Who am I?: The influence of affect on the working self-concept

Two experiments investigated the impact of affect on the working self-concept. Following an affect induction, participants completed the Twenty Statements Test (TST) to assess their working self-concepts. Participants in predominantly happy and angry states used more abstract statements to describe themselves than did participants in predominantly sad and fearful states. Evaluations of the statements that participants generated (Experiment 2) demonstrate that these effects are not the result of (1) participants describing positively and negatively valenced information at different levels of abstraction, or (2) valence-based affective priming. Further, half of the participants in Experiment 2 were led to attribute their affect to the manipulation prior to completing the TST. This manipulation eliminated the influence of affect on the working self-concept. Taken together, these results are consistent with theory and research on the informative functions of affect.     

Recovering from negative events by boosting implicit positive affect

Upregulation of implicit positive affect (PA) can act as a mechanism to deal with negative affect. Two studies tracked temporal changes in positive and negative affect (NA) assessed by self-report and the Implicit Positive and Negative Affect Test (IPANAT; Quirin, Kazén, & Kuhl, 2009). Study 1 observed the predicted increases in implicit PA after exposure to a threat-related film clip, which correlated positively with the speed of recognising a happy face among an angry crowd. Study 2 replicated increases in implicit PA after exposition to the same film clip, and showed that such increases were enhanced by priming self-referential stimuli. The findings are discussed against the background of personality systems interaction (PSI) theory (Kuhl, 2000, 2001), which emphasises the role of the implicit self in affect regulation.     

Exercise and Movement as an Adjunct to Group Therapy for Women with Chronic Mental Illness

Abstract

Feminist therapists value the empowerment of clients and the appropriate sharing of the therapist's institutionalized power. As therapists who are also “mandated reporters,” we are obligated under certain circumstances to use our power to warn potential victims of harm, to prevent clients from harm to self or others, or make reports to institutions which have a great impact on clients' lives. Using four case examples, this paper will present clinical situations where the use of the therapist's power interfaces with homophobia, racism, and paternalism in the lives of low-income clients.     

Precision Commands and the ”Sure I Will” Program:

No abstract available for this article.     

Reid's Third Argument for Moral Liberty

Thomas Reid uses the term ‘moral liberty’ to refer to a kind of free will that is agent-causal and incompatible with determinism. I offer and textually support a new interpretation of Reid's third argument for moral liberty, which Reid presents in Section 4.8 of Essays on the Active Powers of Man. Generally regarded as obscure, most commentators either ignore Reid's third argument or lend it cursory attention. In my interpretation, Reid points to the truism that we have reason to think that human persons conceive of long-term plans. Then, Reid argues that determinism implies that God both conceives of and enacts these plans, leaving us without any reason to believe that people even conceive of these plans. Therefore, we should hold onto the truism and reject determinism. On my interpretation, Reid employs the premises of a theistic argument from design as premises of his argument.     

On questioning being: Foucault’s Heideggerian turn

Attempts to resolve the question of Foucault’s relationship to Heidegger usually look for points of substantive correlation between them: the coincidence of being and power, the meaning of truth, technology, ethics, and so on. Taking seriously Foucault’s claim in his final interview that he uses Heidegger as an ‘instrument of thought’, this paper looks for a correlation in practice. The argument focuses on a structural isomorphism between Heidegger’s concept of the fourfold event (Ereignis) of being and later Foucault’s critique of ‘problematization’ (problématique). This isomorphism, I argue, indicates a covert philosophical confrontation between Foucault and Heidegger, which was determinative for Foucault in the period of the turn to ethics (1976–84). This is a confrontation over the meaning of the ‘event of thought’. Such an interpretation not only permits a literal reading of Foucault’s comments regarding Heidegger in his final interview, but also casts the developments in Foucault’s later work in a fascinating new light. Foucault’s critique of problematization, on this view, is founded in an historicized version of Heideggerian ‘other’ thinking, and pivots on a ontologically tempered enactment of the Heideggerian turn (Kehre).     

Self‐Realization and Owing to Others: An Indirect Constraint?

Abstract

The relationship between self‐realization, and so what I really wholeheartedly endorse and owe to myself, and morality or what we owe to others is normally thought of as antagonism, or as a pleasant coincidence: only if I am indebted to such relations as my fundamental projects that I care wholeheartedly about does morality have a direct connection to self‐realization. The aim of this article is to argue against this picture. It will be argued that the structure of self‐realization and the caring activity involved commits the person to values that are beyond the object of his wholehearted caring, in a way that might just pave the way to morality.     

Self-compassion and social anxiety disorder

Abstract

Self-compassion refers to having an accepting and caring orientation towards oneself. Although self-compassion has been studied primarily in healthy populations, one particularly compelling clinical context in which to examine self-compassion is social anxiety disorder (SAD). SAD is characterized by high levels of negative self-criticism as well as an abiding concern about others’ evaluation of one's performance. In the present study, we tested the hypotheses that: (1) people with SAD would demonstrate less self-compassion than healthy controls (HCs), (2) self-compassion would relate to severity of social anxiety and fear of evaluation among people with SAD, and (3) age would be negatively correlated with self-compassion for people with SAD, but not for HC. As expected, people with SAD reported less self-compassion than HCs on the Self-Compassion Scale and its subscales. Within the SAD group, lesser self-compassion was not generally associated with severity of social anxiety, but it was associated with greater fear of both negative and positive evaluation. Age was negatively correlated with self-compassion for people with SAD, whereas age was positively correlated with self-compassion for HC. These findings suggest that self-compassion may be a particularly important target for assessment and treatment in persons with SAD.     

Informed Consent

Summary

This article focuses on informed consent and the components to be reviewed with clients in the first session or as early as possible thereafter. Recent changes that give patients greater autonomy in the treatment process are also presented. The process of obtaining informed consent or informed refusal places a new responsibility on the practitioner. Informed consent as it pertains to clinical practice, supervision and training, and psychological research is also discussed.     

Stories of crime,stories of suffering: A narrative perspective on ethical issues in criminal justice counselling

Counsellors working with prisoners often listen to stories that are both stories of crime and stories of suffering. From a criminal justice perspective, the suffering of offenders is deliberately inflicted as punishment. From a counselling perspective, however, responding to the suffering of a client and even trying to relieve it is a basic ethical concern. So counsellors, working with offenders, may face the ethical question of how to integrate a response to the suffering of offenders with a response to crime, especially when confronted with stories of cruel, violent crimes. In this paper, it is argued that a narrative perspective on counselling offers a framework in which these responses may be integrated. Here, the principle of recognizing privileged authorship of persons is crucial. The concepts of ‘double listening for implicit others’ and ‘relationally rich stories’ are developed, which are based on concepts and ideas from narrative therapy. These serve as a first step of translating the narrative ethical framework to counselling practice.