回到道德现象本身——康德道德形而上学的论证方法初探

在康德理性的道德形而上学的建构过程中,两种论证方法即分析法和综合法起到了重要的作用。他首先用分析法从普通人的相互混杂的道德认识中逐步分离出纯粹的道德现象和原则,力图给真正的道德哲学奠基。随后他又用综合法来论证道德律的实在性并使它在经验世界中能得到现实的应用,以说明纯粹的道德原则并非人的主观臆造。两种方法相互依赖,相辅相成,共同支撑起道德形而上学的大厦。     

大学生性道德价值观的结构及问卷编制

以文献综述为基础,结合开放式问卷调查、专家分析和探索性施测,提出了大学生性道德价值观的理论构想,在此基础上编制了大学生性道德价值观问卷,并对正式问卷调查结果进行探索性因子分析和验证性因子分析,初步确定大学生的性道德价值观是一个多层次多维度的结构,包括3个二阶因子和8个一阶因子。该研究建构的大学生性道德价值观的理论结构比较合理,初步编制的问卷各项测量学指标总的表现良好,经过修改可以作为测量当代大学生性道德价值观的工具。     

不同情景下小学儿童对说谎与说真话的道德评价

研究探讨了小学7、9、11岁儿童在对说谎与说真话进行道德评价时不同情景间的差异.研究结果发现,小学儿童对于具有积极意义的说谎/真话的评价显著地好于消极性的说谎/真话.但在对具有积极意义的说谎以及具有消极意义的真话进行评价时,具有显著的情景间差异.总的来说,在个体情景下,对谦虚谎及做好事说真话的评价具有年龄的效应,且谦虚谎的评价比白谎更为积极,而白谎的评价比集体情景下的说谎与伤害性说谎更为积极;而儿童对于交往情景下直率真话的评价在所有的年龄都趋于中性,有别于其他情景.     

医学专业精神的初步研究

由于历史和社会文化的差异,中西方对医学专业精神有着不同的理解。在中西不同语境下,分析了“Profession”和“Professionalism”这两个核心概念的涵义,并从中西对比的视角,对中西方医学专业精神所面临的几个共同问题进行了初步研究,包括医学专业核心道德价值观念、利益冲突、行业自治等。在此基础之上,还对我国医学专业精神的发展提出建议。     

中国传统伦理对医院道德管理之贡献

随着经济的腾飞,儒家管理思想在文化、伦理道德层面上给予医院经营管理以深刻影响。在医院道德管理的建设中,中国传统儒家伦理起着重要的作用,“仁”是医院经营发展的中心,“义”是医院经营立足的根本,“礼”是医院经营成功的保证,“智”是医院经营腾飞的关键,“信”是医院经营兴旺的标志。     

防范医疗纠纷的载体建设——天津市人民医院投诉中心的绩效浅析

利用现代医学伦理的人本理念,将投诉中心作为防范医疗纠纷的载体,有效地解决就医者的投诉接待和处理,无疑是一种全新的理念和尝试。通过对投诉制度建设、投诉处理标准化流程、有效投诉信息的利用等方面的经验性论述,阐明了投诉中心的载体建设,为减少医疗纠纷、加强伦理道德建设、构建和谐的医患关系产生了积极的作用。     

MORAL REFORM,MORAL DISAGREEMENT,AND ABORTION

Abstract: Bernard Gert argues that legitimate moral disagreement calls for tolerance and moral humility; when there is more than one morally acceptable course of action, then intolerance and what Gert calls “moral arrogance” would be objectionable. This article identifies some possible difficulties in distinguishing moral arrogance from moral reform and then examines Gert's treatment of abortion as a contemporary example of moral disagreement that he characterizes as irresolvable.     

On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible

A number of philosophers have recently argued that we should interpret the debate over moral responsibility as a debate over the conditions under which it would be “fair” to blame a person for her attitudes or conduct. What is distinctive about these accounts is that they begin with the stance of the moral judge, rather than that of the agent who is judged, and make attributions of responsibility dependent upon whether it would be fair or appropriate for a moral judge to react to the agent in various (negative) ways. This is problematic, I argue, because our intuitions about whether and when it would be fair to react negatively to another are sensitive to a host of considerations that appear to have little or nothing to do with an agent’s responsibility or culpability for her attitudes or behavior. If this is correct, then theories which make attributions of responsibility dependent upon the appropriateness of our reactions as moral judges will turn out to be fundamentally misguided. I am grateful to Barbara Herman, T. M. Scanlon, and two anonymous reviewers for The Journal of Ethics for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to Pamela Hieronymi and the members of her Fall 2201 graduate seminar on moral responsibility at UCLA, and to the audience members at Simon Fraser University, for their valuable feedback on earlier versions of this material. My biggest debt of gratitude goes to Jean Roberts, for stimulating discussion and insightful commentary on multiple drafts of this paper.     

More on the Motive of Duty

A number of neo-Kantians have suggested that an act may be morally worthy even if sympathy and similar emotions are present, so long as they are not what in fact motivates right action–so long as duty, and duty alone, in fact motivates. Thus, the ideal Kantian moral agent need not be a cold and unfeeling person, as some critics have suggested. Two objections to this view need to be answered. First, some maintain that motives cannot be present without in fact motivating. Such non-motivating reasons, it is claimed, are incoherent. Second, if such motives are not in fact motivating, then nonetheless the moral agent's performance of right action will be objectionably cold and unfeeling. While the first objection is not compelling, since the alternative according to which all motives in fact motivate but differ in strength suffers from the very same problems attributed to the neo-Kantian view, the second has force, and any account of moral worth must make room for motives such as sympathy actually motivating right action.     

With Hope and Imagination: Imaginative Moral Decision-Making in Neonatal Intensive Care Units

Although the role of imagination in moral reasoning is often neglected, recent literature, mostly of pragmatist signature, points to imagination as one of its central elements. In this article we develop some of their arguments by looking at the moral role of imagination in practice, in particular the practice of neonatal intensive care. Drawing on empirical research, we analyze a decision-making process in various stages: delivery, staff meeting, and reflection afterwards. We show how imagination aids medical practitioners demarcating moral categories, tuning their actions, and exploring long-range consequences of decisions. We argue that imagination helps to bring about at least four kinds of integration in the moral decision-making process: personal integration by creating a moral self-image in moments of reflection; social integration by aiding the conciliation of the diverging perspectives of the people involved; temporal integration by facilitating the parties to transcend the present moment and connect past, present, and future; and epistemological integration by helping to combine the various forms of knowledge and experience needed to make moral decisions. Furthermore, we argue that the role of imagination in these moral decision-processes is limited in several significant ways. Rather than being a solution itself, it is merely an aid and cannot replace the decision itself. Finally, there are also limits to the practical relevance of this theoretical reflection. In the end, it is up to care professionals as reflective practitioners to re-imagine the practice of intensive care and make the right decisions with hope and imagination.