How (and where) does moral judgment work?

Moral psychology has long focused on reasoning, but recent evidence suggests that moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than deliberate reasoning. Here we discuss recent findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including several studies that specifically investigate moral judgment. These findings indicate the importance of affect, although they allow that reasoning can play a restricted but significant role in moral judgment. They also point towards a preliminary account of the functional neuroanatomy of moral judgment, according to which many brain areas make important contributions to moral judgment although none is devoted specifically to it.     

The relevance of Rawls' principle of justice for research on cognitively impaired patients

An ethical conflict arises when we must performresearch in the interest of future patients,but that this may occasionally injure theinterests of today's patients.In the case of cognitively impaired persons, thequestion arises whether it is compatible withhumane healthcare not only to treat, but alsoto use these patients for research purposes.Some bioethicists and theologians haveformulated a general duty of solidarity, alsopertaining to cognitively impaired persons, as ajustification for research on these persons. Ifone examines this thesis from the theory ofjustice according to John Rawls, it is revealedthat such a duty of solidarity cannotnecessarily be extrapolated from Rawls'conception of justice. This is at least true ofRawls' difference principle, because accordingto the difference principle only those measuresare justifiable which serve the interest of therespective least well off. Those measures whichwould engender additional injury for the leastwell off could not be balanced by any utilityaccording to Rawls.However, John Rawls' difference principleis subordinate to the first principle,which is that each person has an equalright to the most extensive basic libertycompatible with the same liberty for others.These primary goods are determined by thefreedom and integrity of the person.This integrity of decisionally impaired personswould be in danger if one would abstain fromresearch and thus forego the increase inknowledge related to their disease. Thus onecould conclude, at least from Rawls' firstprinciple, that society must take on a duty toguarantee the degrees of freedom forcognitively impaired persons and thus alsosupport the efforts for their healing.     

The "Natural" and the "Formal"

The paper presents an argument against a metaphysical conception of logic according to which logic spells out a specific kind of mathematical structure that is somehow inherently related to our factual reasoning. In contrast, it is argued that it is always an empirical question as to whether a given mathematical structure really does captures a principle of reasoning. (More generally, it is argued that it is not meaningful to replace an empirical investigation of a thing by an investigation of its a priori analyzable structure without paying due attention to the question of whether it really is the structure of the thing in question.) It is proposed to elucidate the situation by distinguishing two essentially different realms with which our reason must deal: the realm of the natural, constituted by the things of our empirical world, and the realm of the formal, constituted by the structures that we use as prisms to view, to make sense of, and to reconstruct the world. It is suggested that this vantage point may throw light on many foundational problems of logic.     

A Pathological View of Disease

This paper is a response to Christopher Boorse's recent defense of hisBiostatistical Theory (BST) of health and disease. Boorse maintains that hisconcept of theoretical health and disease reflects the ``consideredusage of pathologists.' I argue that pathologists do not use ``disease' inthe purely theoretical way that is required by the BST. Pathology does notdraw a sharp distinction between theoretical and practical aspects ofmedicine. Pathology does not even need a theoretical concept of disease. Itsfocus is not theoretical, but practical; pathology's goal is to contribute tothe healing of patients. Pathology, even experimental pathology, is notvalue-free. Not only ``disease' but also such terms as ``nerve' and ``organ'are laden with conceptual values.     

Nietzsche Contra “Self-Reformulation”

Not only do the writings of Nietzsche – early and late – fail to support the pedagogy of self-reformulation, this doctrine embodies what for him is worst in man and would destroy that which is higher. The pedagogy of self-reformulation is also incoherent. In contrast, Nietzsche offers a fruitful and comprehensive theory of education that, while non-democratic and contemptuous of egalitarian aspirations, emerges consistently from his metaphysics and philosophical anthropology. Whatever, then, we might think of his premises, Nietzsche’s philosophy of education represents an attractive model for those who would develop a meaningful, distinctive, and persuasive educational theory. It defines a domain of the possible and then straightforwardly states what is and is not to be done within it – and why.     

