How religion and morality correlate in age of society 5.0: Statistical analysis of emotional and moral associations with Buddhist religious terms appearing on Japanese blogs

In this paper we analyzed how much religious vocabulary, in particular Buddhist vocabulary taken from the largest online dictionary of Buddhist terms, is present in everyday social space of Japanese people, particularly, in Japanese blog entries appearing on a popular blog service (Ameba blogs). We interpreted the level of everyday usage of Buddhist terms as appearance of such terms in the consciousness of people. We further analyzed what emotional and moral associations such contents generate. In particular, we analyzed whether expressions containing Buddhist vocabulary are considered appropriate or not from a moral point of view, as well as the emotional response of Internet users to Buddhist terminology. As a result of analyzing the data, we found out that Buddhist terms were in fact not absent as a theme from Japanese blogs and generated a strong emotional response. However, while the general reaction to several expressions using Buddhist terms was as expected, there were sometimes surprising twists in terms of social consequences, major discrepancies between what is perceived as ethically correct behavior between the Buddhist doctrine and the reasoning of the general population, as well as a considerate number of terms which have lost their original meaning and instead became slang expressions.     

《周易》与"白马非马"--试论易学的对象和研究方法

《易》相传有三个版本《连山》、《归藏》和《周易》.秦汉以来,学界主流向以《周易》为《易》,"白马即马",结果常使易学研究偏离《易》的本来--卦爻画."周易学"主要是在卦爻辞的基础上以"象"的方式解《易》     

Evaluations of moral and conventional intergroup transgressions

To investigate children's understanding of intergroup transgressions, children (3–8 years, N = 84) evaluated moral and conventional transgressions that occurred among members of the same gender group (ingroup) or members of different gender groups (outgroup). All participants judged moral transgressions to be more wrong than conventional transgressions. However, when asked to make a judgment after being told an authority figure did not see the transgression, younger participants still judged that moral violations were less acceptable than conventional transgressions, but judged both moral and conventional transgressions with an outgroup victim as more acceptable than the corresponding transgressions with an ingroup victim. Older children did not demonstrate the same ingroup bias; rather they focused only on the domain of the transgressions. The results demonstrate the impact intergroup information has on children's evaluations about both moral and conventional transgressions.     

儿童道德义愤的发展及其对第三方公正行为的影响

为了探讨儿童道德义愤的发展及其对第三方公正行为的影响，实验1考察106名幼儿园大班、小学2年级和4年级儿童的道德义愤在年级以及数目和价值不公平分配上的差异；实验2考察57名小学儿童在有无代价条件下，其道德义愤对第三方公正行为的影响。结果表明：儿童的道德义愤呈现随年级增长而不断增强的趋势；儿童由数目不公平分配引发的道德义愤得分显著高于价值不公平分配；幼儿园大班和2年级儿童在数目不公平分配中的道德义愤得分均显著高于价值不公平分配，而4年级儿童在数目和价值不公平分配中的道德义愤得分不存在显著差异；诱发道德义愤的儿童更多地做出第三方公正行为，并且更愿意选择补偿受害者；在不同诱发道德义愤条件下，是否需要付出代价都不会影响儿童的第三方公正行为。研究说明儿童的道德义愤随年级增长而发展，并影响第三方公正行为。     

Evolutionary neurology,responsive equilibrium,and the moral brain

The relation between morality and the brain is a topic usefully examined through the evolutionary neurology of John Hughlings-Jackson, who considered higher mental function to be progressively inclusive integration of sensori-motor processes. His view, based on careful observations of patients with neurological disorders, implies that moral reasoning involves integration and coordination of behaviour through a process of representation and re-representation encompassing broader and broader types of information sensitive to environmental contingencies. The relevant information is processed in diverse brain areas: superior temporal sulcus (STS), inferior parietal lobule (IPL), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), dorsolateral prefrontal (DLPF) areas, as well as anterior temporal (AT) structures. Moral function can be regarded as maximally integrating emotion, social cognition, and other-regarding sensibilities using propositionally organised cognitive structures that map a shared world of human activity and relationships so that they take account of what in social and personal life counts as something.     

