The Question of God in an Age of Science: Constructions of Reality and Ultimate Reality in Theology and Science

Both science and theology have lately faced a crisis of authority. Their shared realization of the extent to which knowledge is underdetermined by the data and socially constructed provides a kind of common ground for reconsideration of their respective methods of inquiry as well as of the status of the claims they have warrant to make. Both fields are now consciously and critically employing a models approach. This article proposes criteria for assessing models and applies the criteria to one model from each field. The model of understanding evolution as a struggle for existence is considered from the field of science, and the traditional model for understanding the God-world relation as that of a king's relation to his kingdom is considered from the field of theology. Each of these models is evaluated with respect to its credibility, religious viability, and moral adequacy. In each case an alternative analogy is proposed and argued for.     

Why are there no objective values?

Using the mathematical frameworks of economic preference ranking, subjective probability, and rational learning through empirical evidence, the epistemological implications of teleological ethical intuitionism are pointed out to the extent to which the latter is based on cognitivist and objectivist concepts of value. The notions of objective value and objective norm are critically analysed with reference to epistemological criteria of intersubjectively shared valuative experience. It is concluded that one cannot meaningfully postulate general material theories of morality that could be tested, confirmed or refuted by intersubjective empirical evidence of preferences and values, however loosely the empirical evidence of values may be interpreted. This situation is explained with reference to the ways in which preceived values become systematically influenced by the concomitants of individual valuative experience, but which have nothing to do with contingent subjective interests.     

结果预期与结果反应对儿童意图认知和道德判断的影响

考察了结果预期与结果反应对儿童意图认知和道德判断的影响。结果表明,结果预期影响幼儿园和小学儿童的意图认知,结果反应仅影响幼儿园儿童的意图认知;结果预期和结果反应显著地影响幼儿园和小学儿童的道德判断,但结果预期对小学儿童道德判断的影响要比结果反应大。     

CHRISTIANITY,SCIENCE, AND THREE PHASES OF BEING HUMAN

The alleged conflict between religion and science most pointedly focuses on what it is to be human. Western philosophical thought regarding this has progressed through three broad stages: mind/body dualism, Neo‐Darwinism, and most recently strong artificial intelligence (AI). I trace these views with respect to their relation to Christian views of humans, suggesting that while the first two might be compatible with Christian thought, strong AI presents serious challenges to a Christian understanding of personhood, including our freedom to choose, moral choice itself, self‐consciousness, and the relevance of God to our beginning, being, and ending.     

Selfish power and unselfish status in Chinese work situations

The present research explored the selfishness of power and status as well as the mechanism in Chinese work situations. By using experimental and survey methods, two studies were designed to investigate the relationships among power, status, and self‐interested behaviour (SIB) as well as the mediating effect of perspective‐taking (PT). Results of the two studies consistently indicated that power increases whereas status reduces SIB. These opposing behavioural effects are partially attributed to the fact that power reduces whereas status increases PT. In addition, our results showed an interaction between power and status on SIB in Study 1 (interaction as a mental function), and a positive correlation between perceived power and status in Study 2 (correlation as a mental perception). Through the discussion from the perspective of the self/other‐orientation trait, as well as the stable effects of power and status on SIB in the two studies, we conclude that power is selfish and status is unselfish in Chinese work situations.     

Regression II. Development through regression

As shown in our previous paper (‘Regression I. Experimental approaches to regression’, JAP, 65, 2, 345-65), the common mechanism of regression can be described as reversible dedifferentiation, which is understood as a relative increase of the proportion of low-differentiated (older) systems in actualized experience. Experimental data show that regression following disease (chronic tension headache) is followed by adaptation and an increase in system differentiation in that experience domain which contains systems responsible for that adaptation. The results of mathematical modelling support the idea that reversible dedifferentiation can be one of the mechanisms for increasing the effectiveness of adaptation through learning. Reversible dedifferentiation, which is phenomenologically described as regression, is a general mechanism for restructuring the organism-environment interactions in situations where behaviours that were effective in the past become ineffective. Reversible dedifferentiation has evolved as a component of adaptation when new behaviours are formed and large-scale modifications in the existing behaviours are required in the face of changes in the external and/or internal environment. Thus, the authors believe that this article provides evidence for Jung’s view that regression is not only a ‘return’ to past forms of thinking, affects and behaviour, but that regressive processes provide a significant impetus for psychological growth and development.     

