全文获取类型
| 收费全文 | 1601篇 |
| 免费 | 136篇 |
| 国内免费 | 54篇 |
专业分类
| 1791篇 |
出版年
| 2025年 | 10篇 |
| 2024年 | 32篇 |
| 2023年 | 46篇 |
| 2022年 | 36篇 |
| 2021年 | 39篇 |
| 2020年 | 86篇 |
| 2019年 | 109篇 |
| 2018年 | 102篇 |
| 2017年 | 97篇 |
| 2016年 | 99篇 |
| 2015年 | 55篇 |
| 2014年 | 73篇 |
| 2013年 | 209篇 |
| 2012年 | 49篇 |
| 2011年 | 35篇 |
| 2010年 | 25篇 |
| 2009年 | 43篇 |
| 2008年 | 49篇 |
| 2007年 | 78篇 |
| 2006年 | 87篇 |
| 2005年 | 73篇 |
| 2004年 | 67篇 |
| 2003年 | 69篇 |
| 2002年 | 41篇 |
| 2001年 | 23篇 |
| 2000年 | 29篇 |
| 1999年 | 36篇 |
| 1998年 | 25篇 |
| 1997年 | 13篇 |
| 1996年 | 10篇 |
| 1995年 | 13篇 |
| 1994年 | 2篇 |
| 1993年 | 8篇 |
| 1992年 | 3篇 |
| 1991年 | 2篇 |
| 1990年 | 5篇 |
| 1989年 | 1篇 |
| 1988年 | 8篇 |
| 1987年 | 1篇 |
| 1982年 | 1篇 |
| 1981年 | 1篇 |
| 1980年 | 1篇 |
排序方式： 共有1791条查询结果，搜索用时 0 毫秒
21.
Jessie Sun;Luke D. Smillie; 《Journal of personality》2024,92(3):653-665
People vary in how they perceive, think about, and respond to moral issues. Clearly, we cannot fully understand the psychology of morality without accounting for individual differences in moral functioning. But decades of neglect of and explicit skepticism toward such individual differences has resulted in a lack of integration between moral psychology and personality psychology—the study of psychological differences between people. In recent years, these barriers to progress have started to break down. This special issue aims to celebrate and further increase the visibility of the personality psychology of morality. Here, we introduce the articles in this special issue by highlighting some important contributions a personality-based perspective has to offer moral psychology—particularly in comparison to the currently prominent social psychological approach. We show that personality psychology is well-placed to (a) contribute toward a rigorous empirical foundation for moral psychology, (b) tackle the conceptualization and assessment of stable moral tendencies, (c) assess the predictive validity of moral traits in relation to consequential outcomes, (d) uncover the mechanisms underlying individual differences in moral judgments and behavior, and (e) provide insights into moral development. For these reasons, we believe that moral psychology needs personality psychology to reach its full scholarly potential. 相似文献
22.
Dan P. McAdams;Ananya Mayukha; 《Journal of personality》2024,92(3):666-682
We aim to identify the major ideas and trends in the study of morality within personality psychology over the past 100 years. 相似文献
23.
Juan Carlos Marulanda-Hernández;Alex Wiegmann;Michael R. Waldmann; 《European journal of social psychology》2024,54(6):1168-1181
Previous research has shown that people judge sacrificing a few people to save a larger number to be morally permissible when the intervention targets the threat but not when it targets the victims. We investigated whether this distinction according to the locus of intervention influences people's evaluations of wartime scenarios and whether such evaluations vary according to different types of victims (e.g., civilians vs. soldiers). We observed a significant effect of locus of intervention in situations in which a smaller number of civilians were sacrificed to save a larger number of civilians (Study 1; N = 142). However, the effect of locus of intervention was less pronounced in scenarios in which soldiers were sacrificed to save civilians (Studies 2 and 3; N = 173 and N = 841). A fourth experiment (N = 477) explored why participants treated soldiers and civilians differently. Participants believed that it is more permissible to sacrifice soldiers because they consent to being harmed. 相似文献
24.
Clare Conry-Murray Megan McKechnie Nicole Olivieri Pagan 《The Journal of genetic psychology》2020,181(2-3):171-180
AbstractParticipants with ADHD (n?=?45) and participants without ADHD (n?=?130, total n?=?175) judged hypothetical moral and conventional rule violations that varied the impulsivity of the act, the ADHD diagnosis, and the gender of the actor in order to examine (1) social reasoning about impulsiveness and (2) whether participants infer impulsiveness from the characteristics of the actor, including gender and ADHD-status. Moral violations were judged more negatively than conventional violations, even when they were impulsive. The characteristics of the actor influenced judgments in that participants judged boys’ behavior as more acceptable, as having less control, and as deserving of less punishment compared to girls. In addition, actors who were described as having ADHD were judged overall more positively. Participants with ADHD judged that all actors should receive similar punishment, regardless of the actor’s ADHD diagnosis, while participants without ADHD judged actors with ADHD should receive less punishment than those without. 相似文献
25.
