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931.
Michael Weber 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(1):65-86
A number of neo-Kantians have suggested that an act may be morally worthy even if sympathy and similar emotions are present,
so long as they are not what in fact motivates right action–so long as duty, and duty alone, in fact motivates. Thus, the
ideal Kantian moral agent need not be a cold and unfeeling person, as some critics have suggested. Two objections to this
view need to be answered. First, some maintain that motives cannot be present without in fact motivating. Such non-motivating
reasons, it is claimed, are incoherent. Second, if such motives are not in fact motivating, then nonetheless the moral agent's
performance of right action will be objectionably cold and unfeeling. While the first objection is not compelling, since the
alternative according to which all motives in fact motivate but differ in strength suffers from the very same problems attributed
to the neo-Kantian view, the second has force, and any account of moral worth must make room for motives such as sympathy
actually motivating right action. 相似文献
932.
With Hope and Imagination: Imaginative Moral Decision-Making in Neonatal Intensive Care Units 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Although the role of imagination in moral reasoning is often neglected, recent literature, mostly of pragmatist signature,
points to imagination as one of its central elements. In this article we develop some of their arguments by looking at the
moral role of imagination in practice, in particular the practice of neonatal intensive care. Drawing on empirical research,
we analyze a decision-making process in various stages: delivery, staff meeting, and reflection afterwards. We show how imagination
aids medical practitioners demarcating moral categories, tuning their actions, and exploring long-range consequences of decisions.
We argue that imagination helps to bring about at least four kinds of integration in the moral decision-making process: personal
integration by creating a moral self-image in moments of reflection; social integration by aiding the conciliation of the
diverging perspectives of the people involved; temporal integration by facilitating the parties to transcend the present moment
and connect past, present, and future; and epistemological integration by helping to combine the various forms of knowledge
and experience needed to make moral decisions. Furthermore, we argue that the role of imagination in these moral decision-processes
is limited in several significant ways. Rather than being a solution itself, it is merely an aid and cannot replace the decision
itself. Finally, there are also limits to the practical relevance of this theoretical reflection. In the end, it is up to
care professionals as reflective practitioners to re-imagine the practice of intensive care and make the right decisions with
hope and imagination.
相似文献
Mark CoeckelberghEmail: |
933.
道德敏感性是对情境的道德含意的领悟和解释能力,是道德行为产生过程中逻辑上的初始心理成分。道德敏感性与个体对情境的自动化加工及其伴随着的直觉情绪有着密切的关系。情境的背景与特征,个体的角色卷入、道德图式以及人格特点等因素都可能影响个体的道德敏感性。道德敏感性研究已在儿童早期发展、职业伦理以及测验方法等领域取得一定成果,但其理论构建仍需进一步完善、深化,与教育干预密切相关的发展研究有待加强,研究方法也需拓展和改进 相似文献
934.
935.
Lai Chen 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2007,2(3):363-378
Feng Youlan’s Xin Shixun 新世训 (New Treatise on the Way of Life) written in the late 1930s differed from traditional moral teachings because it focused
on nonmoral life lessons and how to “virtuously” pursue success. It advanced an interpretation of traditional virtues as life
lessons for young people, so that these virtues could transform an individual life in modern society. Thereby the morals of
ancient sages could transfer to the modern, individual, and morality. The problem is just how the ideals of traditional Chinese
culture have adjusted themselves to modern society. Following the phrase “after-virtue”, this effort can be called a pursuit
of “after-sage”.
Translated by Yan Xin from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2006, (2): 36–44 相似文献
936.
937.
938.
Abstract: This Introduction to the collection of essays surveys the philosophical literature to date with respect to five central questions: justice, care, agency, metaphilosophical issues regarding the language and representation of cognitive disability, and personhood. These themes are discussed in relation to three specific conditions: intellectual and developmental disabilities, Alzheimer's disease, and autism, though the issues raised are relevant to a broad range of cognitive disabilities. The Introduction offers a brief historical overview of the treatment cognitive disability has received from philosophers, and explains the specific challenges that cognitive disability poses to philosophy. In briefly summarizing the essays in the collection, it highlights the distinctive contributions the collection makes to ethics, political philosophy, bioethics, and the philosophy of disability. We hope that the richness of the topics explored by these essays will be a spur to further investigation. 相似文献
939.
PETER SINGER 《Metaphilosophy》2009,40(3-4):567-581
Abstract: Many people believe that all human life is of equal value. Most of them also believe that all human beings have a moral status superior to that of nonhuman animals. But how are these beliefs to be defended? The mere difference of species cannot in itself determine moral status. The most obvious candidate for regarding human beings as having a higher moral status than animals is the superior cognitive capacity of humans. People with profound mental retardation pose a problem for this set of beliefs, because their cognitive capacities are not superior to those of many animals. I argue that we should drop the belief in the equal value of human life, replacing it with a graduated view that applies to animals as well as to humans. 相似文献
940.
JEFF MCMAHAN 《Metaphilosophy》2009,40(3-4):582-605
Abstract: This essay explores problems of consistency among commonsense beliefs about the comparative moral status of animals, fetuses, and human beings congenitally endowed with cognitive capacities and potential no higher than those of higher animals. The possibility of genetic cognitive enhancement exacerbates some of these problems, but also offers new resources for understanding the basis of our moral status as inviolable. 相似文献