The bidirectional relation of emotion perception and social judgments: the effect of witness’ emotion expression on perceptions of moral behaviour and vice versa

The present research tested the notion that emotion expression and context perception are bidirectionally related. Specifically, in two studies focusing on moral violations (N?=?288) and positive moral deviations (N?=?245) respectively, we presented participants with short vignettes describing behaviours that were either (im)moral, (in)polite or unusual together with a picture of the emotional reaction of a person who supposedly had been a witness to the event. Participants rated both the emotional reactions observed and their own moral appraisal of the situation described. In both studies, we found that situational context influenced how emotional reactions to this context were rated and in turn, the emotional expression shown in reaction to a situation influenced the appraisal of the situation. That is, neither the moral events nor the emotion expressions were judged in an absolute fashion. Rather, the perception of one also depended on the other.     

Pierre Hadot on Habit,Reason, and Spiritual Exercises

This essay is a reappraisal of Pierre Hadot's concept of spiritual exercises in response to recent criticisms of his work. The author argues that contrary to the claims of his critics, Hadot articulates a compelling argument that spiritual exercises that employ imaginative, rhetorical, and cognitive techniques are both necessary for and successful at producing a subject in which reason is integrated into human character. Such exercises are critical for overcoming the effects of habit, as a result of which everyday conduct resists rational control, and Hadot provides a nuanced account of how particular practices affect different aspects of emotion, behavior, and thought. The concept of spiritual exercises remains a viable component of theoretical frameworks for the study of religious ethics, though the author concludes that Hadot's position on habit and its role in ethical practice requires further investigation.     

Religious Service Attendance and Religious and Secular Organizational Engagement in the United Kingdom

The study uses nationally representative data to examine whether the moral freighting Putnam and Campbell (2010) propose, based on American experiences, may apply to overall British society. Specifically, it tests whether religious service attendance increases religious or secular organizational activities, possibly due to moral freighting that encourages religious congregants to practice their faith, transcending ego boundaries and self-interest. It is also necessary to determine if engagement in religious or secular organizational activities elevates the degree of religious service attendance, thus forming a bidirectional association. The study employs the maximum likelihood-structural equation modeling (ML-SEM) method to verify the proposed reciprocity. The empirical tests confirm that a synergistic reciprocal relationship is established between religious service attendance and religious organizational engagement, and that religious service attendance increases secular organizational engagement. However, secular organizational engagement does not make a bidirectional contribution to religious service attendance.     

声誉关注与社会距离对伤害困境中道德决策的影响：来自行为与ERPs的证据

在社会交往中, 声誉关注是人类合作行为和道德判断的重要决定因素之一。以往研究只是单独考察声誉关注或社会距离会如何影响道德决策行为, 但两者如何交互影响道德决策尚不清楚, 尤其是禁止性道德范畴领域(如, 伤害他人行为)下道德决策的认知神经机制。本研究要求被试在匿名或公开情境下决策是否愿意对不同社会距离他人(朋友、熟人、陌生人)实施疼痛电击以增加自己的金钱收益, 同时记录其决策时的行为和神经反应。结果发现, 匿名情境下被试对朋友的电击伤害要显著低于对熟人和陌生人的, 表现出一种明显的“利己的利他主义”决策倾向; 与朋友和陌生人相比, 被试在涉及熟人的两难决策中花费了更长的时间, 体验到了更强烈的厌恶情绪, 并诱发了更大波幅的与情绪反应有关的P260成分, 以及与认知推理有关的晚期正成分(LPP: 300~450 ms), 表现出一种典型的“熟人效应”。然而, 行为与ERP指标上的这些差异在公开情境下均显著减弱了。这表明个体在禁止性道德范畴领域下的道德决策遵循着一种“利己的利他主义”的道德原则, 熟人关系的不确定性会在道德决策中诱发强烈的负性情绪和认知负荷, 而声誉关注削弱了利己倾向和人际关系的不确定性所带来的厌恶情绪和认知冲突。     

学龄前儿童社会善念理解的发展与心理理论的关系

本文探究了4~6岁儿童社会善念理解的发展及其与心理理论的关系。研究测量了100名4~6岁儿童的社会善念理解、心理理论、亲社会性和执行功能。结果发现, 随着年龄增长, 儿童愈加在社会评价和朋友偏好上倾向于社会善念人物, 并且此社会善念理解能力与心理理论的发展呈显著正相关, 且此相关在控制了年龄、执行功能及亲社会性后依然稳定存在, 但社会善念理解与亲社会性并不相关。此结果表明, 心理理论可能对社会善念理解的发展有重要作用。     

算法歧视比人类歧视引起更少道德惩罚欲

算法歧视屡见不鲜, 人们对其有何反应值得关注。6个递进实验比较了不同类型歧视情境下人们对算法歧视和人类歧视的道德惩罚欲, 并探讨其潜在机制和边界条件。结果发现：相对于人类歧视, 人们对算法歧视的道德惩罚欲更少(实验1~6), 潜在机制是人们认为算法(与人类相比)更缺乏自由意志(实验2~4), 且个体拟人化倾向越强或者算法越拟人化, 人们对算法的道德惩罚欲越强(实验5~6)。研究结果有助于更好地理解人们对算法歧视的反应, 并为算法犯错后的道德惩罚提供启示。     

