全文获取类型
收费全文 | 1443篇 |
免费 | 150篇 |
国内免费 | 120篇 |
专业分类
1713篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 3篇 |
2023年 | 42篇 |
2022年 | 34篇 |
2021年 | 36篇 |
2020年 | 82篇 |
2019年 | 103篇 |
2018年 | 100篇 |
2017年 | 96篇 |
2016年 | 95篇 |
2015年 | 54篇 |
2014年 | 70篇 |
2013年 | 208篇 |
2012年 | 46篇 |
2011年 | 35篇 |
2010年 | 23篇 |
2009年 | 42篇 |
2008年 | 49篇 |
2007年 | 78篇 |
2006年 | 86篇 |
2005年 | 72篇 |
2004年 | 67篇 |
2003年 | 69篇 |
2002年 | 41篇 |
2001年 | 23篇 |
2000年 | 29篇 |
1999年 | 36篇 |
1998年 | 25篇 |
1997年 | 13篇 |
1996年 | 10篇 |
1995年 | 13篇 |
1994年 | 2篇 |
1993年 | 8篇 |
1992年 | 3篇 |
1991年 | 2篇 |
1990年 | 5篇 |
1989年 | 1篇 |
1988年 | 8篇 |
1987年 | 1篇 |
1982年 | 1篇 |
1981年 | 1篇 |
1980年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有1713条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
941.
Results of two retrospective studies suggested that romantic betrayal led to the loss of key aspects of social support from partners, most notably attachment, guidance, and reliable alliance with the partner. Furthermore, specific social provision losses were found to reliably predict recalled and current negative psychological states associated with romantic betrayal. Perceived attachment losses predicted postbetrayal anger and disgust, as well as trauma reactions following betrayal. In addition, a decline in reassurance of one’s worth following betrayal predicted embarrassment about the event, and the degree to which reliable alliance with the partner was lost predicted anxiety and shame. 相似文献
942.
Cristina Roadevin 《Metaphilosophy》2018,49(1-2):137-152
This paper argues that hypocritical blame renders blame inappropriate. Someone should not express her blame if she is guilty of the same thing for which she is blaming others, in the absence of an admission of fault. In failing to blame herself for the same violations of norms she condemns in another, the hypocrite evinces important moral faults, which undermine her right to blame. The hypocrite refuses or culpably fails to admit her own mistakes, while at the same time demands that others admit theirs. The paper argues that this lack of reciprocity—expecting others to take morality seriously by apologizing for their faults, without one doing the same in return—is what makes hypocritical blame unfair. 相似文献
943.
Andrei C. Holman 《The Journal of psychology》2018,152(5):257-275
Traffic law violations are the most important determinants of traffic accidents. This study examined the influence of drivers' ethical perspective on their traffic violations and the mediating role of driving styles in these relationships. A sample of 313 drivers participated in the study. Contrary to expectations, high ethical relativism was found to be associated with fewer aggressive traffic violations. This suggests that the informal normative system that parallels the official traffic regulations is the more salient reference against which drivers usually assess the adequacy of their behaviors, highly relativistic drivers being more willing to also take into consideration the official traffic code in these appraisals. We also found significant interactions between idealism and relativism on both ordinary and aggressive violations. Idealism emerged as a predictor of these violations only in drivers low in relativism. In this group, one's concern about the harm that he/she might cause to other traffic participants induces higher traffic law abidingness. These influences of idealism were mediated by certain driving styles. Drivers' general ethical perspective fosters a specific pattern of driving styles and, consequently, the tendency to commit or to refrain from traffic violations. 相似文献
944.
Max Khan Hayward 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2018,96(4):724-737
This essay develops the epistemic challenge to non-naturalist moral realism. While evolutionary considerations do not support the strongest claims made by ‘debunkers’, they do provide the basis for an inductive argument that our moral dispositions and starting beliefs are at best partially reliable. So, we need some method for separating truth from falsity. Many non-naturalists think that rational reflection can play this role. But rational reflection cannot be expected to bring us to truth even from reasonably accurate starting points. Reflection selects views that are coherent and conflict-free, yet there is no reason to think that the non-natural moral truth must be like this. Inasmuch as we seek coherent, conflict-free, ethical viewpoints, that suggests that our goal is not non-natural truth at all. 相似文献
945.
