Moral Seriousness

“Philosophy as a way of life” has its roots in ancient ethics and has attracted renewed interest in recent decades. The aim in this paper is to construct a contemporized image of Socrates, consistent with the textual evidence. The account defers concern over analytical/theoretical inquiry into virtue, in favor of a neo-existentialist process of self-examination informed by the virtue of what is called “moral seriousness.” This process is modeled on Frankfurt’s hierarchical account of self-identification, and the paper suggests an expansion of Frankfurt’s concept of a person to include “full” personhood, in which the apprehended “meaning” of one’s “whole life” is taken as a necessary condition for eudaimonia (meaning of life) and is characterized by phenomenological transcendence. In addition, the importance of the informed scrutiny of a community of philosophers to the self-examination process is discussed.     

Creating an ethical organizational environment: The relationship between ethical leadership,ethical organizational climate,and unethical behavior

The purpose of this research is to provide a richer lens on the ethical organizational environment by examining the relationship between ethical leadership and unit-level unethical behavior through ethical organizational climate (EOC), with collective moral identity as a boundary condition. In testing our theoretical model, we first develop and validate a measure of EOC to address concerns with existing measures of ethical climate. Second, we examine the role of collective moral identity as a moderator of the relationship between EOC and unit unethical behavior. We discuss implications regarding the importance of developing a more comprehensive conceptualization of EOC.     

PHILOSOPHY AS EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION OF LIVING

This essay describes an approach to designing a course in philosophy as a way of life (PWOL) around a set of immersive “spiritual exercises” through which students might examine their desires, engaging students in a process of testing their own experience against philosophical theories and theories against their own experience. These are used to tie together the units of a course covering classical Western and Eastern philosophical traditions, and to supplement traditional philosophical analysis of texts and arguments with ways of exploring what it might be like to live as a Platonist, Stoic, or Confucian. The essay details several exercises, engages perspectives on PWOL from Pierre Hadot and John Cooper, and addresses the question of how to assess immersive exercises.     

Standard and alternative error theories about moral reasons

An error theory about moral reasons is the view that ordinary thought is committed to error, and that the alleged error is the thought that moral norms (expressing alleged moral requirements) invariably supply agents with sufficient normative reasons (for action). In this paper, I sketch two distinct ways of arguing for the error theorist's substantive conclusion that moral norms do not invariably supply agents with sufficient normative reasons. I am primarily interested in the somewhat neglected way, which I call the alternative route. A reason for this is because it seems a genuine question whether the alternative route towards the substantive conclusion need be as troubling to the moralist as the standard route. My hunch is that it is not. Though the alternative error theory denies justification from genuinely moral acts, it also does so from acts born out of self-interest or immorality. If the alternative theory is true, the moralist can at least hold on to the claim that if genuinely moral considerations fail to provide agents with reasons for action, nothing else (of the sort) does.     

Market mindset impacts moral decisions: The exposure to market relationships makes moral choices more utilitarian by means of proportional thinking

We show that exposure to market relationships increases people’s tendency to make utilitarian moral choices by means of proportional thinking—the definitional feature of the market mindset. In Experiment 1, participants primed with market relationships made more utilitarian choices in both the trolley and the footbridge dilemmas. In Experiment 2, priming market mindset led to more utilitarian moral choices and to greater focus on the proportion of survivors to victims. Experiment 3 showed that the effect of market mindset on utilitarian choices held only when the numbers of potential deaths and saved lives were clearly specified. A preregistered Experiment 4 demonstrated that the motivation to use proportional thinking mediates the relationship between market mindset and making utilitarian choices. Experiment 5, also preregistered, showed that the main effect we demonstrated is not due to suppressed emotions and that proportional thinking increases utilitarian choices as part of a broader orientation on rationality.     

