蔡元培道德教育思想初探

蔡元培的道德教育思想及其实践在中国近现代伦理思想史上具有独特地位。他关于道德教育培养国民健全人格,以公民道德教育为“中坚”,重视公德、私德教育以及道德教育途径与方法等等,对于今天中国特色社会主义思想道德建设仍具有借鉴意义。     

交往理性与德育理念的重建

哲学意义上的交往理论,尤其是哈贝马斯的交往理性可以解决当前目的理性泛滥带来的的德育危机。交往德育是在超越灌输德育的基础上,对主体存在、人的存在目标和生存意义提出本质追问并提供某种可能性诠释的德育理论。它是一种扬弃与超越灌输德育而又与灌输德育截然不同的德育理念,是德育发展的必经阶段。     

回到道德现象本身——康德道德形而上学的论证方法初探

在康德理性的道德形而上学的建构过程中,两种论证方法即分析法和综合法起到了重要的作用。他首先用分析法从普通人的相互混杂的道德认识中逐步分离出纯粹的道德现象和原则,力图给真正的道德哲学奠基。随后他又用综合法来论证道德律的实在性并使它在经验世界中能得到现实的应用,以说明纯粹的道德原则并非人的主观臆造。两种方法相互依赖,相辅相成,共同支撑起道德形而上学的大厦。     

大学生性道德价值观的结构及问卷编制

以文献综述为基础,结合开放式问卷调查、专家分析和探索性施测,提出了大学生性道德价值观的理论构想,在此基础上编制了大学生性道德价值观问卷,并对正式问卷调查结果进行探索性因子分析和验证性因子分析,初步确定大学生的性道德价值观是一个多层次多维度的结构,包括3个二阶因子和8个一阶因子。该研究建构的大学生性道德价值观的理论结构比较合理,初步编制的问卷各项测量学指标总的表现良好,经过修改可以作为测量当代大学生性道德价值观的工具。     

不同情景下小学儿童对说谎与说真话的道德评价

研究探讨了小学7、9、11岁儿童在对说谎与说真话进行道德评价时不同情景间的差异.研究结果发现,小学儿童对于具有积极意义的说谎/真话的评价显著地好于消极性的说谎/真话.但在对具有积极意义的说谎以及具有消极意义的真话进行评价时,具有显著的情景间差异.总的来说,在个体情景下,对谦虚谎及做好事说真话的评价具有年龄的效应,且谦虚谎的评价比白谎更为积极,而白谎的评价比集体情景下的说谎与伤害性说谎更为积极;而儿童对于交往情景下直率真话的评价在所有的年龄都趋于中性,有别于其他情景.     

医学专业精神的初步研究

由于历史和社会文化的差异,中西方对医学专业精神有着不同的理解。在中西不同语境下,分析了“Profession”和“Professionalism”这两个核心概念的涵义,并从中西对比的视角,对中西方医学专业精神所面临的几个共同问题进行了初步研究,包括医学专业核心道德价值观念、利益冲突、行业自治等。在此基础之上,还对我国医学专业精神的发展提出建议。     

中国传统伦理对医院道德管理之贡献

随着经济的腾飞,儒家管理思想在文化、伦理道德层面上给予医院经营管理以深刻影响。在医院道德管理的建设中,中国传统儒家伦理起着重要的作用,“仁”是医院经营发展的中心,“义”是医院经营立足的根本,“礼”是医院经营成功的保证,“智”是医院经营腾飞的关键,“信”是医院经营兴旺的标志。     

防范医疗纠纷的载体建设——天津市人民医院投诉中心的绩效浅析

利用现代医学伦理的人本理念,将投诉中心作为防范医疗纠纷的载体,有效地解决就医者的投诉接待和处理,无疑是一种全新的理念和尝试。通过对投诉制度建设、投诉处理标准化流程、有效投诉信息的利用等方面的经验性论述,阐明了投诉中心的载体建设,为减少医疗纠纷、加强伦理道德建设、构建和谐的医患关系产生了积极的作用。     

MORAL REFORM,MORAL DISAGREEMENT,AND ABORTION

Abstract: Bernard Gert argues that legitimate moral disagreement calls for tolerance and moral humility; when there is more than one morally acceptable course of action, then intolerance and what Gert calls “moral arrogance” would be objectionable. This article identifies some possible difficulties in distinguishing moral arrogance from moral reform and then examines Gert's treatment of abortion as a contemporary example of moral disagreement that he characterizes as irresolvable.     

On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible

A number of philosophers have recently argued that we should interpret the debate over moral responsibility as a debate over the conditions under which it would be “fair” to blame a person for her attitudes or conduct. What is distinctive about these accounts is that they begin with the stance of the moral judge, rather than that of the agent who is judged, and make attributions of responsibility dependent upon whether it would be fair or appropriate for a moral judge to react to the agent in various (negative) ways. This is problematic, I argue, because our intuitions about whether and when it would be fair to react negatively to another are sensitive to a host of considerations that appear to have little or nothing to do with an agent’s responsibility or culpability for her attitudes or behavior. If this is correct, then theories which make attributions of responsibility dependent upon the appropriateness of our reactions as moral judges will turn out to be fundamentally misguided. I am grateful to Barbara Herman, T. M. Scanlon, and two anonymous reviewers for The Journal of Ethics for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to Pamela Hieronymi and the members of her Fall 2201 graduate seminar on moral responsibility at UCLA, and to the audience members at Simon Fraser University, for their valuable feedback on earlier versions of this material. My biggest debt of gratitude goes to Jean Roberts, for stimulating discussion and insightful commentary on multiple drafts of this paper.