儒家伦理中的自律

儒家伦理是否自律,不少学者对此问题进行过深入的探讨,但结论却莫衷一是。该文通过比较儒家伦理中所体现的自主性因素和西方哲学中的“自律”概念,认为学者们的分歧主要在于对西方哲学中“自律”概念的两个构成因素的不同侧重。儒家伦理中不存在作为个人权利基础的“自律”,但在作为道德理想的意义上则的确可说是“自律”的。儒家的“自律”观为我们提供了一个更接近自然主义的人的观念。     

谈中医认知方式及中医理论体系的构建

提出开箱式思维和闭箱式思维的概念,并以此为基础对中医认知方式和中医理论体系的构建进行初步的探讨.整体上,中医认知方式是一种宏观性闭箱式思维,中医学是一种闭箱式理论体系.     

Particularism and the Point of Moral Principles

According to radical moral particularists such as Jonathan Dancy, there are no substantive moral principles. And yet, few particularists wish to deny that something very like moral principles do indeed play a significant role in our everyday moral practice. Loathe at dismissing this as mere error on the part of everyday moral agents, particularists have proposed a number of alternative accounts of the practice. The aim of all of these accounts is to make sense of our appeal to general moral truths in both reaching and justifying our particular moral judgments without thereby violating the particularists' stricture against substantive moral principles. In this paper, I argue that the most prominent non-substantive accounts of moral generalities appealed to by radical particularists – the heuristic account and default reasons accounts – fail in this aim.     

The badness of discrimination

The most blatant forms of discrimination are morally outrageous and very obviously so; but the nature and boundaries of discrimination are more controversial, and it is not clear whether all forms of discrimination are morally bad; nor is it clear why objectionable cases of discrimination are bad. In this paper I address these issues. First, I offer a taxonomy of discrimination. I then argue that discrimination is bad, when it is, because it harms people. Finally, I criticize a rival, disrespect-based account according to which discrimination is bad regardless of whether it causes harm.     

The Meta-Justification of Reflective Equilibrium

The paper addresses the possibility of providing a meta-justification of what appears to be crucial epistemic desiderata involved in the method of reflective equilibrium. I argue that although the method of reflective equilibrium appears to be widely in use in moral theorising, the prospects of providing a meta-justification of crucial epistemic desiderata are rather bleak. Nor is the requirement that a meta-justification be provided obviously misguided. In addition, I briefly note some of the implications of these results for our use of the method of reflective equilibrium and for the best interpretation of the method.     

用青春书写的道德篇章——李春华给我们的启示

湖南师范大学历史文化学院2003级学生李春华舍己救人的英雄事迹正在全国引起强烈的反响。在李春华身上究竟体现出了一种什么样的精神?由此我们应该如何评价80后的中国大学生的整体道德风貌?李春华的事迹对于我们加强大学生思想政治教育和公民道德建设有何启示?中华民族的传统美德如何在当代大学生身上得以传承和发扬?带着对这些问题的求解,我们选编了这几篇稿子,希望能够作为引玉之砖,引起大家的思考和讨论。     

品德心理结构研究进展的剖析及展望

对品德心理结构的研究一直是德育心理学研究的重要课题。纵观我国学者关于品德心理结构的研究成果,提示了研究进展的三个阶段:起步研究阶段、拓展研究阶段、核心研究阶段。初步评定了各研究的得失,提出了进一步研究品德心理结构的展望与启示。     

Many moral buttons or just one? Evidence from emotional facial expressions

We investigated whether moral violations involving harm selectively elicit anger, whereas purity violations selectively elicit disgust, as predicted by the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). We analysed participants’ spontaneous facial expressions as they listened to scenarios depicting moral violations of harm and purity. As predicted by MFT, anger reactions were elicited more frequently by harmful than by impure actions. However, violations of purity elicited more smiling reactions and expressions of anger than of disgust. This effect was found both in a classic set of scenarios and in a new set in which the different kinds of violations were matched on weirdness. Overall, these findings are at odds with predictions derived from MFT and provide support for “monist” accounts that posit harm at the basis of all moral violations. However, we found that smiles were differentially linked to purity violations, which leaves open the possibility of distinct moral modules.