Confidence and Uncertainty in Judgmental Forecasting: Differential Effects of Scenario Presentation

Multiple scenario analysis is used by many organizations for long-term planning, in part because the development of more than one scenario of the future is thought to prevent overconfidence in any one specific forecast. The present study attempts to clarify some of the questions concerning the cognitive effects of scenario presentation by distinguishing between confidence and subjective uncertainty. It examined the impact of different types of scenario information on confidence ratings, credible intervals, and features of forecast series. Subjects (N=186) read either one, two, or no scenario(s) describing potential changes in the level of a stimulus variable, then made forecasts of that variable over the next fifty years. Reading any type of scenario information increased confidence in forecasts; there was no reduction in confidence due to presentation of multiple conflicting scenarios, compared to presentation of only one scenario. Differences in number and in type of scenarios presented did, however, affect subjective uncertainty.     

On the evaluation of one-sided evidence

We examine predictions and judgments of confidence based on one-sided evidence. Some subjects saw arguments for only one side of a legal dispute while other subjects (called ‘jurors’) saw arguments for both sides. Subjects predicted the number of jurors who favored the plaintiff in each case. Subjects who saw only one side made predictions that were biased in favor of that side. Furthermore, they were more confident but generally less accurate than subjects who saw both sides. The results indicate that people do not compensate sufficiently for missing information even when it is painfully obvious that the information available to them is incomplete. A simple manipulation that required subjects to evaluate the relative strength of the opponent's side greatly reduced the tendency to underweigh missing evidence.     

The effects of statistical training on choice heuristics in choice under uncertainty

Kahneman and Tversky (1984) proposed that decision makers perceive choice uncertainty in two ways: (1) as a distribution of possible outcomes or (2) as a single uncertain outcome. Using statistical training as a factor that influences these perceptions, and thus the type of decision approach individuals use, we found that individuals with different levels of experience displayed differences in the decisions they made and in the choice heuristics used to make those decisions. Statistically naive individuals were more likely to prefer loss-minimizing alternatives, use a more non-compensatory heuristic, and spend more time on loss-related information than their statistically experienced counterparts. When a distributional cue, indicating the distributional nature of choice outcomes, was presented to both experience groups, the naive group was found to use a decision approach similar to the experienced group and to make similar decisions. The results are discussed in terms of the need to include factors that alter individuals' approaches to uncertainty in future behavioral models of uncertain choice.     

Regression II. Development through regression

As shown in our previous paper (‘Regression I. Experimental approaches to regression’, JAP, 65, 2, 345-65), the common mechanism of regression can be described as reversible dedifferentiation, which is understood as a relative increase of the proportion of low-differentiated (older) systems in actualized experience. Experimental data show that regression following disease (chronic tension headache) is followed by adaptation and an increase in system differentiation in that experience domain which contains systems responsible for that adaptation. The results of mathematical modelling support the idea that reversible dedifferentiation can be one of the mechanisms for increasing the effectiveness of adaptation through learning. Reversible dedifferentiation, which is phenomenologically described as regression, is a general mechanism for restructuring the organism-environment interactions in situations where behaviours that were effective in the past become ineffective. Reversible dedifferentiation has evolved as a component of adaptation when new behaviours are formed and large-scale modifications in the existing behaviours are required in the face of changes in the external and/or internal environment. Thus, the authors believe that this article provides evidence for Jung’s view that regression is not only a ‘return’ to past forms of thinking, affects and behaviour, but that regressive processes provide a significant impetus for psychological growth and development.     

Guilt feelings and the intelligibility of moral duties

G.E.M. Anscombe argued that we should dispense with deontic concepts when doing ethics, if it is psychologically possible to do so. In response, I contend that deontic concepts are constitutive of the common moral experience of guilt. This has two consequences for Anscombe's position. First, seeing that guilt is a deontic emotion, we should recognize that Anscombe's qualification on her thesis applies: psychologically, we need deontology to understand our obligations and hence whether our guilt is warranted. Second, the fact that guilt is a deontic moral emotion debunks Anscombe's claim that deontic concepts are a relic of the Western, religious past: guilt feelings–hence the idea of moral duty as well–can be found in cultures without an ethics of divine command. Modern moral philosophers' interest in oughts and obligations is not an academic hobbyhorse, but a vital concern arising out of a primeval human emotion.     

