Turning a Blind Eye: A Study of Peer Reporting in a Business School Setting

This article examines student peer reporting by extending the findings from the business ethics and higher education literature. In the conceptual model we propose that reflective moral attentiveness, subjective knowledge of the code of ethics, and academic dishonesty beliefs antecede ethical judgment of peer reporting, which impacts intentions to report peers’ unethical behavior. The relationships are tested using structural equation modeling. The findings indicate that moral attentiveness significantly influences ethical judgment, which in turn affects intention. The relationship between beliefs about academic dishonesty and ethical judgment is partially supported. Based on these results, suggestions for higher education institutions are provided.     

Cognitive Enhancement and Academic Misconduct: A Study Exploring Their Frequency and Relationship

We investigated the acceptability and use frequency of cognitive enhancement medication and three different types of academic misconduct (plagiarism, cheating, and falsifying/fabricating data). Data collected from a web-based survey of German university students were used in our analysis. Moral acceptability of cognitive enhancers was relatively low and moderate for academic misconduct. The correlation between these measures was moderately weak. The use frequency of cognitive enhancers was lower than for academic misconduct and was (very) lightly correlated with the occurrences of reported plagiarism and fabrication/falsification. A higher acceptability of each act was associated with a higher use frequency of each act.     

Judgment Difficulty and the Moral Intensity of Unethical Acts: A Cognitive Response Analysis of Dual Process Ethical Judgment Formation

This study analyzes cognitive responses to explore a dual processing perspective of ethical judgment formation. Specifically, the study investigates how two factors, judgment task difficulty and moral intensity, influence the extent of deontological and teleological processing and their effects on ethical judgments. A single experiment on 110 undergraduate research participants found that judgment task difficulty affected the extent of deontological and teleological processing. Although moral intensity affected ethical judgments, it did not produce effects on either deontological or teleological cognitive responses. Results did not support the hypotheses that deontological and teleological cognitive responses would mediate the relationships between the experimental factors and ethical judgments. Overall, the results support continued research of factors that affect the nature of information processing in ethical decision situations and the use of cognitive response analysis as a tool for conducting this research.     

The Influence of Personality on the Decision to Cheat

Seventeen transgressive behaviors were studied in the context of six personality variables using survey methods. The personality variables were impulsivity, sensation seeking, empathetic perspective taking, guilt, and shame, with social desirability used as a control. Confirmatory factor analysis indicated a five-factor model as having the best fit. Those five factors are competitive cheating, self-cheating, school cheating, relationship cheating, and breaking a social contract. A structural equation model indicated that only impulsivity, sensation seeking, and empathetic perspective taking were related to frequency of transgressive behaviors, thus supporting the hypothesis that moral decision making has a critical automatic component.     

“Granny dumping”: Acceptability of sacrificing the elderly in a simulated moral dilemma

In a simulated moral dilemma, most people would be willing to endorse killing a single individual to save five others, but do people show the same degree of resistance to sacrificing people of different ages? In the present study, participants were asked to choose how acceptable it was to sacrifice one individual from a number of different age groups in order to save five others in a trolley problem. The sacrificial targets were a 70‐year‐old male stranger, a 20‐year‐old male stranger, a 5‐year‐old male stranger, or a 20‐year‐old male disabled stranger. Our results indicated that more participants accepted sacrificing the elderly stranger than the other three targets; sacrificing the child was the least accepted option. These results indicate that the decision‐making process in a moral dilemma involves weighing others' lives according to their age and implicitly predicting their life span.     

Subject‐Involving Luck

In recent years, philosophers have tended to think of luck as being a relation between an event (taken in the broadest sense of the term) and a subject; to give an account of luck is to fill in the right‐hand side of the following biconditional: an event e is lucky for a subject S if and only if ____. We can call such accounts of luck subject‐relative accounts of luck, since they attempt to spell out what it is for an event to be lucky relative to a subject. This essay argues that we should understand subject‐relative luck as a secondary phenomenon. What is of philosophical interest is giving an account of subject‐involving luck, i.e., filling in the right‐hand side of this biconditional: it is a matter of luck that S ?s iff ____. The essay argues that one of the upshots of focusing on subject‐involving luck is that lack of control accounts of luck (LCALs) become more attractive. In particular, a range of counterexamples to LCALs of subject‐relative luck do not apply to LCALs of subject‐involving luck.     

The Potentiality of the Embryo and the Somatic Cell

Recent arguments on the ethics of stem cell research have taken a novel approach to the question of the moral status of the embryo. One influential argument focuses on a property that the embryo is said to possess—namely, the property of being an entity with a rational nature or, less controversially, an entity that has the potential to acquire a rational nature—and claims that this property is also possessed by a somatic cell. Since nobody seriously thinks that we have a duty to preserve the countless such cells we wash off our body every day in the shower, the argument is intended as a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that the embryo should be afforded the same moral status as a fully developed human being. This article argues that this argument is not successful and that it consequently plays into the hands of those who oppose embryonic stem cell research. It is therefore better to abandon this argument and focus instead on the different argument that potentiality, as such, is not a sufficient ground for the creation of moral obligations towards the embryo.     

The role of moral knowledge in everyday immorality: What does it matter if I know what is right?

In contrast to other well-known cognitive models of moral decision-making, social cognitive theory posits that individuals can disengage from their own moral standards thereby allowing themselves to commit immoral acts. While previous research largely supports the general premise of moral disengagement, we suggest that direct tests of moral disengagement processes and the commensurate diminished role of moral knowledge are conspicuously absent. In five studies, we use multiple methods to capture both knowledge of the immorality of an act and theorized in situ processes of moral disengagement. Ultimately, we find no evidence of the proposed processes associated with moral disengagement. Furthermore, our data suggests that moral knowledge is a key driver of moral behavior in everyday situations and is not easily set aside. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research for theory and practice.