Interactivism in artificial intelligence (AI) and intelligent robotics

This paper overviews the interactivist model of representation and its applications in artificial intelligence (AI) and intelligent robotics. Selected examples from approaches in AI and robotics are contrasted with the generic interactivist architecture in order to illustrate specific features of it. Petitagé, an artificial agent that instantiates our interactivist-expectative theory of agency and learning (IETAL), is discussed in detail from the interactivist perspective.     

Determinants of instrumental extinction in terrestrial toads (Bufo arenarum)

Previous research in a water-reinforced instrumental training situation with toads (Bufo arenarum) has shown that performance in both acquisition and extinction is poorer after partial, rather than continuous reinforcement training. In Experiment 1, the performance of a group receiving 24 trials on a 50% partial reinforcement schedule was poorer in acquisition and extinction than that of continuously reinforced groups matched for trials or reinforcements. However, partially reinforced toads extinguished at the same rapid rate as a continuously reinforced group that received training only on the days in which the partial toads received water reinforcement. In Experiment 2, extinction was faster after 10 reinforced acquisition trials than after 30 trials. This evidence suggests that the deleterious effects of partial reinforcement in toads can be explained by a combination of two factors, namely, the distribution of reinforced trials across days and the total number of reinforcements.     

Integrating person and situation perspectives on work satisfaction: A social-cognitive view

Social cognitive career theory (Lent, Brown, & Hackett, 1994) was originally designed to help explain interest development, choice, and performance in career and educational domains. These three aspects of career/academic development were presented in distinct but overlapping segmental models. This article presents a fourth social cognitive model aimed at understanding satisfaction experienced in vocational and educational pursuits. The model posits paths whereby core social cognitive variables (e.g., self-efficacy, goals) function jointly with personality/affective trait and contextual variables that have been linked to job satisfaction. We consider the model’s implications for forging an understanding of satisfaction that bridges the often disparate perspectives of organizational and vocational psychology.     

The gendered nature of career related learning experiences: A social cognitive career theory perspective

The learning experiences questionnaire (LEQ; Schaub & Tokar, 2005) was used to examine learning experiences as they relate to SCCT (Lent, Brown, & Hackett, 1994) across the Holland (1997) RIASEC typology. In particular, differences in men’s and women’s career related learning experiences were examined. A sample of 319 undergraduates at a public Midwestern university completed an online survey. Gender differences were observed in reported levels of some learning experiences; similar to prior findings for self-efficacy and interests, women reported more learning experiences in the Social domain, and men reported more experiences in the Realistic and Investigative domains. Results also supported that more reported learning experiences in a given domain relate to higher self-efficacy and outcome expectations in that domain.     

Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility

The author argued elsewhere that a necessary condition that John Fischer and Mark Ravizza offer for moral responsibility is too strong and that the sufficient conditions they offer are too weak. This article is a critical examination of their reply. Topics discussed include blameworthiness, irresistible desires, moral responsibility, reactive attitudes, and reasons responsiveness.     

Engineering ethics, individuals, and organizations

This article evaluates a family of criticism of how engineering ethics is now generally taught. The short version of the criticism might be put this way: Teachers of engineering ethics devote too much time to individual decisions and not enough time to social context. There are at least six version of this criticism, each corresponding to a specific subject omitted. Teachers of engineering ethics do not (it is said) teach enough about: 1) the culture of organizations; 2) the organization of organizations; 3) the legal environment of organizations; 4) the role of professions in organizations; 5) the role of organizations in professions; or 6) the political environment of organizations. My conclusion is that, while all six are worthy subjects, there is neither much reason to believe that any of them are now absent from courses in engineering ethics nor an obvious way to decide whether they (individually or in combination) are (or are not) now being given their due. What we have here is a dispute about how much is enough. Such disputes are not to be settled without agreement concerning how we are to tell we have enough of this or that. Right now we seem to lack that agreement—and not to have much reason to expect it any time soon. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2005 conference, Ethics and Social Responsibility in Engineering and Technology, Linking Workplace Ethics and Education, co-hosted by Gonzaga University and Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, CA, USA, 9–10 June 2005.     

Right Motive, Wrong Action: Direct Consequentialism and Evaluative Conflict

In this paper I look at attempts to develop forms of consequentialism which do not have a feature considered problematic in Direct Consequentialist theories (that is, those consequentialist theories that apply the criterion of rightness directly in the evaluation of any set of options). The problematic feature in question (which I refer to as ‘evaluative conflict’) is the possibility that, for example, a right motive might lead an agent to perform a wrong act. Theories aiming to avoid this phenomenon must argue that causal relationship entails motives and acts (for example) having the same moral status. I argue that attempts to ensure such ‘evaluative consistency’ are themselves deeply problematic, and that we must therefore accept evaluative conflict.     

Satir's Therapeutically Oriented Educational Process: A Critical Appreciation

Virginia Satir, one of the most influential of the early family therapists, reached millions of people throughout the world through her writings, videotapes, workshops, and personal appearances. Yet the Satir model has never been fully accepted by the mainstream of the family therapy movement. This article introduces Satir and her work, and outlines the conceptual foundations of the model, organized in terms of presuppositions, basic constructs, therapeutic process, and methods, and offers some reasons for this lack of acceptance. The relation of theory to method and practice is the least developed aspect of the Satir model.     

The Power to Feel Fear and The One to Feel Happiness are the Same

The centre of Adorno's Critical Theory is occupied by the theme of happiness. He speaks of the impaired life, of the unjustness of society, of murderous prejudices, of the atrocities in history, of the dissonance in art, of the unhappy consciousness, because something better can only be described from a point of opposition. Happiness cannot be objectified as possession, it always needs to be experienced subjectively, somatically. (With happiness it is like with truth: One does not have it, one is in it.) Happiness cannot be prescribed and ordered; nothing can be done to guarantee happiness. (Happiness goes beyond doing.) Happiness (like fear) has to do with being open to experience which can overwhelm the self. Sexual and aesthetical experience are models for such overwhelming happiness. The sensation of happiness always is very personal, but in this experience the individual leaves its particularity behind. One has to differentiate between goal and object: Happiness may be a goal, but not it itself, only what obstructs it, can be an object of Critical Theory.