Does sport have intrinsic value?

This paper considers the suggestion, central to McFee's (2004 Mcfee, Graham. 2004. Sport, Rules and Values: Philosophical Investigations into the Nature of Sports, London: Routledge. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) moral laboratory argument, that sport is intrinsically valuable. McFee's position is outlined and critiqued and various interpretations of intrinsic value found in the philosophical literature are considered. In addition, Morgan's (2007 Morgan, William J. 2007. Caring, final ends and sports. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 1(1): 7–21. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]) claim that sport is an appropriate final end is considered and partially accepted. The paper draws a number of terminological distinctions and concludes that sport does not have intrinsic value as traditionally conceived, but that this is of little consequence with regard to the role of sport as a moral laboratory.     

Beyond the Individual: Sources of Attitudes Towards Rule Violation in Sport

Today, certain rule-violating behaviours, such as doping, are considered to be an issue of concern for the sport community. This paper underlines and examines the affective dimensions involved in moral responses to, and attitudes towards, rule-violating behaviours in sport. The key role played by affective processes underlying individual-level moral judgement has already been implicated by recent developments in moral psychological theories, and by neurophysiological studies. However, we propose and discuss the possibility of affective processes operating on a social level which may influence athletes' individual-level attitudes. We conclude that one-sided focus on individual rule-violating behaviour and individual sanctions may prove to be ineffective in coming to terms with the issue. In this regard we recommend a twofold approach by addressing underlying social dimensions, along with preventive measures through affect-oriented education.     

“Whow—when I was going to pretend drinking it tasted coke for real!” Second-language learners' out-of-frame talk in peer pretend play: A developmental study from preschool to first grade

Much research has pointed to the importance of out-of-frame negotiations in peer pretend play for preschool children's social, cognitive and literacy development. However, few studies have investigated the longitudinal relations between out-of-frame talk in preschool and children's oral-language skills when entering school, or the pragmatic language competencies second-language learning children have to draw upon to be involved in this planning and negotiating phase of play. In this study, a group of children, who had Turkish as their first language and Norwegian as their second language, was followed for two years, from preschool to first grade, and videotaped in play with peers (N = 15 at age 4, and N = 23 at ages 5 and 6). In the first part of the analysis, relations between out-of-frame talk in preschool and vocabulary skills and story comprehension in first grade were investigated. The second part of the analysis focused on how children developed in regulating their peers through addressing and opposing others in out-of-frame negotiations. The main findings indicate that out-of-frame talk in the preschool years explained variance in oral-language skills in first grade, and that these second-language learners developed to increasingly address and oppose their peers over this two-year period.     

Maturity is explicit: Self-importance of traits in humanitarian moral identity

Development of humanitarian moral identity may correspond with the growing self-importance of moral traits. This study considered the extent to which moral traits become explicit in novice and expert humanitarian moral identity narratives. Eighty humanitarian caregivers from L’Arche communities were given self-understanding interview prompts to assess temporal (i.e., past, present, and future) and relational expectations. Humanitarian responses were compared to four paragraphs comprised of moral traits (i.e., just, brave, caring, and religious) using a computational knowledge representation model known as latent semantic analysis (Landauer, T., McNamara, D., Dennis, S., & Kintsch, W. (Eds.). (2007). Handbook of latent semantic analysis (University of Colorado Institute of Cognitive Science). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum). Consistent with predictions, humanitarian experts displayed more explicitly self-important moral traits than novices on future and romantic partner expectations. Findings suggest that humanitarian development is associated with simulation related to future goal achievement and moral action modeled by close intimates.     

Humanity or justice?

This paper reflects on a critique of cosmopolitanism mounted by Tom Campbell, who argues that cosmopolitans place undue stress on the issue of global justice. Campbell argues that aid for the impoverished needy in the third world, for example, should be given on the Principle of Humanity rather than on the Principle of Justice. This line of thought is also pursued by ‘Liberal Nationalists’ like Yael Tamir and David Miller. Thomas Nagel makes a similar distinction and questions whether the ideal of justice can even be meaningfully applied on a global scale. The paper explores whether the distinction between the Principle of Humanity and the Principle of Justice might be a false dichotomy in that both principles could be involved in humanitarian assistance. It will suggest that both principles might be grounded in an ethics of caring and that the ethics of caring cannot be so sharply distinguished from the discourse of justice and of rights. As a result, the Principle of Humanity and the Principle of Justice cannot be so sharply distinguished either. It is because we care about others as human beings (Principle of Humanity) that we pursue justice for them (Principle of Justice) and the alleviation of their avoidable suffering.     

Justice and peaceful cooperation

Justice is important, but so is peaceful cooperation. In this article, I argue that if one takes seriously the autonomy of individuals and groups and the fact of moral pluralism, a just system of cooperation cannot guarantee peaceful cooperation in a pluralistic world. As a response to this consideration, I develop a contractarian theory that can secure peace in a pluralistic world of autonomous agents, assuming that the agents who exist in this world expect that peaceful cooperation is the most beneficial form of interaction for them in the long run. The theory specifies the restrictions on the behavior of autonomous individual and collective agents that are indispensable for peaceful cooperation in a pluralistic world. In particular, I argue for the need of (i) a globally valid rule of conflict resolution to settle all intra- and inter-group conflicts that cannot be resolved locally, (ii) a world court to apply this rule in cases where local group authorities are inadequate to do so, and to serve as a final court of appeal, and (iii) a world police to enforce the rule.     

Moral obligations towards future generations in African thought

Given the importance of being able to account for moral obligations towards future generations, especially in the light of the problem of global climate change, I argue that there are under-appreciated notions in African thought that are able to significantly contribute to the on-going discourse with respect to inter-generational moral obligations. I identify two related African notions, both springing from the prominent belief that ancestors who have died – but continue to have a presence – are entitled to respect, which upon secular refinement are promising in terms of grounding a claim that we do have moral obligations to future generations. These conceptions are that the environment is a communal resource, shared across generations, and that the present generation should express gratitude to its predecessors for preserving the environment on its behalf, by emulating its predecessors and preserving the environment for future generations. I argue that these two conceptions present plausible grounds for thinking that we have moral obligations to posterity, partly because they go some way towards overcoming some of the theoretical concerns generally associated with the notion of moral obligations towards unidentifiable, contingent future persons.     

Barry Taylor

I respond to an argument made by Gunnar Björnsson and Ragnar Francén Olinder against motivational internalism. Björnsson and Olinder present a hypothesis in which all of us are selfishly motivated to act in accordance with our moral judgments. The conceivability of such a possibility, they argue, rules out motivational internalism. I argue that this is not the case, and that, according to one dominant view about moral judgments, the agents in the hypothesis do not make genuine moral judgments. One therefore cannot argue decisively against motivational internalism without arguing against this view about moral judgments.     

Quality of Reasons and Degrees of Responsibility

Traditionally, theories of moral responsibility feature only the minimally sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. While these theories are well-suited to account for the threshold of responsibility, it’s less clear how they can address questions about the degree to which agents are responsible. One feature that intuitively affects the degree to which agents are morally responsible is how difficult performing a given action is for them. Recently, philosophers have begun to develop accounts of scalar moral responsibility that make use of this notion of difficulty [Coates and Swenson 2013; Nelkin 2016]. In this paper, I argue that these accounts, although innovative, are incomplete. The degree to which agents are morally responsible is determined not only by the difficulties that agents face but also by the quality of the reasons for which they act.