Hypocritical Blame,Fairness, and Standing

This paper argues that hypocritical blame renders blame inappropriate. Someone should not express her blame if she is guilty of the same thing for which she is blaming others, in the absence of an admission of fault. In failing to blame herself for the same violations of norms she condemns in another, the hypocrite evinces important moral faults, which undermine her right to blame. The hypocrite refuses or culpably fails to admit her own mistakes, while at the same time demands that others admit theirs. The paper argues that this lack of reciprocity—expecting others to take morality seriously by apologizing for their faults, without one doing the same in return—is what makes hypocritical blame unfair.     

Ethical Predispositions to Violate or Obey Traffic Rules and the Mediating Role of Driving Styles

Traffic law violations are the most important determinants of traffic accidents. This study examined the influence of drivers' ethical perspective on their traffic violations and the mediating role of driving styles in these relationships. A sample of 313 drivers participated in the study. Contrary to expectations, high ethical relativism was found to be associated with fewer aggressive traffic violations. This suggests that the informal normative system that parallels the official traffic regulations is the more salient reference against which drivers usually assess the adequacy of their behaviors, highly relativistic drivers being more willing to also take into consideration the official traffic code in these appraisals. We also found significant interactions between idealism and relativism on both ordinary and aggressive violations. Idealism emerged as a predictor of these violations only in drivers low in relativism. In this group, one's concern about the harm that he/she might cause to other traffic participants induces higher traffic law abidingness. These influences of idealism were mediated by certain driving styles. Drivers' general ethical perspective fosters a specific pattern of driving styles and, consequently, the tendency to commit or to refrain from traffic violations.     

Non-Naturalist Moral Realism and the Limits of Rational Reflection

This essay develops the epistemic challenge to non-naturalist moral realism. While evolutionary considerations do not support the strongest claims made by ‘debunkers’, they do provide the basis for an inductive argument that our moral dispositions and starting beliefs are at best partially reliable. So, we need some method for separating truth from falsity. Many non-naturalists think that rational reflection can play this role. But rational reflection cannot be expected to bring us to truth even from reasonably accurate starting points. Reflection selects views that are coherent and conflict-free, yet there is no reason to think that the non-natural moral truth must be like this. Inasmuch as we seek coherent, conflict-free, ethical viewpoints, that suggests that our goal is not non-natural truth at all.     

Moral injury and the priesthood of all believers1

This article proceeds from the conviction that moral injury suffered by many combat veterans is a deeply spiritual matter requiring spiritual resources for healing. The tradition of the care of souls commends itself. It takes into account that the “soul” is an expression of the whole person in all its physical, spiritual, and social realities. Moral injury affects all those dimensions of personhood or soul. Since the Reformation the care of souls has been a vocation for the ministry of the whole people of God under the theology of the priesthood of all believers. A caring community is essential to healing for many dealing with moral injury. Indeed, the veterans themselves, in sharing their stories and their pain, become part of that ministry of the priesthood of all believers and may well find healing in the meaningfulness of their mutual ministry.     

Why cannot reasons change your moral decisions? Because they are not persuasive enough: A comment on Stanley et al. (2018)

Stanley et al. (2018) found that the consideration of reasons rarely induced people to change their moral decisions. We challenged this article by assuming what caused such a null or weak effect was that the persuasiveness of reasons provided to oppose the initial decisions was not strong enough. To verify our assumption, this study used Stanley et al.’s (2018) experimental paradigm and manipulated the levels of persuasiveness of reasons. The results revealed (1) that not only strong opposing reasons but also weak affirming reasons could induce changes in moral decision-making and increase decision confidence after altering the decisions; (2) that people with a weak decision confidence tended to change their initial decisions after evaluation of reasons; and (3) that people who maintained their decisions after considering weak opposing reasons enhanced rather than reduced their decision confidence. Overall, these findings demonstrated that moral decision change was a composite outcome of the interaction among reason type, reason persuasiveness and initial decision confidence and that low-quality argumentation had a boomerang effect on moral persuasion. This study re-lifted the role of rational reasoning in moral decision-making and revising, thus posing important amendments to Stanley et al.’s (2018) findings.     

