全文获取类型
收费全文 | 1523篇 |
免费 | 155篇 |
国内免费 | 117篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 3篇 |
2023年 | 35篇 |
2022年 | 27篇 |
2021年 | 37篇 |
2020年 | 79篇 |
2019年 | 110篇 |
2018年 | 100篇 |
2017年 | 110篇 |
2016年 | 102篇 |
2015年 | 55篇 |
2014年 | 72篇 |
2013年 | 208篇 |
2012年 | 48篇 |
2011年 | 33篇 |
2010年 | 29篇 |
2009年 | 49篇 |
2008年 | 61篇 |
2007年 | 79篇 |
2006年 | 98篇 |
2005年 | 85篇 |
2004年 | 76篇 |
2003年 | 74篇 |
2002年 | 50篇 |
2001年 | 24篇 |
2000年 | 28篇 |
1999年 | 33篇 |
1998年 | 21篇 |
1997年 | 13篇 |
1996年 | 13篇 |
1995年 | 13篇 |
1994年 | 1篇 |
1993年 | 8篇 |
1992年 | 4篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
1990年 | 4篇 |
1989年 | 1篇 |
1988年 | 9篇 |
1987年 | 1篇 |
1980年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有1795条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
931.
Yujia Song 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2018,48(1):65-84
This paper gives a new and richer account of open-mindedness as a moral virtue. I argue that the main problem with existing accounts is that they derive the moral value of open-mindedness entirely from the epistemic role it plays in moral thought. This view is overly intellectualist. I argue that open-mindedness as a moral virtue promotes our flourishing alongside others in ways that are quite independent of its role in correcting our beliefs. I close my discussion by distinguishing open-mindedness from what some might consider its equivalent: empathy and tolerance. 相似文献
932.
Jonas Jervell Indregard 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2018,48(5):662-683
According to Kant each person has an empirical character, which is ultimately grounded in one’s free choice. The popular Causal Laws interpretation of empirical character holds that it consists of the causal laws governing our psychology. I argue that this reading has difficulties explaining moral change, the ‘gradual reformation’ of our empirical character: Causal laws cannot change and hence cannot be gradually reformed. I propose an alternative Causal Powers interpretation of empirical character, where our empirical character consists of our mind’s causal powers. The resulting picture of empirical character allows for moral change and Kantian weakness of will. 相似文献
933.
Intrigued by the possible paths that the evolution of religious capacity may have taken, the authors identify a series of six major building blocks that form a foundation for religious capacity in genus Homo. Homo neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens idaltu are examined for early signs of religious capacity. Then, after an exploration of human plasticity and why it is so important, the analysis leads to a final building block that characterizes only Homo sapiens sapiens, beginning 200,000–400,000 years ago, when all the other cognitive and neurological underpinnings gradually came together. Because the timing of cognitive evolution has become an issue, the authors identify the time periods for these building blocks based on findings from modern cognitive science, neuroscience, genomic science, the new cognitive archaeology, and traditional stones‐and‐bones archaeology. The result is a logical, and even a likely story 55–65 million years long, which leads to the evolution of religious capacity in modern human beings. 相似文献
934.
Alda Balthrop‐Lewis 《The Journal of religious ethics》2018,46(1):157-166
Cathleen Kaveny's Prophecy Without Contempt seeks to reorient the conversation among religious ethicists and political theorists about religion in public life. Rather than focus on religious speech in general, Kaveny distinguishes deliberation and indictment as forms of discourse, and she subjects indictment to ethical evaluation. She aims to constrain the public exercise of inordinate indictment, while encouraging prophetic indictment that meets the demands of justice. While the book is a much‐needed corrective, Kaveny's focus on the powerful rhetoric of prophetic indictment omits the harms that can come to the body politic from unjust silence. Such silence deserves more moral attention. 相似文献
935.