Guilt feelings and the intelligibility of moral duties

G.E.M. Anscombe argued that we should dispense with deontic concepts when doing ethics, if it is psychologically possible to do so. In response, I contend that deontic concepts are constitutive of the common moral experience of guilt. This has two consequences for Anscombe's position. First, seeing that guilt is a deontic emotion, we should recognize that Anscombe's qualification on her thesis applies: psychologically, we need deontology to understand our obligations and hence whether our guilt is warranted. Second, the fact that guilt is a deontic moral emotion debunks Anscombe's claim that deontic concepts are a relic of the Western, religious past: guilt feelings–hence the idea of moral duty as well–can be found in cultures without an ethics of divine command. Modern moral philosophers' interest in oughts and obligations is not an academic hobbyhorse, but a vital concern arising out of a primeval human emotion.     

Traffic safety competencies in Peruvian high school students

This study aims to comprehend traffic safety competencies in high school students from two specific regions of Peru, as well as to analyze the differences between both groups. For this purpose, a qualitative study was carried out which consisted of eight focus groups in high schools, three of them in the metropolitan area of Lima (Lima region) and five in the province of Rodríguez de Mendoza (the Amazonas region). The focus groups were constituted by 73 students enrolled in the last three years of high school, named 3rd, 4th and 5th grade of secondary education, whose ages ranged from 14 to 18 years. The collected data were analyzed employing elements of Grounded Theory and Axiomatic Set Theory. The main findings reveal that most participants have a general understanding of traffic rules and the proper use of the components of traffic safety. Thus, they understand the traffic rules as road signs that regulate the behavior of drivers and pedestrians. In addition, participants know the proper procedure to follow at traffic lights, pedestrian walkways and how to use seat belts. They also identify the driver’s tiredness/drowsiness, and the consumption of alcohol and drugs as potential factors that cause traffic accidents. No causes that are linked to pedestrian behavior were identified, and only participants from the Amazonas region mentioned speeding as a contributing factor. On the other hand, participants report that in practical situations they engage in risky behavior and fail to comply with transit rules. They justify this behavior by citing poor infrastructure, vehicle malfunctions, and the need get around quickly in order to get things done. Finally, the implications of the results are discussed and compared to the content and implementation of the Peruvian Road Safety Educational Program (PENSV, for its acronym in Spanish), providing recommendations that can aid evidence‐based policy making in Peru.     

Toward ethical cognitive architectures for the development of artificial moral agents

New technologies based on artificial agents promise to change the next generation of autonomous systems and therefore our interaction with them. Systems based on artificial agents such as self-driving cars and social robots are examples of this technology that is seeking to improve the quality of people’s life. Cognitive architectures aim to create some of the most challenging artificial agents commonly known as bio-inspired cognitive agents. This type of artificial agent seeks to embody human-like intelligence in order to operate and solve problems in the real world as humans do. Moreover, some cognitive architectures such as Soar, LIDA, ACT-R, and iCub try to be fundamental architectures for the Artificial General Intelligence model of human cognition. Therefore, researchers in the machine ethics field face ethical questions related to what mechanisms an artificial agent must have for making moral decisions in order to ensure that their actions are always ethically right. This paper aims to identify some challenges that researchers need to solve in order to create ethical cognitive architectures. These cognitive architectures are characterized by the capacity to endow artificial agents with appropriate mechanisms to exhibit explicit ethical behavior. Additionally, we offer some reasons to develop ethical cognitive architectures. We hope that this study can be useful to guide future research on ethical cognitive architectures.