近五十年来台湾地区士林哲学之研究与前瞻

根据祁尔松（Etienne Gilson）的说法,中世纪哲学,尤其是十三世纪的思想,是基督宗教哲学。本文按其在台湾发展时所袭用的名词,称之为士林哲学。士林哲学之传入中国,虽然早在利玛窦时期（1550—1610）已经开始,但真正成为学术思想之主流之一,是最近五十年来在台湾地区的发展。20世纪初士林哲学初传入台湾时,当时的思想环境,对基督宗教哲学并不十分友善,这种种情况,与中世纪的思想家,面对信仰与神学之挑战相似。当时的思想家,融合各种不同的思想派系,对柏拉图与亚理斯多德的观念,重新诠释与批判,批判与诠释是创新的基础。所以,中世纪可说是哲学的第二春,而中世纪哲学之精华,即全盛期的士林哲学。十四世纪唯名论之后,士林哲学逐步式微,于十九世纪末再兴。本文认为,士林哲学在台湾发展之过程,与其在中世纪之盛行,及十九世纪末之再兴,背景虽异但有不少相似之处,而这些相似之处,正是士林哲学之基本思想与立场。本文对台湾士林哲学之发展,从四方面探讨：（1）回到形上学之根以面对新的挑战;（2）形上学基本立场与概念之说明;（3）反思与批判;（4）未来发展之方向。本文所参考之资料,一是已发表之学术文献;其二是与学者们之正式交谈——如学术演讲、座谈会等,及非正式之谈话、访问等。     

传统儒家、道家哲学生态观比较

儒家、道家哲学生态观既有共同点,又存在差异。在生态存在论上,两者都是一种生成论世界观,强调人与自然万物的内在联系。不过,道家注重自然运化过程的自然性、一体性,儒家则强调自然运化的生命特征,肯定人与万物的差别;在生态价值论上,道家偏重“自然”的价值．强调自然运化的自然目的性和价值性,肯定人和万物的自然本性的价值。儒家则偏重“人文”价值。它强调人与社会的生存价值．肯定主体德性的价值;在生态实践观上,道家强调“自然无为”的实践原则,“自然无为”体现了对自然自组织、自协调智慧的信任。道家实践观体现在个人生活方式上具有消减性特征,强调慈爱利物、俭啬有度、知和不争。儒家强调发挥人的主体能动性,肯定主体对人与社会、人与自然关系的协调作用。在对农业生产实践的治理上。儒家强调顺应天时、因地制宜和“谨其时禁”。     

Community Science: Creating an Alternative Place to Stand?

This article comments on two emerging views of community psychologys approaches to the use of research for responding to social problems in contemporary community contexts – (a) the formation of a new field of community science, or (b) the updating of community psychology research traditions. If community science is to become established as a field related to community psychology, its proponents will need to agree upon conventions of epistemology, foci of interest, methods, and standards by which its work can be judged so that it can be distinguished from other human sciences. These articles provide early sketches for what community science might be. However, as noted in this commentary, we need to heed signs of concern about community psychologys continued relevance in public discourse regarding the analysis of and responses to social problems. While this special issue offers some promising responses to the concern of what the field can contribute, the field would be well served if we broaden our dialogue about a renewal of community psychologys commitment to social justice and the need for its perspectives in the practice of research that seeks to address community-based issues in the early 21st century.     

Ethical Instrumentalism

The present essay offers a sketch of a philosophy of value, what I shall here refer to as ‘ethical instrumentalism.’ My primary aim is to say just what this view involves and what its commitments are. In the course of doing so, I find it necessary to distinguish this view from another with which it shares a common basis and which, in reference to its most influential proponent, I refer to as ‘Humeanism.’ A second, more general, aim is to make plausible the idea that, given the common basis, ethical instrumentalism provides a more compelling picture of the philosophy of value than Humeanism does.     

Identity and moral responsibility of healthcare organizations

In this paper the moral responsibility of a Healthcare Organization (HCO) is conceived as an inextricable aspect of the identity of the HCO. We attempt to show that by exploring this relation a more profound insight in moral responsibility can be gained. Referring to Charles Taylor we explore the meaning of the concept of identity. It consists of three interdependent dimensions: a moral, a dialogical, and a narrative one. In section two we develop some additional arguments to apply his concept of personal identity to organizations. The final section works out the relationship of three dimensions of identity to some actual issues in contemporary HCOs: the tension between care and justice, the importance of dialogues about the diversity of goods, and the relevance of becoming familiar with the life-story of the HCO. Identity of an HCO is established and developed in commitments to and identification with certain goods that are central for a HCO. However, many of these goods are interwoven with everyday practices and policies. Therefore, moral responsibility asks for articulation of goods that often stay implicit and should not be reduced to a merely procedural approach. However difficult this articulation may be, if it is not tried at all HCOs run the risk of drifting away from their very identity as healthcare institutions: to offer care to patients and to do this in accordance with demands of social justice.