Relations between forms and functions of aggression and moral judgments of aggressive transgressions

The present study sought to examine the influence of aggressive behavior, psychopathy, and gender on moral judgments of aggressive transgressions. A two-dimensional conceptualization of aggression was used, such that proactive relational aggression, reactive relational aggression, proactive physical aggression, and reactive physical aggression were treated as distinct subtypes of aggression and also as distinct subtypes of moral judgments of aggression. Participants were 421 emerging adults (215 women). Self-report measures of aggression, psychopathy, and moral judgments were collected. Peer-reports of aggression and psychopathy were obtained from a randomly assigned subsample of 73 participants (46 women) for validity purposes. Unique associations were found between subtypes of aggression and corresponding moral judgments of the same subtypes.     

Support for the Populist Radical Right: Between Uncertainty Avoidance and Risky Choice

The last several decades have witnessed a structural change in politics toward cultural and identity conflicts, accompanied by the rise of populist radical right (PRR) parties. However, we know surprisingly little about the psychological or cognitive-motivational factors underlying PRR support. We claim that uncertainty avoidance (UA)—an epistemic avoidance motivation—represents a central motive because UA resonates with the PRR platform and precedes common predictors of PRR voting. Using data from the 2017 Austrian National Election Study, we found that UA was indeed indirectly associated with a higher likelihood of PRR voting. This association is because greater UA fostered right-wing sociocultural views, whereas associations with populist attitudes or expected government competence were more ambiguous. PRR parties appear to offer “certainty,” but as extreme parties, they also remain a “risky choice.” We conclude by discussing the contribution of a cognitive-motivational account to explain PRR voting.     

新型冠状病毒疫情影响下大学生对医生角色行为的道德判断研究

2020年初,在我国发生了新型冠状病毒引发的重大疫情,医生是战“疫”的重要角色,也是最受关注的职业群体。这次疫情是否改变了以往因医患矛盾而引发的大众对医生的道德判断?本研究采用徐科朋(2019)编制的道德判断材料,以非医护专业大学生为被试,用实验法分别比较了疫情前和疫情中大学生对医生道德和不道德行为的判断。结果发现:(1)疫情前大学生对医生在公平行为上的赞扬程度显著高于疫情中,疫情中大学生对医生在关爱、忠诚、权威行为上,赞扬程度显著高于疫情前。(2)在整体不道德行为上,疫情中大学生均对医生的评价比对照组严格。疫情前大学生对医生在背叛、颠覆行为上的评价要比对照组宽松。疫情中大学生对医生在伤害、背叛、堕落行为上的评价要比对照组严格。(3)疫情中,大学生对医生在整体不道德行为和各维度不道德行为上的评价较疫情前均更加严格。     

Learning through observing: Effects of modeling truth‐ and lie‐telling on children’s honesty

The current study examined the influence of observing another's lie‐ or truth‐telling – and its consequences – on children's own honesty about a transgression. Children (N = 224, 5–8 years of age) observed an experimenter (E) tell the truth or lie about a minor transgression in one of five conditions: (a) Truth‐Positive Outcome – E told the truth with a positive outcome; (b) Truth‐Negative Outcome – E told the truth with a negative outcome; (c) Lie‐Positive Outcome – E lied with a positive outcome; (d) Lie‐Negative Outcome – E lied with a negative outcome; (e) Control – E did not tell a lie or tell the truth. Later, to examine children's truth‐ or lie‐telling behavior, children participated in a temptation resistance paradigm where they were told not to peek at a trivia question answer. They either peeked or not, and subsequently lied or told the truth about that behavior. Additionally, children were asked to give moral evaluations of different truth‐ and lie‐telling vignettes. Overall, 85% of children lied. Children were less likely to lie about their own transgression in the TRP when they had previously witnessed the experimenter tell the truth with a positive outcome or tell a lie with a negative outcome.     

First steps toward an understanding of procedural fairness

In four experiments, we tested whether 20‐month‐old infants are sensitive to violations of procedural impartiality. Participants were shown videos in which help was provided in two different ways. A main character provided help to two other agents either impartially, by helping them at the same time, or in a biased way, by helping one agent almost immediately while the other after a longer delay. Infants looked reliably longer at the biased than at the unbiased help scenarios despite the fact that in both scenarios help was provided to each beneficiary. This suggests that human infants can attend to departures from impartiality and, in their second year, they already show an initial understanding of procedural fairness.