Contractualism and Global Economic Justice

This article examines Rawls's and Scanlon's surprisingly undemanding contractualist accounts of global moral principles. Scanlon's Principle of Rescue requires too little of the world's rich unless the causal links between them and the poor are unreliable. Rawls's principle of legitimacy leads him to theorize in terms of a law of peoples instead of persons, and his conception of a people leads him to spurn global distributive equality. Rawls's approach has advantages over the cosmopolitan egalitarianism of Beitz and Pogge. But it cannot generate principles to regulate the entire global economic order. The article proposes a new cosmopolitan economic original position argument to make up for this lack in Rawls's Law of Peoples.     

The Limits of Toleration in John Locke's Liberal Thought

In the following paper I attempt to show how in Locke's liberalthought the individual is subject to a complex operation involvingliberation and subjugation. In A Letter on Toleration (1685),Locke argues that the individual's inward beliefs should be freed fromthe coercion of Church and State. To ensure liberty of conscience, theindividual's soul should be constituted in practice – notstructured by violence but negotiated by rational persuasion. However,as I suggest, the authority of reason is not established without anelement of violence. In his writings on education, Locke maintains thatthe right to care for one's soul should be enjoyed only after rigorousmoral training. Thus, the individual's conscience is to be freed fromoutward violence of ecclesiastic and civil powers only after first, inyouth, being subject to the moral discipline of esteem, disgrace, andshame, the inward violence of which discloses limits in Locke'sdiscourse on toleration.     

Genetics and the Interpersonal Elaboration of Ethics

Confidentiality in genetic testing posesimportant ethical challenges to the currentprimacy of respect for autonomy and patientchoice in health care. It also presents achallenge to approaches to decision-makingemphasising the ethical importance of theconsequences of health care decisions. In thispaper a case is described in which respect forconfidentiality calls both for disclosure andnon-disclosure, and in which respect forpatient autonomy and the demand to avoidcausing harm each appear to call both fortesting without consent, and testing only withconsent. This creates problems not only forclinicians, families and patients, but also forthose who propose clinical bioethics as a toolfor the resolution of such dilemmas.In this paper I propose some practical waysin which ethical issues in clinical geneticsand elsewhere, might be addressed. Inparticular I call for a closer relationshipbetween ethics and communication in health caredecision-making and describe an approach to theethics consultation that places particularemphasis on the value of interpersonaldeliberation in the search for moralunderstanding. I reach these conclusionsthrough an analysis of the concept of `moraldevelopment' in which I argue that theachievement of moral understanding is anecessarily intersubjective project elaboratedby moral persons.     

The end of theoretical orientations?

Theoretical orientation is the most pervasive organizing device in psychology. Ideas, books, people, therapies, and other salient matters are frequently classified into psychodynamic, behavioral, humanistic, cognitive, or other orientation categories. The continued prominence of theoretical-orientation classification belies a breakdown in its applicability to contemporary psychology. Psychotherapy remains a stronghold. However, with internal and external forces endorsing particular approaches, theoretically-based practices will be forced to yield to evidence-based ones. The final dismantling of traditional theoretical categories by evidence-based practice standards paradoxically provides a hopeful impetus to otherwise arrested theoretical development. Manifest avowed theoretical orientation is distinguished from a latent theoretical-orientation construct, and the ways a new kind of meta-theory of therapy will reduce the naivete and increase the applicability of clinical research is discussed.     

网络经济的伦理意蕴——网络经济特征的视角

与传统工业经济相比,网络经济具有信息网络所赋予的新的特点,同时又蕴藏着特定的道德内涵。从网络经济的特征的视角来看,我们可以发现网络经济中所蕴藏的“以人为本”、“服务顾客”的道德取向;合作双赢、利益共享的伦理理念;公正平等、和谐共处的价值导向;开放自由、共同发展的伦理方向。