Black magic (henceforth BM) is acting in an attempt to harm human beings through supernatural means. Examples include the employment of spells, the use of special curses, the burning of objects related to the purported victim, and the use of pins with voodoo dolls. For the sake of simplicity, we shall focus on attempts to kill through BM. The moral attitude towards BM has not been, as far as we know, significantly discussed in contemporary analytic philosophy. Yet the topic brings up interesting questions and poses challenges, occasionally even reaching the level of paradoxes. Ideas of respecting persons, in particular, will be seen to be challenged by this form of magic. The notion of respecting persons will be treated here broadly and pluralistically. Indeed part of the interest in the discussion will be the unfolding of the diverse ways in which this term should be understood, and the contrasts between its various uses. Often, as we shall see, respect for persons and disrespect for them, in different senses, will co-exist, and the dilemma will be one where avoiding some forms of disrespect will involve us in disrespect in other senses. 相似文献
26.
Andrew Tice Ingram 《Ratio》2020,33(1):56-67
G.E.M. Anscombe argued that we should dispense with deontic concepts when doing ethics, if it is psychologically possible to do so. In response, I contend that deontic concepts are constitutive of the common moral experience of guilt. This has two consequences for Anscombe's position. First, seeing that guilt is a deontic emotion, we should recognize that Anscombe's qualification on her thesis applies: psychologically, we need deontology to understand our obligations and hence whether our guilt is warranted. Second, the fact that guilt is a deontic moral emotion debunks Anscombe's claim that deontic concepts are a relic of the Western, religious past: guilt feelings–hence the idea of moral duty as well–can be found in cultures without an ethics of divine command. Modern moral philosophers' interest in oughts and obligations is not an academic hobbyhorse, but a vital concern arising out of a primeval human emotion. 相似文献
27.
The present study sought to examine the influence of aggressive behavior, psychopathy, and gender on moral judgments of aggressive transgressions. A two-dimensional conceptualization of aggression was used, such that proactive relational aggression, reactive relational aggression, proactive physical aggression, and reactive physical aggression were treated as distinct subtypes of aggression and also as distinct subtypes of moral judgments of aggression. Participants were 421 emerging adults (215 women). Self-report measures of aggression, psychopathy, and moral judgments were collected. Peer-reports of aggression and psychopathy were obtained from a randomly assigned subsample of 73 participants (46 women) for validity purposes. Unique associations were found between subtypes of aggression and corresponding moral judgments of the same subtypes. 相似文献
28.
Christian Coseru 《Zygon》2020,55(2):461-473
The problem of free will is associated with a specific and significant kind of control over our actions, which is understood primarily in the sense that we have the freedom to do otherwise or the capacity for self-determination. Is Buddhism compatible with such a conception of free will? The aim of this article is to address three critical issues concerning the free will problem: (1) what role should accounts of physical and neurobiological processes play in discussions of free will? (2) Is a conception of mental autonomy grounded in practices of meditative cultivation compatible with the three cardinal Buddhist doctrines of momentariness, dependent arising, and no-self? (3) Are there enough resources in Buddhism, given its antisubstantialist metaphysics, to account for personal agency, self-control, and moral responsibility? 相似文献
29.
Moral dumbfounding occurs when people maintain a moral judgment even though they cannot provide reasons for it. Recently, questions have been raised about whether dumbfounding is a real phenomenon. Two reasons have been proposed as guiding the judgments of dumbfounded participants: harm-based reasons (believing an action may cause harm) or norm-based reasons (breaking a moral norm is inherently wrong). Participants in that research (see Royzman, Kim, & Leeman, 2015), who endorsed either reason were excluded from analysis, and instances of moral dumbfounding seemingly reduced to non-significance. We argue that endorsing a reason is not sufficient evidence that a judgment is grounded in that reason. Stronger evidence should additionally account for (a) articulating a given reason and (b) consistently applying the reason in different situations. Building on this, we develop revised exclusion criteria across three studies. Study 1 included an open-ended response option immediately after the presentation of a moral scenario. Responses were coded for mention of harm-based or norm-based reasons. Participants were excluded from analysis if they both articulated and endorsed a given reason. Using these revised criteria for exclusion, we found evidence for dumbfounding, as measured by the selecting of an admission of not having reasons. Studies 2 and 3 included a further three questions relating to harm-based reasons specifically, assessing the consistency with which people apply harm-based reasons across differing contexts. As predicted, few participants consistently applied, articulated, and endorsed harm-based reasons, and evidence for dumbfounding was found. 相似文献
30.
Claudia Gherghel Dorin Nastas Takeshi Hashimoto Jiro Takai Aaron Castelán Cargile 《Ethics & behavior》2020,30(2):126-149
We investigated the effect of culture, moral discourse, and motivation to engage in prosocial behavior on benefactors’ positive affect. Participants from three cultures (Japan, Romania, and the United States) responded to scenarios in which they could perform small acts of kindness for different targets. A stronger relationship between agentic and obligated motivation to perform acts of kindness, as well as between obligated motivation and positive affect, was observed for participants from Japan, and for individuals with higher endorsement of the Community Ethic. Agentic motivation to engage in prosocial behavior was related to benefactors’ positive affect, regardless of relationship type. 相似文献