Using Prolonged Exposure and Cognitive Processing Therapy to Treat Veterans With Moral Injury-Based PTSD: Two Case Examples

Moral injury refers to acts of commission or omission that violate individuals’ moral or ethical standards. Morally injurious events are often synonymous with psychological trauma, especially in combat situations—thus, morally injurious events are often implicated in the development of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) for military service members and veterans. Although prolonged exposure (PE) and cognitive processing therapy (CPT) have been well established as effective treatments for veterans who are struggling with PTSD, it has been suggested that these two evidence-based therapies may not be sufficient for treating veterans whose PTSD resulted from morally injurious events. The purpose of this paper is to detail how the underlying theories of PE and CPT can account for moral injury-based PTSD and to describe two case examples of veterans with PTSD stemming from morally injurious events who were successfully treated with PE and CPT. The paper concludes with a summary of challenges that clinicians may face when treating veterans with PTSD resulting from moral injury using either PE or CPT.     

Defending Cognitive Liberty in an Age of Moral Engineering

In 2009, Mark Walker first proposed the Genetic Virtue Project, advancing that science should explore using genetic engineering to eliminate moral evils just as it attempts to eliminate natural ones like disease. This seemed like an issue for the far future given the unique challenges. Walker focused on the wrong aspect of personhood, however, as moral engineering of the brain appears to be a more likely possibility. As early aspects of moral engineering the brain are in development, especially through the manipulation of the neural correlates of religious and political beliefs, emotions, and behaviors, I consider several issues surrounding this project so as to protect individual rights and prevent future harms. I advance an internal criterion for the field called Acceptability Across Ideologies to serve as a guide to protect against coercive and harmful technologies and analyze how current laws protecting cognitive liberty are lacking and in need of revision.     

领导正直的概念、测量及其展望

领导正直（leader integrity）作为一种道德品质,长期以来被认为是有效领导者的关键特征。近年来, 道德丑闻和管理者违法乱纪事件频频发生,引发了学术界对领导正直问题的关注。然而,学界对领导正直 的内涵、测量及其作用机制的研究尚处于起步阶段,关于领导正直的文献综述更是寥寥无几。本文从领导 正直的概念、测量、影响因素、作用机制和实施效果等方面,对国内外相关研究进行系统梳理和探讨。未 来研究应从领导正直的概念与维度的完善、影响因素的拓展和作用机制的深入识别等方面展开努力。     

The moral virtue of open-mindedness

This paper gives a new and richer account of open-mindedness as a moral virtue. I argue that the main problem with existing accounts is that they derive the moral value of open-mindedness entirely from the epistemic role it plays in moral thought. This view is overly intellectualist. I argue that open-mindedness as a moral virtue promotes our flourishing alongside others in ways that are quite independent of its role in correcting our beliefs. I close my discussion by distinguishing open-mindedness from what some might consider its equivalent: empathy and tolerance.     

A gradual reformation: empirical character and causal powers in Kant

According to Kant each person has an empirical character, which is ultimately grounded in one’s free choice. The popular Causal Laws interpretation of empirical character holds that it consists of the causal laws governing our psychology. I argue that this reading has difficulties explaining moral change, the ‘gradual reformation’ of our empirical character: Causal laws cannot change and hence cannot be gradually reformed. I propose an alternative Causal Powers interpretation of empirical character, where our empirical character consists of our mind’s causal powers. The resulting picture of empirical character allows for moral change and Kantian weakness of will.     

EVOLUTION OF RELIGIOUS CAPACITY IN THE GENUS HOMO: COGNITIVE TIME SEQUENCE

Intrigued by the possible paths that the evolution of religious capacity may have taken, the authors identify a series of six major building blocks that form a foundation for religious capacity in genus Homo. Homo neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens idaltu are examined for early signs of religious capacity. Then, after an exploration of human plasticity and why it is so important, the analysis leads to a final building block that characterizes only Homo sapiens sapiens, beginning 200,000–400,000 years ago, when all the other cognitive and neurological underpinnings gradually came together. Because the timing of cognitive evolution has become an issue, the authors identify the time periods for these building blocks based on findings from modern cognitive science, neuroscience, genomic science, the new cognitive archaeology, and traditional stones‐and‐bones archaeology. The result is a logical, and even a likely story 55–65 million years long, which leads to the evolution of religious capacity in modern human beings.     

Twenty‐First‐Century Counseling Theory Development in Relation to Definitions of Free Will and Determinism

This article is a continuation of Wilks's ( 2003 ) review of the development of counseling theory in relation to definitions of free will and determinism. The original review showed that theoretical synthesis was in part achieved when causal events inherent in absolute determinism were incorporated into a soft self‐determinist process. This review traces three 21st‐century challenges to self‐determinism and provides evidence supporting the inclusion of both self‐determinism and indeterminate free will in a single but asymmetrical causal model.     

Anticipatory Uncertainty: How Academic and Industry Researchers in the Life Sciences Experience and Manage the Uncertainties of the Research Process Differently

The institutional contexts of research increasingly require researchers to anticipate their productivity and the uncertainties inherent in their research. This applies to both academic researchers and to researchers in start-up companies. This creates a specific kind of uncertainty, anticipatory uncertainty, that we define as the state of being uncertain as to whether research processes will be productive in a specific time frame and along situated definitions of good performance. In the life sciences, this anticipatory uncertainty is experienced and managed differently, depending on how research is organized and the cultural resources available in specific institutional contexts. In biotechnology companies, there is a readiness to embrace dynamic changes in both research strategies and the organization of work in response to new developments in the progress of the overall research agenda. In academia, the ability of research groups to react with similar flexibility seems significantly constrained by the individual attribution of research work and credit, and the correspondingly high level of individual anticipatory uncertainty. This raises questions about how far the current organization of academic research allows epistemic uncertainty to be embraced and corresponding risks to be taken, rather than safe questions to be pursued.     

Practical Skills and Practical Wisdom in Virtue

This paper challenges a frequent objection to conceptualizing virtues as skills, which is that skills are merely capacities to act well, while virtues additionally require being properly motivated to act well. I discuss several cases that purport to show the supposed motivational difference by drawing our attention to the differing intuitions we have about virtues and skills. However, this putative difference between virtue and skill disappears when we switch our focus in the skill examples from the performance to the performer. The ends of a practice can be used to judge not only the skilfulness of a performance, but also the motivational commitment of the performer. Being virtuous requires both acting well and being properly motivated to do so, which can be captured by viewing virtues as the moral subset of skills. In claiming this, though, I resist the idea that there is no element in virtue that is not found in other skills. Virtue requires being practically wise about how practices fit into a conception of the good life, but other skills do not. I further argue that this difference doesn't undermine the ‘virtue as skill’ thesis, as it's the connection between virtues and morality that requires practical wisdom.