Gauthier and the Capacity for Morality

In Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier tries to provide a justification of morality from morally neutral premises within the constraints of an instrumental conception of reason. But his reliance on this narrow conception of reason creates problems, for it suggests that moral motivation is self-interested. However, Gauthier holds that to act morally is to act for the sake of morality and others, not oneself. An individual who so acts has what he calls an affective capacity for morality. He attempts to reconcile the tension between the self-interested account of moral behaviour and the affective capacity for morality by showing that the latter could develop from the former without violating the constraints of instrumental rationality. I argue, first, that his account is incomplete and assumes what it has to demonstrate; and, second, that this cannot be remedied with any plausibility. Finally, I argue that Gauthier covertly relies on a substantive claim about human good that is inconsistent with the instrumental conception of reason. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Why Naturalism?

My goal in this paper is to explain what ethical naturalism is, to locate the pivotal issue between naturalists and non-naturalists, and to motivate taking naturalism seriously. I do not aim to establish the truth of naturalism nor to answer the various familiar objections to it. But I do aim to motivate naturalism sufficiently that the attempt to deal with the objections will seem worthwhile. I propose that naturalism is best understood as the view that the moral properties are natural in the sense that they are empirical. I pursue certain issues in the understanding of the empirical. The crux of the matter is whether any synthetic proposition about the instantiation of a moral property is strongly a priori in that it does not admit of empirical evidence against it. I propose an argument from epistemic defeaters that, I believe, undermines the plausibility of a priorism in ethics and supports the plausibility of naturalism.     

环境伦理学中的道德客体与正义取向

本文尝试通过分析现今较为流行的几种环境伦理观倡导的环境义务对象及其理论根据,指出其合理因素和缺陷所在,进而提出价值共同体的概念,以此阐明人类在环境义务对象上的多样性和复杂性,并提出一种兼顾多层次对象的环境正义观。     

社区心理辅导实验模型的建构及其价值

建立实验模型,探索社区心理辅导的路径、具体实施的方法及其价值,为居民的心理健康和社区精神文明工作提供心理学理论和实践的依据;方法：采用症状自评量表(SCL-90)评估辅导前和辅导后社区居民的心理状况并进行自身比较;结果：l、辅导前居民的心理卫生存在问题较多;2、辅导后居民的心理卫生出现显著的变化;3、与辅导前比较,辅导后的居民心理卫生有明明显进步,特别在敌对的人际关系、偏执的认知方式和焦虑、抑郁的情绪等方面改变最为突出。结论：l、开展社区心理辅导是促进精神文明建设的全新理念和有效方法。2、建立、健全社区心理辅导网络对提高居民心理素质,减少心理疾病的发生、发展具有重要而又深远的作用。3、社区心理辅导实验模型的建立为广泛开展有关工作提供了理论和实践依据。     

王充的教育心理思想研究

该文系统研究了王充的教育心理思想,内容包括基本观点、学习心理思想、德育心理思想、差异与教师心理思想等。     

以德治国与中国社会资本的重建

当今中国社会道德水准和社会资本的下降,已经是不可回避的现实。在改革开放和发展市场经济的过程中,寻找一种方式能够使政府、社会和公民的力量相互协调并都能得到充分发挥,从而消弭潜在的社会危机爆发的可能性和克服社会资本进一步下降的可能性,是实现社会“善治”的根本要求。社会资本建立和积累的基础在于具有富足的社会道德资源,“以德治国”为当代中国重新整合国家、社会和个人的道德资源提供了前提。它有利于中国社会的道德资源富足与协调,从而使政府、社会与个体能够协调有效地实现各自的行动目标。     

企业核心竞争力与企业伦理品质

企业真正的核心竞争力来自企业伦理品质所产生的道德实力。企业的道德实力是企业遵循与市场经济理性相适应的道德准则,它一贯尊重和尽力满足利益相关人利益,并与利益相关人和谐交往共同发展而产生的道德凝聚力和影响力。与企业经营实力一样,企业道德实力是可以描述和量度的客观状态。具体可以从顾客忠诚度、员工忠诚度、股东忠诚度、融资资信度、同行联系度、供销稳定度、社区融洽度和社会美誉度等八个方面进行考量。     

Nie Wieder: Group‐Based Emotions for In‐Group Wrongdoing Affect Attitudes toward Unrelated Minorities

This article focuses on the effects of group‐based emotions for in‐group wrongdoing on attitudes towards seemingly unrelated groups. Two forms of shame are distinguished from one another and from guilt and linked to positive and negative attitudes towards an unrelated minority. In Study 1 (N = 203), Germans' feelings of moral shame—arising from the belief that the in‐group's Nazi past violates an important moral value—are associated with increased support for Turks living in Germany. Image shame—arising from a threatened social image—is associated with increased social distance. In Study 2 (N = 301), Britons' emotions regarding atrocities committed by in‐group members during the war in Iraq have similar links with attitudes towards Pakistani immigrants. We extend the findings of Study 1 by demonstrating that the effects are mediated by a sense of moral obligation and observed more strongly when the unrelated group is perceived as similar to the harmed group. Guilt was unrelated to any outcome variable across both studies. Theoretical and practical implications about the nature of group‐based emotions and their potential for affecting wider intergroup relations are discussed.     

Trustworthiness in explanation: The obligation to explain well

‘Scientific integrity’ certainly requires that data and references be beyond reproach. However, issues within the theory of scientific explanation suggest that there may be more to it than just this. While it is true that some contemporary, pragmatic analyses of explanation suffer from the ‘problem of relevance’ (an inability to ensure that explanations which are paradigmatic technically are relevant to the question being posed), it does not seem to be true that the addition of formal, metaphysical constraints is necessary to solve this problem. I argue that, when viewed as requests for help with an epistemic problem, explanation-seeking questions reveal the existence of a set of moral criteria centered in trust which, when satisfied, prevent trivial or irrelevant explanations from being offered, thereby broadening the concept of ‘scientific integrity’.     

The future of analysis

The aim of analysis is to enable our patients to differentiate themselves from their past. The question we face as analysts is whether we are in fact neurotically bound to repeat the past. This paper addresses this question by considering some of the reasons that there is a 'crisis in analysis'. Two central problems within the practice of analysis are identified as contributing to this 'crisis': 1) a view of the patient as 'enemy', or as innately destructive; and 2) a trend towards here-and-now interpretations within the transference which disregards history and the role of external reality. The danger of such an approach is that it does not allow patients to separate from their hateful primal scenes and to become free of neurotic guilt. When we are anxious about our own destructiveness and aggression and do not link this to a failure to form a loving relation, we run the risk of fostering compliance and conformity within our patients and within our own professional societies. In contrast, it is the recognition of the past and its influence on the present that makes analysis a tool for revolution.