道德困境决策中的忽略偏差:现象与测量

道德困境决策中的忽略偏差效应是指在道德困境中,当作为和不作为都会造成消极结果的情况下,个体认为作为导致的消极结果比不作为导致的消极结果更不道德,从而使人们在道德决策时更倾向于不作为的现象。由于传统道德决策研究范式存在义务论决策倾向性和一般性不作为反应倾向相混淆的局限,道德困境决策中的忽略偏差效应尚未做进一步探索。本文梳理了道德困境决策中忽略偏差效应的表现,通过CNI模型提出甄别和测量道德困境决策中忽略偏差效应的策略:创设研究情景; 分离不作为倾向性和忽略偏差效应; 综合探索忽略偏差效应的群体和个体特征。针对CNI模型的局限性,结合CAN算法和漂移扩散模型对未来的研究方向进行了展望。     

何以应对道德自我威胁?道德记忆偏差的视角

人们会做出一些不道德的事情,这可能对他们积极的道德自我概念构成威胁。为了应对这种道德自我威胁,人们会表现出道德记忆偏差,即遗忘威胁道德自我的不道德事件或信息。近年来,研究者基于自传体记忆范式、游戏范式、代入范式和自我参照范式,为道德记忆偏差现象提供了证据支持。研究还进一步表明,这种道德记忆偏差可能出于应对道德自我威胁的需要,即人们希望通过有选择地遗忘来维护积极的道德自我概念。 值得注意的是,道德记忆偏差现象存在一些不一致的发现。未来研究应该寻求可能的调节变量,以整合现有不一致的发现,揭示人们使用道德记忆偏差应对道德自我威胁的情境或个体差异。此外,根据道德自我威胁的解释,道德记忆偏差的存在可能需要一定条件。人们做出有意不道德行为时,应该能够意识到自身行为有违道德标准、体验到道德自我威胁,进而表现出道德记忆偏差;但是人们在做出无意不道德行为时,可能不会体验到道德自我威胁,也就不会表现出道德记忆偏差。人们做出不太严重的不道德行为时,道德记忆偏差能够帮助人们很好地应对道德自我威胁。但是人们在做出严重违反道德的行为时,道德记忆偏差可能不足以应对道德自我威胁,该偏差可能就不复存在。 道德记忆偏差与其他应对道德自我威胁策略之间可能存在一定的联系。一种可能性是,道德记忆偏差与这些策略之间是相关补充、共同发挥作用的。还有一种可能性是,其他策略可能为道德记忆偏差的出现提供了条件。人们在做出不道德行为后,可能会通过道德推脱和自我合理化等方式来降低其道德标准,改观其对该事件的评价,从而更容易地模糊不道德行为,表现出道德记忆偏差。除应对道德自我威胁外,道德记忆偏差还存在其他可能的解释。道德记忆偏差可能源自人们的印象管理动机,即人们可能为了维护在他人面前的道德形象而表现出道德记忆偏差。道德记忆偏差还可能发生在记忆加工的不同阶段,比如该现象可能发生在编码阶段,即人们对道德事件的编码加工多于不道德事件;储存阶段,即人们可能受到积极自我图式的影响而对不道德事件产生遗忘;也可能在提取阶段,即人们可能会主动地抑制对不道德事件的提取。未来研究应关注道德记忆偏差存在条件,并在研究广度上扩展其研究范畴,在研究深度上揭示其认知机制,并探究与其他应对道德自我威胁策略的关系。     

歧视知觉对留守青少年攻击行为的影响：多重中介效应分析

为考察歧视知觉对留守青少年攻击行为的影响及其作用机制,采用问卷法对662名留守中学生进行调查。结果表明：（1）歧视知觉、抑郁、愤怒、道德推脱与攻击行为两两显著正相关。（2）歧视知觉不能直接影响留守青少年攻击行为,但存在四条显著的间接路径：愤怒的简单中介作用;道德推脱的简单中介作用;抑郁和道德推脱的链式中介作用;愤怒和道德推脱的链式中介作用。因此,抑郁、愤怒和道德推脱在歧视知觉与留守青少年攻击行为之间起多重中介作用。     

When Manipulation Gets Personal

Many accounts of moral responsibility have emerged recently that question the importance of conscious choice for moral responsibility. Instead of this ‘volitional’ requirement, these ‘attributionist’ accounts claim that agents are responsible for their actions when their actions reflect who they are and what they value. This paper argues that attributionist accounts are too quick to dismiss the connection between volition and moral responsibility. By excising conscious control from their accounts, attributionists leave open the undesirable possibility that an agent may fulfil all necessary conditions for moral responsibility even when she is under the conscious control of another person. Through analyzing situations in which attributionist conditions for moral responsibility are met while an agent is controlled by someone else, the link between an agent's volition and her moral responsibility becomes more apparent.