论德性

德性是人优秀品质中的一种,是由理智或智慧在正确道德观念的前提下根据有利于具有者和他活动于其中的共同体及其成员更好生存的根本要求培育的,通常以心理定势对人的活动发生作用并使人的活动及其主体成为善(好)的道德意义上的善(好)品质,即道德的品质.它具有指向性、意向性、多维性、统一性、稳定性和普适性等主要特征.德性从直觉的层次看是社会道德要求的内化,但从批判的层次上看则根源于人更好生存的需要.德性一般都体现为德目或德性要求,因而具有规范性,但德性规范是构成性规则,与作为规范性规则的道德规范有所不同.     

CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES,MORAL REQUIREMENTS,AND MORAL MOTIVATION

Abstract: Kant has argued that moral requirements are categorical. Kant's claim has been challenged by some contemporary philosophers; this article defends Kant's doctrine. I argue that Kant's claim captures the unique feature of moral requirements. The main arguments against Kant's claim focus on one condition that a categorical imperative must meet: to be independent of desires. I argue that there is another important, but often ignored, condition that a categorical imperative must meet, and this second condition is crucial to understanding why moral requirements are not hypothetical. I also argue that the claim that moral requirements are not categorical because they depend on desires for motivation is beside the point. The issue of whether moral requirements are categorical is not an issue about whether moral desires or feelings are necessary for moral motivation but are rather an issue about the ground of moral desires or moral feelings. Moral requirements are categorical because they are requirements of reason, and reason makes moral desires or feelings possible.     

Bullying in prisons: the importance of perceived social status,prisonization, and moral disengagement

Research has focused on the environmental causes of bullying in prison, but neglected the intrinsic characteristics of bullies. Although the importance of social status in prison has been noted as one factor that may influence bullying, no empirical research has yet addressed this. The main aim of this study was to investigate whether the perceived importance of social status in prison motivates bullying, with the subsidiary aim of exploring whether moral disengagement and prisonization influence the relationship. A total of 132 adult male prisoners were interviewed and categorized as a bully, victim, bully/victim or not involved. The prevalence of bullying was high, with over half the prisoners being both a victim and perpetrator of bullying. As predicted, bullying was positively related to the perceived importance of social status; prisoners involved in bullying valued social status more than those who were not. Furthermore, moral disengagement mediated the relationship between bullying and social status. Prisonization was also related to the perceived importance of social status, moral disengagement and bullying. It is concluded that a desire to achieve social status in prison may contribute to bullying. Furthermore, prisonized attitudes may instill values such as social status into prisoners and may also help facilitate cognitive distortions such as moral disengagement, which in turn, may serve to maintain involvement in bullying activity. Aggr. Behav. 32:1–12, 2006. © 2006 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities

Is choice necessary for moral responsibility? And does choice imply alternative possibilities of some significant sort? This paper will relate these questions to the argument initiated by Harry Frankfurt that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's extension of that argument in terms of guidance control in a causally determined world. I argue that attending to Frankfurt's core conceptual distinction between the circumstances that make an action unavoidable and those that bring it about that the action is performed – a distinction emphasised in his recent restatement – provides a new route into an analysis of Frankfurt's argument by showing how it depends on a person's ‘decision to act’ involving the exercise of choice. The implicit reliance of Frankfurt's argument on this notion of choice, however, undermines his claim that the example of the counterfactual intervener strengthens the compatibilist case by providing a counter-example to the principle of alternative possibilities. I also argue that Frankfurt's reliance on the exercise of choice for moral responsibility is also evident in the Fischer/Ravizza argument, and that a close analysis of both arguments shows that such exercise of choice is not available if causal determinism is true.