What is the Problem with Fundamental Moral Error?

Quasi-realists argue that meta-ethical expressivism is fully compatible with the central assumptions underlying ordinary moral practice. In a recent paper, Andy Egan has developed a vexing challenge for this project, arguing that expressivism is incompatible with central assumptions about error in moral judgments. In response, Simon Blackburn has argued that Egan's challenge fails, because Egan reads the expressivist as giving an account of moral error, rather than an account of judgments about moral error. In this paper I argue that the challenge can be reinstated, even if we focus only on the expressivist's account of judgments about moral error.     

Subjective socioeconomic status and departmental identity interact to reduce depressive tendencies and negative affective responding for female undergraduates

How do subjective socioeconomic status (SES) and departmental identity promote the mental health of female undergraduates? We conducted a questionnaire study (Study 1) and an experimental study (Study 2) with undergraduates enrolled in a women's junior college to examine whether subjective SES and group identity have an interactive effect on mental health. Results indicated that in participants with high subjective SES, increased identification with their reference in‐group (the academic department) was associated with a decreased tendency for depression (Study 1). These individuals also showed reduced negative affect when responding in situations of social exclusion (Study 2). These effects were absent, or had a reduced intensity in participants with low subjective SES. In sum, subjective SES and departmental identity interact to reduce depressive tendencies and negative affective responding for female undergraduates. Individuals with higher subjective SES may gain more benefits from group identity. We have discussed the implications of these findings.     

Further evidence for the case against neuropsychoanalysis: How Yovell,Solms, and Fotopoulou's response to our critique confirms the irrelevance and harmfulness to psychoanalysis of the contemporary neuroscientific trend

In their paper “The case for neuropsychoanalysis” Yovell, Solms, and Fotopoulou (2015) respond to our critique of neuropsychoanalysis (Blass & Carmeli, 2007), setting forth evidence and arguments which, they claim, demonstrate why neuroscience is relevant and important for psychoanalysis and hence why dialogue between the fields is necessary. In the present paper we carefully examine their evidence and arguments and demonstrate how and why their claim is completely mistaken. In fact, Yovell, Solms, and Fotopoulou's paper only confirms our position on the irrelevance and harmfulness to psychoanalysis of the contemporary neuroscientific trend. We show how this trend perverts the essential nature of psychoanalysis and of how it is practiced. The clinical impact and its detrimental nature is highlighted by discussion of clinical material presented by Yovell et al (2015). In the light of this we argue that the debate over neuropsychoanalysis should be of interest to all psychoanalysts, not only those concerned with biology or interdisciplinary dialogue.     

重大传染病感染患者的道德创伤隐患研究

重大传染病疫情背景下,病原体的不断变异、疫苗保护效力的不确定性以及诸多后遗症会导致疫情难以控制,并且造成一个数量极其庞大的特殊弱势群体—感染患者。在感染患者从疑似患病到康复的期间,影响他人工作生活、恶化疫情防控形势、感染他人、亲友的抛弃、传染病污名化、医疗资源分配不均以及社会的歧视与排挤等潜在的道德创伤源会对其内心原本的道德体系产生巨大的冲击,甚至改变其原有的道德认知并击溃其积极的道德情感,从而产生道德创伤。在此基础上,感染患者会因此产生一系列社会问题、信任问题、精神问题、生存问题以及诸多消极观念。

     

论西方主流伦理理论的前提错误——兼论道德无力症与冷漠症对医疗的影响

从“畏死的恐惧”出发重塑扎根生命的道德基础,即道德行为和“生-生”式的道德关系是人的本真需要,道德权威性的根据是人类生命共同体这一“内在永恒大我”和人的本真存在方式的需要。这拯救了道德相对主义,也使个体作为潜在的人类生命共同体而能以“与永恒相关的生命意义”推开恐惧。进而,道德行为是出于内在自由而达于实在的自由的。道德主体应具备的道德实践能力包括独立能力、通达能力和勇气。生存性境况中的原子式个体不具备道德实践能力,生命境况中的“超个体的个体”才有此能力。由此,人类道德无力症和道德冷漠症的根源是西方主流伦理理论的前提错误,即以原子式个体充任道德主体。它是医疗纠纷和暴力频发的原因。     

新型冠状病毒肺炎定点医院医护人员心理状况调查分析

为了解定点收治新型冠状病毒肺炎患者的医院中医护人员心理状况,从而针对性地进行心理护理,采用便利抽样法,应用《医护人员心理健康调查表》对3所定点收治新型冠状病毒肺炎患者的医院中1 266名医护人员进行问卷调查。结果显示,定点医院医护人员中,27.5%存在抑郁,26.3%存在焦虑,26.0%存在孤独。女性、已婚、传染科、发热门诊、监护室相比男性、未婚、普通门诊更容易抑郁;传染科、监护室相比普通门诊更容易焦虑。因此,医院应加强对这类群体的心理疏导和人文关怀,以减轻心理压力,提高工作效率。     

ICU护士伦理气氛认知与道德困境的相关性研究

采用量性研究方法对ICU护士进行调查分析,了解ICU护士道德困境和伦理气氛认知的现状,并探讨两者之间的相关性。结果显示,ICU护士道德困境总分为43.00分(24.00, 67.00),伦理气氛认知得分为(3.44±0.38)分。相关性分析结果显示：道德困境总分与关怀型伦理气氛呈负相关(r=-0.131,P＜0.05),与功利型伦理气氛呈正相关(r=0.297,P＜0.01)。护理管理者在临床工作中可采取积极有效的措施塑造关怀型伦理气氛,避免或削弱功利型伦理气氛的形成, 从而降低道德困境的发生。

     

Longitudinal Changes of Planned Happenstance Skills by Gender,Community Types,and Employment Status in a Sample of College Students in School‐to‐Work Transition

This study examined the characteristics of college students who are transitioning from school to work by measuring their mean differences on planned happenstance skills subscales at 3 separate time points. The results indicated that the mean of planned happenstance skills changed across the 3 time points and are somewhat different through demographic factors, such as gender, community types, and employment status. In addition, 2‐way and 3‐way multivariate analysis of variance results showed that the interaction effects of 3 demographic variables on 5 planned happenstance skills were not significant. Practical implications for career counselors are discussed.     

Merit,fit, and basic desert

Basic desert is central to the dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists over the four-case manipulation argument. I argue that there are two distinct ways of understanding the desert salient to moral responsibility; moral desert can be understood as a claim about fitting responses to an agent or as a claim about the merit of the agent. Failing to recognize this distinction has contributed to a stalemate between both sides. I suggest that recognizing these distinct approaches to moral desert will help clarify a central source of disagreement between compatibilists and incompatibilists and assist both sides in resolving the current stalemate.     

Do emotions play an essential role in moral judgments?

The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence of an emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present review reveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger, sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judging conduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recent studies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence in support of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus instead on how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interact with empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.