The Moral Foundations of Human Rights Attitudes

Human rights are claimed to be innate and based on moral principles. Human rights attitudes have been shown to be related to political ideology, but there have been few studies investigating their relationship with morality. Using moral foundations theory, we examine whether morals can predict human rights attitudes across two studies. The first study used questionnaires to show that human rights are based exclusively on individualizing moral foundations; however, increases in individualizing and decreases in binding foundations predict increases in human rights endorsement. Moral foundations also mediated the relationship between political identification and human rights. Both individualizing and binding foundations performed a role in explaining the lower endorsement of human rights by conservatives as compared to liberals. The second study used textual analysis of newspaper articles to show that human-rights-related articles contained more moral language than other articles, in particular for the individualizing foundations. Conservative newspapers had a greater use of binding foundations in human rights articles than liberal newspapers.     

关系型人力资源管理实践对受益人利他行为的影响：基于道德补偿的视角

关系型人力资源管理实践在众多组织和机构中十分普遍,其对社会、组织及个人的负面影响也备受学者们关注,但以往研究却忽视了关系型人力资源管理实践的另一面。本文从道德补偿视角探究关系型人力资源管理实践对关系受益人利他行为的积极影响,通过4个实验研究设计对研究假设进行了验证。结果发现,关系型人力资源管理实践会促使关系受益人出于弥补而做出利他行为,关系受益人的道德自我形象和内疚情绪中介了关系型人力资源管理实践与利他行为之间的关系(研究1和2),且关系受益人与非受益同事的关系亲密度正向调节上述链式中介效应(研究3)。相比于低水平的关系亲密度,高水平关系亲密度下关系型人力资源管理实践通过道德自我形象和内疚影响利他行为的间接效应更强。本文有助于拓展关系实践的研究视角,且为企业管理者平衡关系型HRM实践的消极影响提供建议。     

Naturalizing Ethics: the Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency

Moral agency is a central feature of both religious and secular conceptions of human beings. In this paper I outline a scientific naturalistic model of moral agency making use of current findings and theories in sociobiology,developmental psychology, and social cognitive theory. The model provides answers to four central questions about moral agency: (1) what it is, (2) how it is acquired, (3) how it is put to work, and (4) how it is justified. I suggest that this model can provide religious and secular moral theories with a basis for a common understanding of moral agency.     

Genealogy of Morality and Law

In order to clarify the relationship between morality and law, it is necessary to define both concepts precisely. Cultural realities refer to concepts which are more specifically defined if we focus towards the genealogy of those realities, that is to say, their motivation, function and aim. Should we start from legal anthropology, comparative law and history of law, law arises as a social technique which coactively imposes ways of solving conflicts, protecting fundamental values for a society's co-existence. Values subject to being protected are proposed by morality, the latter making subordination of law to morality inevitable. This explains that a great number of modern constitutions include a reference to fundamental moral values, that is to say, they have explicitly positivised moral contents. Legal reasoning, at all levels and expressions, needs to appeal to the aforementioned values. Constitutional reasoning, international law, legislative activity and judicial practice are studied to verify the latter. This subordination of law to morality sets out a serious problem: moralities are cultural realities which are only valid for a specific society. In order for law not to fall in a not very rational legal relativism, law should not be subordinated to morality, but to ethics, the latter understood as cross-cultural morality. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a step forward in this sense.     

Feminist Bioethics: Where We've Been, Where We's Going

The primary contribution of feminism to bioethics is to note how imbalances of power in the sex-gender system play themselves out in medical practice and in the theory surrounding that practice. I trace the ten-year history of feminist approaches to bioethics, arguing that while feminists have usefully critiqued medicine's biases in favor of men, they have unmasked sexism primarily in the arena of women's reproductive health, leaving other areas of health care sorely in need of feminist scrutiny. I note as well that feminist bioethicists have contributed very little to bioethical theory. In the second part of the paper I suggest two future directions for feminist bioethics. The first is to expand its critique of gender bias beyond reproductive medicine, devoting attention to the same issues raised by advances in biomedical technology as are taken up by mainstream bioethicists. The second is to develop bioethical theory that is more responsive than are mainstream moral theories to the social practices that subordinate women and minority groups.