孙中山的伦理思想述要——纪念孙中山诞辰140周年

孙中山的伦理思想是在近代中国人民反帝反封建的斗争中形成的,其形成标志着中国近代民族资产阶级伦理思想的成熟。他的基于“民生史观”的道德起源和本质论;张扬“自由、平等、博爱”的道德观;“为主义而奋斗”的人生观;包含着许多合理积极宝贵内容,值得认真地继承与弘扬。     

人与自然和谐的道德基础——古代"天人合一"思想的现代生态伦理启示

人与自然的和谐有着道德基础。古代的“天人合一”思想为我们从道德的视角研究人与自然的和谐,以及建构现代生态伦理观提供了一定的帮助。从道德的意义上,人与自然的和谐中人是道德主体,承担着全部道德责任,其行为是道德评价的对象。人对自然的适应与改造、尊重与利用是辩证的统一。     

Mill on Happiness: A question of method

There are issues in Reid scholarship as well as the primary texts that seem to suggest that Reid is not a direct realist about visual perception. In this paper, I examine two key issues – colour perception and visible figure – and attempt to defend the direct realism of Reid's theory through an interpretation of ‘directness’ as well as what Reid calls ‘acquired perception’, which is ‘mediate’ in that it requires prior perception of signs, but nonetheless constitutes direct perception.     

Leibniz's Twofold Gap Between Moral Knowledge and Motivation

Moral rationalists and sentimentalists traditionally disagree on at least two counts, namely regarding the source of moral knowledge or moral judgements and regarding the source of moral motivation. I will argue that even though Leibniz's moral epistemology is very much in line with that of mainstream moral rationalists, his account of moral motivation is better characterized as sentimentalist. Just like Hume, Leibniz denies that there is a necessary connection between knowing that something is right and the motivation to act accordingly. Instead, he believes that certain affections are necessary for moral motivation. On my interpretation, then, Leibniz is an externalist about judgements and motivation: he is committed to a gap between the judgement that something is morally right and the motivation to act accordingly. As a matter of fact, I will argue that there are two gaps. The first and less controversial one has to do with the fact that Leibniz reconciles his psychological egoism with ethical altruism through his account of love. The second gap between moral judgements and motivation is a more fundamental one: Leibniz denies that there are any necessary connections between beliefs and motivation, or even more generally, between perceptions and appetitions.     

On misunderstanding science

Abstract

The paper examines the differences between Kuhn's account, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, of the sciences as necessarily communal activities with internally set standards of procedure and achievement, and that view of the sciences which calls itself ‘Scientific Realism’ and regards them as striving toward, and perhaps asymptotically approaching, some external and objective reality that bestows truth or falsity on scientific theories.

The main argument turns on Poincaré's demonstration that Newton's Second Law (f = ma) is not a testable, provable proposition with a truth value, but something that is simply adopted. It is adopted in the light of experience, certainly, but there is no logical necessity in the adoption. My suggestion is that it is a ‘way of looking’ and ‘a method of analysis’ and that the necessity of its adoption by any individual lies in its being a necessary condition of entry into the scientific community. That community itself adopts ways of looking or methods of analysis for their fruitfulness in dealing with old problems and defining new ones.

Incoherences in the ‘approach’ account of scientific progress are looked at, and the individualistic assumptions that motivate it. These require the sciences to be presented as the source and basis of agreement and community amongst separated individuals. This picture and its requirement inverts reality as well as Kuhn's account, which makes community and agreement the starting point. The notion of reality as a transcendental convergence point becomes redundant.

The old problem of the incommensurability of paradigms is discussed by relating them to the notions of ways of looking and methods of analysis. These may be incompatible in that one cannot look at things in two different ways at once, but at the same time they cannot be measured on any common scale.     

In Defence of Kripkenstein: On Lewis’ Proposed Solution to the Sceptical Argument

Abstract

In Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke argues for an extreme form of meaning scepticism. One influential reply to Kripke’s arguments was developed by David Lewis. The reply developed by Lewis makes use of the notion of mind-independent relations of similarity and difference. The aim of the paper is to argue that Lewis’ reply is not satisfactory: the challenge to find a refutation of Kripke’s sceptical arguments remains unmet.     

孔门三弟子比较论说

孔门十哲,出类拔萃者莫若颜回、子贡、子路,且此三人之身世、性情、才具、道德修为和成就各有风华,但又殊途同归：共同维护了孔门。光大了儒家。孔子称得上是中华民族几千年来最为伟大的教育家,颜回、子贡、子路三人各方面的修为和成就,莫不大大受惠于夫子有教无类、因材施教的卓越的教育理论和教育方式。三人也没有辜负孔子的教导,以身垂范,较好地诠释了孔子儒家所宣扬的“仁、智、勇”;并与其师一道,在乱世中矢志不渝,坚守道义,追求理想,为儒学的传播和繁荣做出了重要的贡献。     

情绪作为道德判断的“催化剂”：道德判断中的评价倾向与特异性效应

在不同领域的道德判断中,情绪可能起着“催化剂”的作用。一种特定情绪对应一种核心评价;一种情绪只影响某一道德领域的判断,不同情绪的影响是特异性的;进化心理学和具身认知对道德判断中存在的评价倾向和特异性效应进行了解释。未来研究需要探索评价倾向与特异性效应的内在心理机制。以及进一步探讨文化等第三变量对不同情绪与特定领域道德判断的影响。     

恐惧管理对道德五基准及道德判断的影响

本研究探讨恐惧管理理论对道德五种基本准则以及道德判断的影响。85名被试随机分配到实验组与控制组。全部被试首先完成道德五基准问卷。实验组被试接受死亡凸显提示后观看短片并完成一系列道德两难问题的判断;控制组接受一般负性事件提示。研究结果显示,相对于控制组而言,实验组被试倾向于作出直觉而非理性判断,并且死亡凸显对道德直觉判断的影响受到厌恶情绪的中介作用。同时,当故事情节发生转换时,实验组被试倾向于作出与原有道德直觉规范相一致的道德判断。本研究从恐惧管理理论出发,为道德判断的情理之争提供了启示。     

社会距离知觉对道德判断的影响研究

理论上,人们对不同个体行为是否违背道德的判断是完全一致的。本研究提出,人们对社会距离线索的知觉会影响对道德行为的判断。研究设计了两个实验,分别从社会距离直接启动和社会距离线索启动的角度对这一假设进行了检验。结果发现,较近的社会距离启动及社会距离线索都能促使个体采取更温和的道德判断,功利主义的色彩比较浓厚,而较远的社会距离启动促使个体采用更加严格的道德判断,表现出道义论倾向。文章最后讨论了这一结果对未来研究的意义。