A new moral sentimentalism

This paper argues for a novel sentimentalist realist metaethical theory, according to which moral wrongness is analyzed in terms of the sentiments one has most reason to have. As opposed to standard sentimentalist views, the theory does not employ sentiments that are had in response to morally wrong action, but rather sentiments that antecedently dispose people to refrain from immoral behavior, specifically the sentiments of compassion and respect.     

Epistemic Motivation and the Structure of Moral Intuition: Dispositional Need for Closure as a Predictor of Individualizing and Binding Morality

Moral foundations theory argues that morality encompasses both group‐preserving binding concerns about in‐group loyalty, authority and purity and individualizing concerns about harm avoidance and fairness. Although studies have examined the relationship between sociopolitical attitudes and the moral foundations, the relationship between individual differences in epistemic motivation—as indexed by need for cognitive closure—and moral intuition remains unexplored. Given the role of groups in providing epistemic security, we hypothesized that the need for closure would be most strongly related to support for the foundations most central to the regulation of group ties, that is, the binding foundations as opposed to the individualizing ones. Data from three samples provided evidence for this. Unpacking this pattern, we also found that those high in need for closure endorsed all foundations, whereas those low in need for closure emphasized only the individualizing ones. Finally, we found that the relationship between need for closure and the binding foundations was mediated by right‐wing authoritarianism, an orientation closely linked to a desire for the preservation of conventional in‐group morality. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology     

家庭功能对青少年道德推脱的影响:责任心与道德认同的作用

用总体家庭功能量表、青少年人格五因素问卷、道德认同问卷和道德推脱问卷对1013名青少年进行调查。结果表明:(1)家庭功能对青少年道德推脱具有显著的负向预测作用;(2)在家庭功能对青少年道德推脱的负向预测关系中,责任心起部分中介作用;(3)家庭功能通过责任心对道德推脱的间接影响随着道德认同水平的增加而减弱。     

Hypocritical Blame,Fairness, and Standing

This paper argues that hypocritical blame renders blame inappropriate. Someone should not express her blame if she is guilty of the same thing for which she is blaming others, in the absence of an admission of fault. In failing to blame herself for the same violations of norms she condemns in another, the hypocrite evinces important moral faults, which undermine her right to blame. The hypocrite refuses or culpably fails to admit her own mistakes, while at the same time demands that others admit theirs. The paper argues that this lack of reciprocity—expecting others to take morality seriously by apologizing for their faults, without one doing the same in return—is what makes hypocritical blame unfair.     

Ethical Predispositions to Violate or Obey Traffic Rules and the Mediating Role of Driving Styles

Traffic law violations are the most important determinants of traffic accidents. This study examined the influence of drivers' ethical perspective on their traffic violations and the mediating role of driving styles in these relationships. A sample of 313 drivers participated in the study. Contrary to expectations, high ethical relativism was found to be associated with fewer aggressive traffic violations. This suggests that the informal normative system that parallels the official traffic regulations is the more salient reference against which drivers usually assess the adequacy of their behaviors, highly relativistic drivers being more willing to also take into consideration the official traffic code in these appraisals. We also found significant interactions between idealism and relativism on both ordinary and aggressive violations. Idealism emerged as a predictor of these violations only in drivers low in relativism. In this group, one's concern about the harm that he/she might cause to other traffic participants induces higher traffic law abidingness. These influences of idealism were mediated by certain driving styles. Drivers' general ethical perspective fosters a specific pattern of driving styles and, consequently, the tendency to commit or to refrain from traffic violations.     

Non-Naturalist Moral Realism and the Limits of Rational Reflection

This essay develops the epistemic challenge to non-naturalist moral realism. While evolutionary considerations do not support the strongest claims made by ‘debunkers’, they do provide the basis for an inductive argument that our moral dispositions and starting beliefs are at best partially reliable. So, we need some method for separating truth from falsity. Many non-naturalists think that rational reflection can play this role. But rational reflection cannot be expected to bring us to truth even from reasonably accurate starting points. Reflection selects views that are coherent and conflict-free, yet there is no reason to think that the non-natural moral truth must be like this. Inasmuch as we seek coherent, conflict-free, ethical viewpoints, that suggests that our goal is not non-natural truth at all.     

Quality and Quantifiers

I examine three ‘anti-object’ metaphysical views: nihilism (there are no objects at all), generalism (reality is ultimately qualitative), and anti-quantificationalism (quantification over objects does not perspicuously represent the world). After setting aside nihilism, I argue that generalists should be anti-quantificationalists. Along the way, I attempt to articulate what a ‘metaphysically perspicuous’ language might even be.     

Moral injury and the priesthood of all believers1

This article proceeds from the conviction that moral injury suffered by many combat veterans is a deeply spiritual matter requiring spiritual resources for healing. The tradition of the care of souls commends itself. It takes into account that the “soul” is an expression of the whole person in all its physical, spiritual, and social realities. Moral injury affects all those dimensions of personhood or soul. Since the Reformation the care of souls has been a vocation for the ministry of the whole people of God under the theology of the priesthood of all believers. A caring community is essential to healing for many dealing with moral injury. Indeed, the veterans themselves, in sharing their stories and their pain, become part of that ministry of the priesthood of all believers and may well find healing in the meaningfulness of their mutual ministry.     

道德推脱的概念、测量及相关变量

道德推脱是指个体产生的一些特定的认知倾向, 这些认知倾向包括重新定义自己的行为使其伤害性显得更小、最大程度地减少自己在行为后果中的责任和降低对受伤目标痛苦的认同。对道德推脱的概念、测量进行了介绍, 并对其影响因素、影响后果的实证研究进行了系统性的总结。最后, 指出未来研究应该重视完善测量工具、构建道德推脱影响因素模型、强化纵向研究范式和加强道德推脱的干预研究。     

Why cannot reasons change your moral decisions? Because they are not persuasive enough: A comment on Stanley et al. (2018)

Stanley et al. (2018) found that the consideration of reasons rarely induced people to change their moral decisions. We challenged this article by assuming what caused such a null or weak effect was that the persuasiveness of reasons provided to oppose the initial decisions was not strong enough. To verify our assumption, this study used Stanley et al.’s (2018) experimental paradigm and manipulated the levels of persuasiveness of reasons. The results revealed (1) that not only strong opposing reasons but also weak affirming reasons could induce changes in moral decision-making and increase decision confidence after altering the decisions; (2) that people with a weak decision confidence tended to change their initial decisions after evaluation of reasons; and (3) that people who maintained their decisions after considering weak opposing reasons enhanced rather than reduced their decision confidence. Overall, these findings demonstrated that moral decision change was a composite outcome of the interaction among reason type, reason persuasiveness and initial decision confidence and that low-quality argumentation had a boomerang effect on moral persuasion. This study re-lifted the role of rational reasoning in moral decision-making and revising, thus posing important amendments to Stanley et al.’s (2018) findings.