert.     

Actions and accidents

In acting intentionally, it is no accident that one is doing what one intends to do. In this paper, I ask how to account for this non-accidentality requirement on intentional action. I argue that, for systematic reasons, the currently prevailing view of intentional action – the Causal Theory of Action – is ill-equipped to account for it. I end by proposing an alternative account, according to which an intention is a special kind of cause, one to which it is essential that it represents its effect.     

Respect,Coercion, and Religious Reasons

It is often assumed that people of faith should not endorse a law for religious reasons, since such an endorsement is considered to be disrespectful. Such a position is increasingly opposed by scholars who argue that such demands unjustifiably force people of faith to compromise their religious ideals. In order to defend their opposition to such demands, some scholars have invoked thought experiments as reductio arguments against the claim that endorsing laws dependent on religious reasons is necessarily disrespectful. I argue that these attempts have failed, and present an alternative thought experiment that demonstrates that such a law is not necessarily disrespectful. Because I conclude that previously proposed principles cannot defend this conclusion, I defend an alternative way of accommodating this intuition; a post‐secular deliberative approach based on the principle of double effect.     

Do We Decide Intentionally?

In a recent article in this journal, Joshua Shepherd presents and rejects a new argument for the sceptical conclusion that everyday decisions aren't intentional actions. After relating his focal argument to a different argument for the same conclusion that is presented and rejected by Alfred Mele, I defend these arguments from extant criticisms, and develop new objections that shed light on the intentionality of typical decisions.     

Can Character Traits Be Based on Brute Psychological Facts?

Some of our largely unchosen first‐order reactions, such as disgust, can underwrite morally‐laden character traits. This observation is in tension with the plausible idea that virtues and vices are based on reasons. I propose a way to resolve the tension.     

How permissive consent works

Consent that is voluntary, informed and given by a competent person sometimes transforms a wrong into a right act. How does consent that meets these requirements change the moral property of an act, namely that of being a wronging of a person? This is the question this paper will deal with. Some authors argue that valid consent changes the moral property of an act by changing the reasons which speak against the act. This account of the normative force of consent will be critically examined and rejected. An alternative model will then be put forward and defended according to which consent changes the moral property of an act if and only if the wrong-making property of the act is that it is not consented to. The upshot will be that consent does not eliminate the wrong-making property if the unconsented act is wrong for other reasons than not being consented to.