Twenty‐First‐Century Counseling Theory Development in Relation to Definitions of Free Will and Determinism
下载免费PDF全文
![点击此处可从《Journal of counseling and development : JCD》网站下载免费的PDF全文](/ch/ext_images/free.gif)
Duffy Wilks 《Journal of counseling and development : JCD》2018,96(2):213-222
This article is a continuation of Wilks's ( 2003 ) review of the development of counseling theory in relation to definitions of free will and determinism. The original review showed that theoretical synthesis was in part achieved when causal events inherent in absolute determinism were incorporated into a soft self‐determinist process. This review traces three 21st‐century challenges to self‐determinism and provides evidence supporting the inclusion of both self‐determinism and indeterminate free will in a single but asymmetrical causal model. 相似文献
936.
Danny Booth 《Philosophical Psychology》2018,31(3):431-445
In this review of Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro’s The Multiple Realization Book I look at the positive account, Modest Identity Theory, that Polger and Shapiro advance. In §2 of this review, I outline P&S’s arguments against multiple realization and summarize the view they defend, Modest Identity Theory. In §3, I consider what consequences the adoption of Modest Identity Theory might have on the ontology of psychological or mental kinds. In particular, I highlight the ontological pluralism and anti-reductionism that Polger and Shapiro endorse. Modest Identity Theory tolerates multiple taxonomies of psychological kinds, which represents an important departure from earlier versions of Identity Theory. I conclude in §4 by arguing that the way Modest Identity Theory individuates psychological kinds very closely resembles the way that those kinds are individuated by functionalism. I argue that the causal properties individuative of psychological kinds can be used to group together distinct neuroanatomical characteristics. I illustrate this by describing research into the functional connectivity of the reading network. I conclude by emphasizing the value of using empirical evidence from neuroscience and cognitive science to inform the new pluralistic ontology of psychological and mental kinds with which Modest Identity Theory is compatible. 相似文献
937.
Matt Stichter 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2016,94(3):435-448
This paper challenges a frequent objection to conceptualizing virtues as skills, which is that skills are merely capacities to act well, while virtues additionally require being properly motivated to act well. I discuss several cases that purport to show the supposed motivational difference by drawing our attention to the differing intuitions we have about virtues and skills. However, this putative difference between virtue and skill disappears when we switch our focus in the skill examples from the performance to the performer. The ends of a practice can be used to judge not only the skilfulness of a performance, but also the motivational commitment of the performer. Being virtuous requires both acting well and being properly motivated to do so, which can be captured by viewing virtues as the moral subset of skills. In claiming this, though, I resist the idea that there is no element in virtue that is not found in other skills. Virtue requires being practically wise about how practices fit into a conception of the good life, but other skills do not. I further argue that this difference doesn't undermine the ‘virtue as skill’ thesis, as it's the connection between virtues and morality that requires practical wisdom. 相似文献
938.
939.
Tomas Ekenberg 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2016,24(2):215-230
Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) holds that freedom of the will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. This condition, however, turns out to be trivially fulfilled by all rational creatures at all times. In order to clarify the necessary conditions for moral responsibility, we must look more widely at his discussion of the nature of the will and of willed action. In this paper, I examine his theory of voluntariness by clarifying his account of the sin of Satan in De casu diaboli. Anselm agrees with Augustine that the sinful act cannot be given a causal explanation in terms of a distinct preceding act of will or desire or choice. He thus rejects volitionalist accounts of Satan's sin and thus of voluntary action in general. He moves beyond his predecessor, however, in insisting on the necessity of an explanation in terms of reasons, and his theory of the dual nature of the rational will is designed to meet this demand. A comparison of Satan's case with the case of the miser of De casu diaboli 3, finally, shows that Anselm's account requires that acts of the will or ‘willings’ qualify as voluntary, a suggestion as interesting as problematic. 相似文献
940.
Xunwu Chen 《亚洲哲学》2016,26(2):166-181
This essay explores the Confucian theory of mind. Doing so, it first examines the early Confucian concept of the human mind as a substance that has both moral and cognitive functions and a universal nature. It then explores the neo-Confucian concept of the human mind, the original mind, and the relationships between the human mind and human nature, as well as between the human mind and the human body. Finally, it explores the Confucian concept of cultivation of the mind. 相似文献