James M. Childs Jr. 《Dialog》2018,57(2):111-119
This article proceeds from the conviction that moral injury suffered by many combat veterans is a deeply spiritual matter requiring spiritual resources for healing. The tradition of the care of souls commends itself. It takes into account that the “soul” is an expression of the whole person in all its physical, spiritual, and social realities. Moral injury affects all those dimensions of personhood or soul. Since the Reformation the care of souls has been a vocation for the ministry of the whole people of God under the theology of the priesthood of all believers. A caring community is essential to healing for many dealing with moral injury. Indeed, the veterans themselves, in sharing their stories and their pain, become part of that ministry of the priesthood of all believers and may well find healing in the meaningfulness of their mutual ministry. 相似文献
946.
医学专业精神的初步研究 总被引:6,自引:1,他引:5
由于历史和社会文化的差异,中西方对医学专业精神有着不同的理解。在中西不同语境下,分析了“Profession”和“Professionalism”这两个核心概念的涵义,并从中西对比的视角,对中西方医学专业精神所面临的几个共同问题进行了初步研究,包括医学专业核心道德价值观念、利益冲突、行业自治等。在此基础之上,还对我国医学专业精神的发展提出建议。 相似文献
947.
利用现代医学伦理的人本理念,将投诉中心作为防范医疗纠纷的载体,有效地解决就医者的投诉接待和处理,无疑是一种全新的理念和尝试。通过对投诉制度建设、投诉处理标准化流程、有效投诉信息的利用等方面的经验性论述,阐明了投诉中心的载体建设,为减少医疗纠纷、加强伦理道德建设、构建和谐的医患关系产生了积极的作用。 相似文献
948.
KATHLEEN WALLACE 《Metaphilosophy》2007,38(4):380-403
Abstract: Bernard Gert argues that legitimate moral disagreement calls for tolerance and moral humility; when there is more than one morally acceptable course of action, then intolerance and what Gert calls “moral arrogance” would be objectionable. This article identifies some possible difficulties in distinguishing moral arrogance from moral reform and then examines Gert's treatment of abortion as a contemporary example of moral disagreement that he characterizes as irresolvable. 相似文献
949.
Angela M. Smith 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(4):465-484
A number of philosophers have recently argued that we should interpret the debate over moral responsibility as a debate over
the conditions under which it would be “fair” to blame a person for her attitudes or conduct. What is distinctive about these
accounts is that they begin with the stance of the moral judge, rather than that of the agent who is judged, and make attributions
of responsibility dependent upon whether it would be fair or appropriate for a moral judge to react to the agent in various
(negative) ways. This is problematic, I argue, because our intuitions about whether and when it would be fair to react negatively
to another are sensitive to a host of considerations that appear to have little or nothing to do with an agent’s responsibility
or culpability for her attitudes or behavior. If this is correct, then theories which make attributions of responsibility
dependent upon the appropriateness of our reactions as moral judges will turn out to be fundamentally misguided.
I am grateful to Barbara Herman, T. M. Scanlon, and two anonymous reviewers for The Journal of Ethics for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to Pamela Hieronymi and the members of her
Fall 2201 graduate seminar on moral responsibility at UCLA, and to the audience members at Simon Fraser University, for their
valuable feedback on earlier versions of this material. My biggest debt of gratitude goes to Jean Roberts, for stimulating
discussion and insightful commentary on multiple drafts of this paper. 相似文献
950.
Michael Weber 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(1):65-86
A number of neo-Kantians have suggested that an act may be morally worthy even if sympathy and similar emotions are present,
so long as they are not what in fact motivates right action–so long as duty, and duty alone, in fact motivates. Thus, the
ideal Kantian moral agent need not be a cold and unfeeling person, as some critics have suggested. Two objections to this
view need to be answered. First, some maintain that motives cannot be present without in fact motivating. Such non-motivating
reasons, it is claimed, are incoherent. Second, if such motives are not in fact motivating, then nonetheless the moral agent's
performance of right action will be objectionably cold and unfeeling. While the first objection is not compelling, since the
alternative according to which all motives in fact motivate but differ in strength suffers from the very same problems attributed
to the neo-Kantian view, the second has force, and any account of moral worth must make room for motives such as sympathy
actually motivating right action. 相似文献