Evaluating the Covid-19 pandemic: The role of moral disengagement

The COVID-19 pandemic affected daily life worldwide. We examined how individuals perceived these changes. We expected the propensity to morally disengage (MD) to predict a less negative view of the pandemic via lower perspective-taking and compassion. As predicted, the results of a cross-sectional study (N = 717) show that alongside dispositional optimism, MD was associated with perceiving the pandemic in a less negative manner. Unexpectedly, the proposed mediating effects were not found. Exploratory results showed that MD predicted existential security directly and quality of life indirectly via lower compassion. Altogether, MD may provide some benefits in terms of pandemic perceptions.     

Right-Based Morality and Hohfeld's Relations

The paper begins by defending the Hohfeldianaccount of rights (as equivalence relations) from thecharge that it cannot capture their specialsignificance, and thus cannot be used in a right-basedmoral theory. It goes on to argue that, because of amisunderstanding of this relational account, theconception of right-based morality that has emerged inrecent years has been variously flawed from theoutset. A particular form of explanatory priority waswrongly taken to be essential, and then eitherincoherently combined with equivalence, or taken to bea reason for rejecting equivalence where right-basedthinking is concerned. In fact, this form of priorityis not sufficient for establishing a right-based moraltheory. It is also not necessary, since theHohfeldian analysis can be shown to be entirelyadequate to meeting the original aims of thoseproposing this approach to ethics.     

Common Law Approaches to the Relationship Between Law and Morality

How are general relations of law and morality typically conceived in an environment of Anglo-saxon common law? This paper considers some classical common law methods and traditions as these have confronted and been overlaid with modern ideas of legal positivism. While classical common law treated a community and its morality as the cultural foundation of law, legal positivism's analytical separation of law and morals, allied with liberal approaches to legal regulation, have made the relationship of legal and moral principles more complex and contested. Using ideas from Durkheim's and Weber's sociology, I argue that the traditional common law emphasis on an inductive, empirical treatment of moral practices has continuing merit, but in contemporary conditions the vague idea of community embedded in classical common law thought must be replaced with a much more precise conceptualisation of coexisting communities, whose moral bonds are diverse and require a corresponding diversity of forms of legal recognition or protection.     

Scientia Iuris - An Unsolved Philosophical Problem

Legal dogmatics in Continental European law (scientia iuris, Rechtswissenschaft) consists of professional legal writings whose task is to systematize and interpret valid law. Legal dogmatics pursues knowledge of the existing law, yet in many cases it leads to a change of the law. Among general theories of legal dogmatics, one may mention the theories of negligence, intent, adequate causation and ownership. The theories produce principles and they also produce defeasible rules. By means of production of general and defeasible theories, legal dogmatics aims at obtaining a system of law that is both internally coherent and harmonized with its background in morality and (political) philosophy. Legal dogmatics is necessary in the context of constitutional constraints on the majority rule. Only if the courts act on the basis of Reason they can be a legitimate counterpart of the majority rule. And Reason cannot be exhausted by particular decision making. It also needs a more abstract deliberation, given by expert jurists. However, legal dogmatics has been a target of several kinds of criticism: empirical, morally-political, epistemological, logical, and ontological. The position taken in this article is to answer such criticism by mutually adjusting philosophy and the practices of the law.     

God, Genes, and Cognizing Agents

Much ink has been spilled on the claim that morality and religion have evolutionary roots. While some attempt to reduce morality and religion to biological considerations, others reject any link whatsoever. Any full account, however, must acknowledge the biological roots of human behavior while at the same time recognizing that our relatively unique capacity as cognitive agents requires orienting concepts of cosmic and human nature. While other organisms display quasi-moral and proto-moral behavior that is indeed relevant, fully moral behavior is only possible for organisms that attain a higher level of cognitive ability. This, in turn, implies a significant role for religion, which has traditionally provided an orientation within which moral conduct is understood.     

伦理何为

伦理学是“成人”,“做人”之维。人离不开伦理,伦理学首先是“成人”之道。“人”成为什么样的人也离不开伦理,伦理学又是“做人”之维。伦理要内化成人心理的存在,才能成为“成人”之道,“做人”之维。道德建设要符合“成人”与“做人”的要求。     

试析中国国家主导的公民道德建设之合理性

针对中国国家主导的公民道德建设的合理性,从中国共产党性质、目标、任务的先进性、合理性;现代化经济建设的客观要求;社会主义国家文化职能等方面进行阐述,同时,从思想史上对国家职能认识的角度,强调了社会主义中国对国家在道德建设中的作用重视的必要性。     

Religiosity and the value of being moral: Understanding the meaning of morality through a personal values perspective

We demonstrate how religiosity predicts relationships between personal values and perceptions of morality in four studies across two cultures (Jews in Israel and mainly Christians in the US). In Studies 1A (N = 337) and 1B (N = 200), we explored the commonalities and differences between religious and non-religious participants in the association between values and the importance of being moral. In Studies 2A (N = 131) and 2B (N = 250), we tested the role of religiosity in the association between values and evaluations of others’ morality. Power (negatively) and Benevolence (positively) were associated with morality across levels of religiosity. The associations with Conservation were more positive for more religious participants; the associations with Universalism were more positive for less religious participants. Finally, the associations with at least one of the Openness-to-change values were more negative if a person was more religious. Studies 2A and 2B showed these associations existed over and above differences in personal values.     

Do you believe what you have been told? Morality and scientific literacy as predictors of pseudoscience susceptibility

The aim of the current study was to examine the antecedents of susceptibility to pseudoscientific information. Participants were asked to assess their perceived probability of and familiarity with statements containing popular science misconceptions and pseudoscientific claims, which were fabricated for the study. Measures of scientific literacy, moral inclinations, need for closure, and a set of additional variables were collected. Analysis of the results showed that susceptibility to known pseudoscientific theories predicted falling for novel unwarranted claims. Scientific literacy strongly predicted lower pseudoscience susceptibility of all types. Finally, participants' moral inclinations were found to be a strong predictor of different types of pseudoscientific statements.     

Morality, Self-Interest, and Two Kinds of Prudential Practical Rationality

In this article it is assumed that human goodness is to be judged with respect to how well one does at practical reasoning. It is acknowledged that (1) there is a difference between moral practical reasoning (MPR) and prudential practical reasoning (PPR) and (2) what these would recommend sometimes conflict. A distinction is then made between absolute PPR and relative PPR and it is argued that doing well at absolute PPR is always consistent with MPR. It is also argued that since it is more reasonable to assess prudential practical rationality in terms of the absolute standard than the relative standard, there is no conflict between the demands of MPR (morality) and PPR (self-interest).